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I. INTRODUCTION

The tax code is a puzzle. Whether one views it as an engaging enigma
or a ridiculous riddle, the tax code requires careful and considered
attention to fit the statutory pieces together to form a sensible picture. The
procedural pieces of the puzzle, however, are often neglected by taxwriters
and academics. Tax academics eschew procedure because it is not "real"
tax law and nontax academics tend to see it as isolated from the
mainstream of legal thought.' Such neglect is unwarranted and unwise. The

1. See generally Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mama Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 590 (1994), making a general plea for more
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ideas underlying tax administration deserve as much attention as those
underlying substantive tax provisions if the puzzle pieces are to fit. This
Article joins the small but growing number of commentators who have
begun to apply ideas from other areas of academic study, such as civil
procedure and administrative law, to tax administration, and vice versa.2
In this Article, I pursue three goals. The first is to describe and justify
the inquisitorial nature of tax administration. I offer the conception of tax
administration as two related but distinct functions: tax determination and
tax collection, both of which employ inquisitorial processes. I suggest that
the justification for the use of these processes lies in the government's
need for information to ensure that all taxpayers pay their "proper" tax and
thereby encourage voluntary compliance. My second goal is to show how
certain procedural provisions in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98) 3 reflect Congressional ignorance of the
basic inquisitorial process paradigm under which the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) has operated; the new statutes instead link to a
conception of tax administration as primarily adversarial.4 In a

interdisciplinary work and concluding:
A symbiotic relationship between tax and nontax law will deepen our tax
understanding while providing a fertile area in which to test and refine nontax
principles. Accordingly, in performing their tax legislation, administration, and
litigation functions, the relevant players must resist the notion that they bring
nothing to the table other than their special tax expertise and background. By
replacing their narrow tax lens with a panoramic perspective of the legal
landscape, the tax debate will be invigorated with nontax learning while the
special talents of tax lawyers and professors will generate insights useful to their
nontax counterparts.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptionsand
Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REv. 413 (1999) (arguing that changes in
tax procedure were a "pernicious exercise in symbolic legislation"); cf Marcus Schoenfeld, A
Critique of the Internal Revenue Service's Refusal to Disclose How It "Determined" a Tax
Deficiency, and ofthe Tax Court'sAcquiescence With This View, 33 IND. L. REV. 517 (2000) with
Leandra Lederman, Are There ProceduralDeficienciesin Tax FraudCases?: A Reply to Professor
Schoenfeld, 35 IND. L. REv. 143 (2001) (debating the conceptual and doctrinal role of the Tax Court
vis-d-vis the Service's determination of liability in fraud cases); Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing
Tax Procedure: Applying GeneralFederalLearningto Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 183 (1996) (linking practical difficulties in tax administration to the conceptual and
doctrinal confusion about notices of deficiency).
3. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). All citations to code sections are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, unless otherwise indicated.
4. It is thus beyond the scope ofthis Article to discuss those changes that introduce notions
of "equity" at odds with the traditional "turn-square-comers" approach of administrative law in
general and tax administration in particular: notably the provisions governing Offers In
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fundamental way, the so-called "reforms" of the RRA 98 are bottomed on
a paradigm in significant tension with the paradigm underlying prior law.
This tension has already created a practical uncertainty in procedural
matters and will likely create more as both the Service and the courts
struggle to execute and interpret the new laws. 5 Finally, if nothing else, I
hope to convince the reader that discussion of tax administration should
not be so much about "customer service" versus "tax enforcement" models
of administration, but should instead focus on the degree to which tax
administration should or should not be inquisitorial.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II links the viability of our
"voluntary" system of tax compliance to the Service's ability to acquire the
information necessary for a "proper" determination of tax and explains
how this ability, combined with the information asymmetry between
taxpayers and government, forms the basis for an inquisitorial system of
tax administration. Part III explains how both Congress and the courts have
indeed adopted an essentially inquisitorial system oftax determination and
collection, and how courts police the Service's administration of the tax
laws using inquisitorial logic. In so doing, Part III offers a
conceptualization of tax administration as two relatively autonomous
procedural boxes, one called "determination" and the other called
"collection." Part IV demonstrates how, beginning with the dramatic
hearings held by the Senate Finance Committee in September 1997, the
history of RRA 98 evidences not merely the taxwriters' ignorance and
misunderstanding of tax procedure but also of the underlying inquisitorial
nature of the process. As a result, RRA 98 attempts to insert provisions
grounded in adversarial logic into a scheme heretofore grounded in
inquisitorial logic: a classic case of round pegs inserted into square holes.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the puzzle pieces do not fit
well together.
Compromise, § 7122, Taxpayer Assistance Orders, § 7811, and the spousal relief provisions in
§ 6015. These ideas of equity undercut the traditional idea of a"true" tax liability in favor of a more
flexible approach where-like much else in current postmodern life where the contingency of truth
is, ironically, itself an accepted truth-tax liabilities are treated more as simply another item up for
negotiation and less as a civic responsibility. Nor do I discuss the archaic conception of taxadministration-as-face-to-face-process which runs throughout RRA 98. Tax administration is in
reality an impersonal, high-volume process carried out largely by computers and machines. RRA
98 thus creates substantial mischief in tax administration because many of its provisions are written
more for the 1863 Bureau of Internal Revenue than the current Service. Building that soapbox,
however, is not my goal in this Article.
5. For another scholar who has explored specific doctrinal tensions in the interplay of
inquisitorial and adversarial processes that exist in modem administrative law, see generally Jon
C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kajka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to
InquisitorialAdministrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997) (addressing the
appropriateness of an adversarial system issue exhaustion requirement in the Social Security
Administration's inquisitorial system of administrative claims adjudication).
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II. THE CRITICAL NEED FOR INFORMATION
Courts and commentators have long proclaimed the United States tax
system to be based on voluntary self-assessment.6 In one sense, this claim
is false. For example, despite tax protestor rhetoric,7 it is not as though
taxpayers have any legal choice in the matter: the law requires them to file
returns, report their income and deductions, calculate their taxes, and pay
any amounts owed when the return is filed.8 Congress weaves together
civil and criminal penalties to enforce these duties and leaves the ever
unpopular Service to swing the net.9
Like many cliches, however, "voluntary self-assessment" is true in a
more significant sense than it is false. The tax determination process
ultimately rests on taxpayers disclosing their financial affairs and paying
what they owe-through withholding or otherwise-without overt
government compulsion. It is "voluntary" in the same sense that stopping

6. See, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1957) ("Our system of taxation is
based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint."); Joseph J. Darby,
Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 577 (1998) ("The United States
enjoys what is quite probably the most successful tax collection system in the world. It is based on
the principle of voluntary self-assessment.").
7. See Beresford v. I.R.S., No. 00-35650, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3187, at *1-*2 (9th Cir.
Feb. 23, 2001):
Steven Beresford, Ph.D appeals pro se the district court's order dismissing his
action seeking a refund of federal income taxes, penalties, and interest and
requesting a permanent injunction. The district court properly rejected as meritless
Beresford's contention that he has no legal obligation to file or pay income taxes
because the American income tax system is based upon voluntary compliance.
Id. (footnote omitted). Many tax protestors have less formal education than Dr. Beresford.
8. E.g., §§ 6011-6012.
9. Chapter 68 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) lists forty-eight separate civil penalty
provisions. Nine of them-called "additions to the tax" and "additional amounts"--are added to
and assessed along with the amount of taxes owed. See, e.g., § 6651 (failure to file tax returns or
pay tax by return due date); § 6652 (failure to file information returns); § 6654 (failure to pay
estimated taxes); § 6662 (accuracy-related penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations which leads to an understatement of taxes owed); § 6663 (penalty for civil fraud). The
rest are denoted "assessable penalties" because they may be assessed independently of any taxes.
See, e.g., § 6672 (trust fund recovery penalty for failure to withhold and pay over trust fund taxes,
including employee income and social security (FICA) taxes); §§ 6694-6695 and 6695 (penalties
aimed at tax return preparers); §§ 6700-6701 (penalties aimed at tax shelter promoters). Chapter
75 defines twenty-seven taxpayer crimes ranging from misdemeanors to felonies and provides for
forfeiture of any property used in violation of the tax laws. See, e.g., § 7201 (felony for tax
evasion); § 7202 (felony for willful failure to pay tax); § 7203 (misdemeanor for willful failure to
file return); § 7206 (felony for making false statements or concealing material facts or property in
a variety of circumstances).
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one's car at a red light-at midnight with no traffic and no one looking-is
voluntary. It is each citizen's self-enforcement of the legal duty that keeps
both the tax and transportation systems running smoothly. With over 130
million individual returns and over 80 million other returns (not including
information returns) filed in calendar year 200 1, 0 the system depends on
the veracity, if not the kindness, of taxpayers.
It is true that, like Bentham's Panopticon, the discipline of selfreporting and payment cannot be divorced from the constant coercive
threat of discovery and the resulting civil or criminal sanctions." Most
people, however, recognize that compliance based on a desire to avoid the
penalties implicit in potential government review is far removed from
compliance based on government agents making the initial liability
decision or confiscating one's property. It is in this sense that compliance
is voluntary.
This sense of "voluntary" is best illustrated by Packard v. United
States 2 and Browne v. UnitedStates. 3 The taxpayers in both cases were
bona fide religious tax protestors who had long refused to pay some or all
of their taxes but had also made no effort to prevent the Service from
actively collecting the taxes-plus penalties of about twenty-five percent
of the taxes owed-from their bank accounts.' 4 While they did not object
to the levies, the penalties were costly and they sued to be relieved of
them. 5 They argued that since they "allowed" the continual levying of
their accounts, the imposition of penalties was unnecessary to achieve
compliance and the Service therefore violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which requires the government to use the method least
burdensome on religious exercise to accomplish its compelling purpose
(here, the collection of tax).' 6 Both courts rejected the argument that it was
less restrictive to levy on assets than to impose penalties to encourage selfassessment and payment. 7 The Browne court explained:
Allowing individuals like the plaintiffs to withhold a portion
of their due taxes would encourage chaos in that every

10. BRIAN BALKOVIC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 1136, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETRNs, PRELIMINARY DATA 2001, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 136, 137(2002), available

at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/Olinprel.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
11. See MICHELFOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTHOFTHEPRISON 200-03 (Alan

Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978) (discussing Bentham's theory and the link
between systems of punishment and internalized individual discipline).
12. 7 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1998), affd, 198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1999).
13. 22 F. Supp. 2d 309 (D. Vt. 1998), aff'd, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999).
14. Browne, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 310; Packard,7 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
15. Browne, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 310; Packard,7 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
16. Browne, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 310-11; Packard,7 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
17. Browne, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 313; Packard,7 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
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individual with an objection to a particular governmental
expenditure would be able to unilaterally impose additional,
time-consuming administrative burdens on the IRS.
Furthermore, acceptance of the plaintiffs' arguments would
encourage more governmental involvement in religious
matters in that the IRS would be required to assess the
genuineness of each tax protester's religious beliefs. Finally,
it is difficult to imagine a means of compliance with the tax
laws which is less restrictive than the voluntary compliance
to which the plaintiffs object. 8
Undergirding the entire self-assessment regime is the idea that for every
taxpayer, there exists a "true" tax liability. This idea appears in a variety
of contexts. For example, courts routinely speak of the taxpayer's "legal
duty to file true and accurate returns."' 9 The Service routinely penalizes
taxpayers for filing inaccurate returns and, when taxpayers complain that
it was their accountant's fault, courts routinely reply that "the duty of filing
accurate [tax] returns cannot be avoided by placing responsibility on a tax
return preparer."2 Likewise, taxpayers may generally choose any method
of accounting for their income, so long as that method "clearly reflects
income."'" Further, the Service follows the "basic theory

. . .

that the

taxpayer shall pay his full tax but not a penny more"22 and various Service
publications urge Service employees to find and apply only the "true
meaning" of the law.23

18. 22 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (citations omitted). The Packardcourt agreed. 7 F. Supp. 2d at 147
("[W]e see no less restrictive means [than penalties] of inducing the payment of taxes by taxpayers
.... Since the income tax system is a self-reporting and self-assessment one based on voluntary
actions, the Government cannot be compelled to resort to cumbersome methods to encourage
compliance."). For another view ofthese cases, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For Godand Country:
Taxing Conscience, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 939, 985 (1999) (arguing for establishment of a peace tax
fund to accommodate those bona fide religious tax protestors whose conscientious objections to war
prevent them from paying taxes to support military spending).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Alt, No. 1:90 CR 45, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8914, at *5 (W.D.
Mich. June 27, 1991).
20. MetraChem Corp. v. Comm'r., 88 T.C. 654, 662 (1987).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2).
22. HARRoP A. FREEMAN & NORMAN D. FREEMAN, THE TAX PRACTICE DESKBOOK 3-2
(1973).
23. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689:
At the heart of administration is interpretation of the Code. It is the responsibility
of each person in the Service, charged with the duty of interpreting the law, to try
to find the true meaning of the statutory provision and not to adopt a strained
construction in the belief that he is "protecting the revenue." The revenue is
properly protected only when we ascertain and apply the true meaning of the
statute.
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Until 1998, the idea of a true tax liability was implicit in the Service's
mission statement, which stated that"' [t]he purpose of the IRS is to collect
the proper amount of tax revenue."' 24 It is widely assumed among scholars
and policymakers that taxpayers are more willing to voluntarily comply
with a system that treats like taxpayers alike than they are when similarly
situated taxpayers are treated differently.25 The idea of a "true" tax liability
inheres in this compliance theory as well. A tax unpaid is a tax evaded. An
increased perception that others are evading taxes
can create a vicious cycle of growing disrespect for the tax
system, which undermines voluntary compliance. The IRS
has some evidence that this is happening now from Roper
surveys they commissioned in 1999 and 2001. In 1999, 87
percent of respondents said that cheating on taxes was
unacceptable; in 2001, only 76 percent. In 1999,96 percent of
respondents agreed that it is everyone's duty to pay their fair
share of taxes; in 2001,91 percent. And, in 2001, respondents
were skeptical that cheaters would be caught. A plurality of
respondents (37 percent) said that cheaters were less likely to
be audited in 2001 than in the past. Only one in three thought
the odds of detection had increased.26
The Service uses various tools to ensure that all taxpayers report and
pay their "true" tax liability, and thereby encourage voluntary compliance.
Sometimes the tools are an automated part of the incredible Spielberg-like
operations in the Service Centers where those 210 million returns were
received and processed in 2001.27 Other times they are manually operated
by Service employees in the field.28 Whether a particular compliance tool

Id. (emphasis supplied).
24. Practicesand Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., S. HRG. 105-190, at 4 (1997) [hereinafter Practices and
Procedures](statement of Sen. William Roth) (quoting the IRS's mission statement).
25. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplaybetween Norms andEnforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2003).
26. Leonard E. Burman, UrbanInstituteTestimony on Tax Fraud,Evasion, 2003 TAxNOTEs
TODAY 133-26 (July 1I, 2003) (reporting the statement of Leonard E. Burman before the House
Committee on the Budget).
27. See, e.g., infra note 29 and accompanying text.
28. For example, § 6011 and its regulations allow the Service to require taxpayers to file their
employment tax returns (Form 941) returns monthly instead of quarterly. This allows quicker
reaction to non-payment. Likewise, § 7512 allows the Service to require taxpayers to establish
special trust fund accounts in a bank and to deposit withheld taxes within two days after making
payroll. Again, this allows the Service to better monitor compliance and swiftly learn of any nonpayment.
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is wielded by Service Center computers or field agents, it runs on
information.
The need for reliable information cannot be overemphasized. For
example, one compliance tool, frequently overlooked in popular media
complaints about low audit rates, is the Service's return matching
programs.29 The Code requires third party payors to send "information
returns," such as W-2s to report wages paid,3" and a veritable forest of
1099s to report all sorts of non-wage payments, from dividend
distributions, 3 to cash paid for fish.32 The knowledge that a payor will
report payments to the Service is widely thought to be a great incentive for
a taxpayer to properly report the payments.3 3 The Service uses information
returns to monitor and enforce the duty to report all income and has
become increasingly sophisticated in doing so.34 In2001, for example, it

29. The main program is called the Information Returns Program (IRP), which matches W-2s
and 1099s against Form 1040s. Charles 0. Rossotti, GAO Testimony at JCT Hearingon Annual
Review of IRS Reform Act, 2001 TAx NOTES TODAY 90-31, at 26 (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter
Rossotti Testimony 2001] ("It is true that simply focusing on the audit rate does substantially
understate the IRS' capacity to find errors in returns, especially in certain kinds of returns.").
30. § 6051; Treas. Reg. § 31.6051.
31. § 6042; Treas. Reg. § 1.6042-2.
32. § 6050R; see also INTERNALREVENUE SERv., GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1099,
1098, 5498, AND W-2G (2003), availableat http://www.irs.gov/formspubsl
page/0,,idZ3D I 11601,00.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
33. See I TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 73-75 (Jeffrey A. Roth et al.
eds., 1989) (describing as "conventional" the view that a "taxpayer's fear of getting caught and
punished depends in part on structural characteristics of his or her financial environment that make
noncompliance more or less difficult to detect"). What economists call "transaction visibility" is
widely believed to be an important component of voluntary compliance. See Kim M. Bloomquist,
Trends as Changes in Variance: The Case of Tax Noncompliance, June 2003 IRS Research
Conference, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=l10164,00.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003). Studies show that taxpayers are consistently more likely to report not only
those income items actually subject to third-party information reporting and withholding, id., but
also those items which the taxpayers perceive as being matchable. See Alan H. Plumley, The Impact
ofthe IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance:PreliminaryEmpiricalResults (National Tax Association
95th Annual Conference on Taxation) Nov. 14, 2002, at 15 n.2 (noting that increase in third-party
information documents had little impact on increased reporting compliance because "most
taxpayers apparently assumed that the matching was always in place").
34. Compare Margaret Milner Richardson, Remarks at the 3rd Annual IRS-Weber State U.
Tax Practitioner Symposium (Sept. 22, 1993), in 1993 IRB LEXIS 407 (describing the advent of
the Automated Underreporter Program, performing computer matching of W-2's with tax returns
to find and assess more than $4 billion in discrepancies in 1992), with STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, REPORT ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY

THE IRSREFORM AND RESTRUCTURINGACT OF 1998, JCX-38-02, at 5 (2002) [hereinafter REPORT
RELATING TO THE IRS] ("In fiscal year 2001, the IRS began capturing the data from 16.8 million
K-I forms which are used to report income, credits, and deductions of partners, shareholders and
beneficiaries of passthrough entities. In 2002, the IRS will begin processing and matching K-i
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was able to verify about eighty percent of reported income through
matching.35 It is the information provided by the third party payors that
fuels these particular compliance tools. 36 Matching programs, however, can
generally only monitor income items.37 It is only by reviewing the entire
return that the Service can monitor deduction items and credits to ensure
that taxpayers are correctly reporting their transactions. 3
Audits are perhaps the most notorious compliance tool. Here, the need
for information is both more and less obvious. Obviously, the examining
revenue agent needs information about the taxpayer's relevant transactions
and financial accounts. Less obviously, however, the revenue agent may
need to evaluate both the taxpayer's state of mind during or prior to the
transactions, and the taxpayer's relationship with other parties to the
transaction. State of mind can be important to determine whether a
transaction had a bona fide business purpose apart from its tax
consequences. 39 For example, whether a transaction was a hedging
transaction for purposes of characterizing the resulting gain or loss as
ordinary or capital depends, in part, on whether the taxpayer entered into
the transaction "primarily" to reduce certain defined business risks.4"
Likewise, the taxpayer's relationship with other parties to the transaction

forms with individual tax returns."). The problems encountered by the Service in implementing its
K-I matching program are described in a GAO Report to the Senate Committee on Business and
Entrepreneurship. See GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIR, COMMITrEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE: CHANGES TO IRS's SCHEDULE K-I MATCHING PROGRAM

BURDENED COMPLAINT TAXPAYERS (2003).
35. See REPORT RELATING TO THE IRS, supra note 34, at 5.

36. Note, however, that § 6201(d), added in 1996, places the burden on the Service to
produce more evidence of an income item than solely a third party information return if the taxpayer
has "fully cooperated" with the Service.
37. It is also used to match some deductions, such as the home mortgage interest deduction.
Rossotti Testimony 2001, supra note 29, at 28, 29.
Document matching is not useful for verifying... gain or loss on asset sales, or
most itemized deductions. We estimate that the total personal income that cannot
be verified by document matching represented about $1.2 trillion in FY 1998, or
19.7 percent of total reported personal income. An important role of audits is to
verify these major categories of income and deductions.
Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (providing a debate
between the majority and dissent over the proper weight to be given to a taxpayers intent in
determining tax the consequence of a transaction); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478
(2000), affd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Gulig v. Comm'r, No. 01-60538, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11920 (5th Cir. June 17, 2002) (debating between the majority and dissents over role of
subjective intentions in deciding whether a family partnership was a sham).
40. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b)(c).
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is often important in determining the true nature of the transaction and,
hence, its tax consequences. Relationships help determine whether a
transaction was a bona fide loan, gift, compensation for services, or a
corporate dividend,4 ' whether to impute interest to a below market loan,42
whether a loss on a sale should be allowed,43 or how to treat the disposition
of an installment sale obligation," just to mention a few examples.
Information is thus critical in determining the proper tax, not only for the
taxpayer who initially reports the tax result, but also to the Service in
verifying the accuracy of the returns, either through automated programs
or through individualized audits.
Neither the matching programs nor audits would be effective without
a penalty regime to back them up. Penalties are one of the most critical
compliance tools. Both in theory and in practice, the Service tries to
administer penalties more to encourage upfront voluntary compliance than
to punish bad behavior. The theory finds expression in the Service's
Penalty Policy Statement:
Penalties are used to enhance voluntary compliance: Penalties
constitute one important tool of the Internal Revenue Service
in pursuing its mission of collecting the proper amount of tax
revenue at the least cost. Penalties support the Service's
mission only if penalties enhance voluntary compliance. Even
though other results such as raising of revenue, punishment,
or reimbursement of the costs of enforcement may also arise
when penalties are asserted, the Service will design,
administer and evaluate penalty programs solely on the basis
of whether they do the best possible job of encouraging
compliant conduct.4"

41. See, e.g., Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 339, 347 (1957), af'd,
261 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that a taxpayer corporation was not allowed to deduct
payments as compensation because they were disguised dividends to shareholder-employee).
42. § 7872.
43. § 267.
44. § 453(b).
45. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL POLICY STATEMENT P-1 -18,
I.R.M. 1.2.1.2 (1992). Policy Statements are published in the Internal Revenue Manual, available
on the IRS website. Go to www.irs.gov, click on "Tax Professionals," click on "Internal Revenue
Manual," and look in Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1, titled "Policies of the Internal Revenue Service."
The Policy Statements are grouped by function with the "Administrative" statements in the P-I -x
series. Notice that the part quoted in the text speaks of the Service's mission as "collecting the
proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost." The Service revised its mission statement in
response to RRA 98, taking out "collecting the proper ... tax" and putting in "helping [taxpayers]
understand and meet their tax responsibilities." I.R.M. 114.1.4.2 (1999).
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For a practical example of a penalty used to enhance compliance and
the resulting need for information to administer it, consider the
section 6698 penalty for partnerships. This penalty encourages compliance
with the return requirements for partnerships, which in turn allows the
Service to match partnership returns against partners' individual returns
using one of the automated matching program tools.4 6 Section 6698, added
to the Code in 1978, imposes a penalty against "any" partnership that fails
to file a required return, unless the failure is due to "reasonable cause. 4 7
Despite that absolute statutory "any," the Service issued a Revenue
Procedure in 1984 which basically said that partnerships of fewer than 10
individuals automatically had "reasonable cause" as long as either the
partnership or one of the partners certified that all partners had timely filed
returns that together completely reported all partnership income. 48 The
Revenue Procedure was based on language in the House Ways and Means
Committee Report that "[a]lthough these [small] partnerships may
technically be required to file partnership returns, the committee believes
that full reporting of the partnership income and deductions by each
partner is adequate and that it is reasonable not to file a partnership return
'
in this instance."49
But wait, there's more. One would think that the Revenue Procedure
relieved small partnerships of the section 6698 penalty. One would be
wrong. The reason lies in the bulk processing nature of the tax
determination procedure and the Service's need for information. Recall
that the Service processed over 210 million returns in calendar year 200 1,0
and that is not counting information returns, such as W-2s or 1099s. Until
at least 2001, Service Center computers automatically sent out a proposed
section 6698 penalty to taxpayers who reported partnership income but
whose return could not be matched with a partnership return. This resulted
in many taxpayers being assessed a section 6698 penalty who, under the
1984 Revenue Procedure, should not have been. Since the penalties were
relatively small, the taxpayers had little incentive to hire attorneys who
would then find and apply the 1984 Revenue Procedure.5 The Pacific

46. Schedule E (Form 1040), Part 11 (2002) requires individuals reporting profit or loss from
partnership distributions to disclose the partnership's Employer Identification Number (EIN). The
Service Center computers have a program that seeks to match that number with a database
containing the EINs of all partnerships that have filed returns. If the Service Center does not find
a corresponding EIN, then the Center automatically generates and mails a letter to the partner
proposing a § 6698 penalty.
47. § 6698(a).
48. Rev. Proc. 84-35, 1984-1 C.B. 509 (1984), supersedingRev. Proc. 81-11, 1981-1 C.B.
651 (1981).
49. H.R. REP. No. 95-1445, at 75 (1978).
50. BALKOVIC,supra note 10, at 137.
51. The penalty is $50 times the number of-partners in the partnership. § 6698(b).
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Northwest Citizens Advocacy Panel pointed out the problem to the local
Taxpayer Advocate and proposed a solution, which was approved in a
Service Center Advisory. 2 Similar to the Packardand Browne courts
above, the Service Center Advisory rejected as impractical the idea of
putting the burden on the Service to discover the information necessary to
apply the small partnership exception:
Requiring the Service to audit each and every partnership to
determine whether it meets the criteria set forth in revenue
procedure 84-35 before asserting the section 6698 penalty
would not only be contrary to the Code, but also
unnecessarily expensive and time consuming.
Generally, the Service does not know whether the
partnership meets the reasonable cause criteria or qualifies for
relief under Rev. Proc. 84-35 unless and until the partnership
files a return (Form 1065) or some other document with the
Service. The individual partners' income tax returns, even if
timely filed and complete, are not linked together during their
initial processing.53
At the same time, the Service Center Advisory recognized the need to
apply the section 6698 penalty appropriately.
Penalties exist to encourage voluntary compliance by
supporting the standards of behavior expected under the
Internal Revenue Code. To achieve this desired effect
penalties must be proportionate to the offense they intend to
correct, severe enough to deter noncompliance, and applied
by the Service in a consistent, accurate, and impartial manner.
See generally Penalty Policy Statement P-1-18; IRM
120.1.1.2. In addition, the taxpayers against whom the penalty
is imposed must be given an opportunity to have their interest
heard and considered.54
The resulting problem was an information problem: how could the
Service learn about small partnerships which qualified under the 1984
Revenue Procedure for relief from the section 6698 penalty? The answer
was to solicit the information from the affected partners. Thus, the Citizen
Advisory Panel proposed, and the Service Center Advisory blessed, the
idea that whenever the Service Center computers automatically generated

52. INTERNALREVENUE SERV., SERVICECENTERADVISORY, SCA 200135029 (Aug. 1,2001).

53. Id.
54. Id.
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a letter proposing the section 6698 penalty, they could also generate both
another letter explaining the Revenue Procedure exception and a form for
the taxpayer to use to give the Service the information it needed to not
apply the penalty." The Service Center Advisory suggested that the letter
contain, in part, the following language:
Under revenue procedure 84-35, some partnerships are
presumed to meet the reasonable cause standard if they meet
certain criteria. You may answer the questions on the next
page and return them to us in the envelope provided so that
we may determine whether you qualify for abatement of this
penalty under revenue procedure 84-35. Before you return the
questionnaire to us, make sure.., that each partner or his or
her representative with a power of attorney signs the
questionnaire under the penalties of perjury. 6
Just as reliable information is needed for the matching programs and
audits, it is also critical to enable the Service to apply penalties. As the
Service Center Advisory acknowledged, "penalties must be proportionate
to the offense they intend to correct."" Fbr penalties to support either
automated or manual compliance tools, the Service again needs
information, not only about the facts and circumstances ofthe transactions
relating to the return, but also about the taxpayer's intent and planning. 8
Many penalties are structured similarly to the section 6698 failure to file
penalty: the penalty is asserted merely for an act or a failure to act but
relieved if the taxpayer shows some "reasonable cause."59 With the burden
so placed, taxpayers have every incentive to provide the Service with the
information that demonstrates their "reasonable" behavior, including their
reasonable reliance on professional tax advice. 6' For these types of

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., § 6651, § 6662; see also Monahan v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 235, 257 (1997)
(finding a section 6662(b)(2) substantial understatement); ASAT, Inc. v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 147,
175 (1997) (holding that there was section 6662(b)(1) negligence or disregard); Electric & Neon,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1324, 1342 (197 1) (finding a section 6651 failure to file). The section 6672
Trust Fund Recovery Penalty is similar in that it is asserted for any intentional failure to pay trust
fund taxes, but may be relieved if the taxpayer can show the failure was unintentional. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 643 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that taxpayer's belief that
corporation was paying trust fund taxes must be reasonable under the circumstances in order to
escape application of the penalty). Note, however, that RRA 98 modified section 7491 to place the
burden of production on the Service as to penalties, for examinations started after July 22, 1998,
to certain taxpayers and under certain conditions. § 7491(c); see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
60. See, e.g., Paula Constr. Co. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 1055, 1061 (1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1345
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penalties, information about taxpayer intent is necessary only to relieve the
penalty, not to impose it.6 ' For other penalties, however, the Service bears
the burden to show not only an act of noncompliance with the law, but also
an intent to circumvent it.62 For these types of penalties, the Service
requires information about the taxpayer's intentions and state of mind to
judge whether to impose the penalty.
The chief source of information needed to ensure tax compliance is the
taxpayer. It is the taxpayer who knows what transactions have occurred
and what their state of mind was regarding those transactions. It is the
taxpayer who knows where relevant documents are located. It is the
taxpayer upon whom the Code and attendant regulations place the burden
of creating and retaining adequate documentation of transactions.63 It is
true that third parties who participate in transactions with the taxpayer are
a secondary source of information. However, to the extent that these third
parties must file various information returns, as discussed above, they must
also send a copy to the taxpayer. 64 Both commentators and courts have

(5th Cir. 1973) (stating that reliance on a qualified adviser will constitute reasonable cause only if
the taxpayer has acted in good faith and has made full disclosure of all relevant facts to the adviser).
See also INTERNAL REVENuE SERv., FIELD SERVICE ADVICE, FSA 200132029 (Aug. 10, 2001),
reviewing all facts and circumstances to conclude that
penalties should be imposed. [The taxpayer] appears to have a lax attitude about
properly following the information reporting and income reporting tax rules. Our
federal income tax system should not and cannot tolerate such a lax attitude. [The
taxpayer] apparently never attempted to comply with the reporting requirements
specifically... but instead reported as it chose and now contends that its manner
of reporting was sufficient.
61. Similarly, taxpayers can avoid the special extended six year period for the Service to audit
their return by disclosing with their return any items of income they are not reporting.
§ 6501 (e)(1)(A)(ii).
62. For example, the Service bears both the burden of production and persuasion whenever
it asserts the § 6663 fraud penalty. Bacon v. Comm'r, No. 00-3665, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21882
(3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2001). See also Conforte v. Comm'r, 692 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1982).
63. § 6001 sets forth the general rule that taxpayers "shall keep such records, render such
statements, make such returns.., as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe." Likewise,
Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) generally requires taxpayers "to keep such permanent books of account
or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income,
deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown by such person in any return of such tax
or information." Other statutes impose more specific duties. See, e.g., § 274(d) (imposing specific
substantiation requirements before certain meal and entertainment expenses may be claimed as
deductions under § 162).
64. All sections in Chapter 61 A, Part IIIB, contain a subsection generally entitled "Statements
to be furnished to person with respect to whom information is required" requiring the third party
payor to provide a copy of the information return to the taxpayer. § 6041-6050T.
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long recognized this information asymmetry as a central justification for
why the taxpayer bears the burden of proof in tax controversies:
The machinery prescribed by Congress to determine the
amount due the Government is the assessment of the
administrative agency charged with its collection. Once the
tax is assessed a rebuttable presumption arises based, in part,
on the probability of its correctness. The presumption is also
based upon considerations of public policy. First, as to the
accuracy of the amount assessed, the presumption furthers the
policy of requiring the taxpayer to meet certain bookkeeping
obligations placed upon him by the Code. It also recognizes
that the taxpayer has more readily available to him the correct
facts and figures.65
For these reasons, in order to maintain a voluntary tax reporting system,
the government must have access to enough information about the
taxpayer's transactions to monitor, verify, and enforce the law. Who
determines what is "enough" information and from what sources that
information may be obtained? It is this Article's contention that the legal
structure Congress has created and has historically adhered to allows the
Service to decide what information it needs to determine tax liabilities and
where to get it. While the discretion is not unfettered, the system has
historically contained only the slightest judicial check on what is most
accurately described as the Service's inquisitorial powers, until RRA 98.
As summarized by the Second Circuit in 1933 in approving the
enforcement of a summons against a taxpayer during the pendency of the
taxpayer's appeal before the then Board of Tax Appeals, "[n]evertheless,
we think that the Commissioner's power still persists pending the appeal.
Properly, it is not a power to procure or perpetuate evidence at all; it is
strictly inquisitorial, justifiable because all the facts are in the taxpayer's
hands."6

65. Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971). See, e.g., Leo P. Martinez,
The Summons Power andthe Limits of Theory: A Reply to ProfessorHyman, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1705,
1717-24 (1997) (describing the idea that the taxpayer and the Service should be equally restricted
in obtaining information from each other as "The Myth of the Level Playing Field"); see also
United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1 st Cir. 1973) (noting that the burden of proof serves to
bolster "the presumption of administrative regularity; the likelihood that the taxpayer will have
access to the relevant information; and the desirability of bolstering the record-keeping
requirements of the Code"); United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1965) (providing
an excellent discussion of justification for burden of proof rules on taxpayers); Church of
Scientology v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 381, 468 (1984) (placing the burden of proof on taxpayers in Tax
Court is justified by information asymmetry). See generally United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976) (discussing burden of proof rules in context of "naked" assessment).
66. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir. 1933). Accord United States v. Admin.
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III. TAX ADMINISTRATION As INQUISITORIAL PROCESS

This section explores the pre-RRA 98 legal structure. It will define
what characteristics distinguish an inquisitorial process from an adversarial
process, and examine the extent of the Service's decisional powers to
assess and collect tax liabilities and the scope of the Service's most potent
tool for gathering information-the summons-to show how, until 1998,
Congress and the courts worked together to define and expand an
inquisitorial model of tax determination by allowing the Service to be both
the evidence-gatherer and primary decision-maker regarding taxpayers'
proper tax liability.
A. InquisitorialProcessDefined
The idea of an inquisitorial tax system seems un-American. It certainly
seems counterintuitive to anyone who has been the subject of inquiry from
the Service. To taxpayers under the scrutiny of a revenue agent, a revenue
officer, or worse, a special agent, the process feels most adversarial as
taxpayers resist as best they can the unwanted intrusion into their lives.
Tax resistence is always adversarial in this respect, whether the resistence
arises from bizarre ideological misconceptions about the law, legitimate
disputes over application of the law, or practical preferences to pay more
immediately important creditors than the government.
But feelings of "us" against "them" are not the hallmark distinctions
that scholars have traditionally used to differentiate adversarial systems
from inquisitorial systems. Instead, scholars have suggested two ways in
which one can put decisional processes into the adversarial box or the
inquisitorial box, one being descriptive and the other being normative. I
Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding enforcement of summons during pendency
of Tax Court proceedings); see also Ash v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 459 (1991) (providing divergent views
within the Tax Court over whether allowing the Service to issue a summons during a pending Tax
Court appeal disadvantages the taxpayer in Tax Court); Leo P. Martinez, The Summons Power and
Tax Court Discovery: A Different Perspective, 13 VA. TAX REV. 73 1, 754 (1994) (expressing the
view that information asymmetry between the taxpayer and the Service justifies use of summons
power even during pending Tax Court review). See generally United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293,
299 (5th Cir. 1981)' (finding that the IRS' powers of investigation "have been justified and should
be liberally construed, 'because all the facts are in the taxpayer's hands"') (citing Bolich, 67 F.2d
at 895); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 175 (5th Cir. 1967) (same); Hubner v. Tucker, 245
F.2d 35, 43 n.5 (9th Cir. 1957) ("As to a taxpayer, '[it is strictly inquisitorial, justifiable because
all the facts are in the taxpayer's hands."') (citations omitted); In re Albert Lindley Lee Mem'l
Hosp., 209 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1953) (same); PAA Mgm't v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 425,
427 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); United States v. Upjohn Co., No. K77-7 Misc. CA-4, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19410, at *28 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1978) (same); United States v. Cecil E. Lucas Gen.
Contractor, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1267, 1277 (D.S.C. 1975) (same); In re Tax Liability of Norda
Essential Oil & Chemical Co., 142 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (same).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

suggest that tax administration is inquisitorial under both. That is,
descriptively, tax administration has in fact functioned as an inquisitorial
system supported by the laws and doctrines created by Congress and
courts. Further, these doctrinal developments are justified by the societal
values served by inquisitorial systems.
The key descriptive distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial
process, so far as it relates to tax determination, lies in the relation between
the decisionmaker and the evidence-gatherer. That is, who controls the
gathering and presentation of the information to the decisionmaker? 67 An
adversarial process separates the evidence-gatherer from the
decisionmaker; it relies on multiple parties in interest to gather evidence
and present it to a passive, neutral decisionmaker (either a judge or a
jury). 6' An inquisitorial process merges the two roles; it relies on a neutral

decisionmaker to gather the relevant information as part and parcel of the
decisionmaking. 69 The adversarial process stereotypically dumps a load of
evidence on the decisionmaker all at once, whereas the inquisitorial
process is stereotypically heuristic, with the decisionmaker gathering
evidence and making decisions about the issues interactively. 70 A review
of the pre-RRA 98 statutory structure, the administrative practice and the
judicial interpretations of both will demonstrate that prior to RRA 98 the
Service was responsible for (a) deciding both the tax liability and how to
collect it, and (b) gathering the evidence with which to make those
decisions.7
A key normative distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial
process has been offered in a recent article by Matthew T. King.72 King
suggests that inquisitorial systems reflect a normative preference for a "full

67. See generally John A. Langbein, The GermanAdvantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (1985) (contrasting inquisitorial model ofGerman litigation with American adversarial
model); Richard A. Posner, An EconomicApproach to the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477
(1999) (arguing that adversarial evidence-gathering ought to be, in theory, somewhat more efficient
than inquisitorial gathering). The debate over proper tax administration has generally been over a
"customer service" model versus a "tax enforcement" model. See discussion infra Part IV. Part of
this Article's purpose is to try and move the discussion oftax administration away from those terms
and towards the idea of inquisitorial and adversarial process models.
68. Posner, supra note 67, at 1488.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1495 (citing MIRJAN R. DAMAGRAV OKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997)).
Naturally, I paint here with a broad brush, and in fact do not claim that the administrative tax
determination process is solely inquisitorial, since the administrative decisionmaker may ultimately
become a litigant to compel compliance with information requests. That is the "slightest judicial
check" I mentioned before and discuss in some detail below.
71. See infra Part III.B.-C.
72. Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Searchfor Truth and the
Exclusion ofEvidence in AdversarialandInquisitorialJustice Systems, 12 INT'LLEGALPERSP. 185
(2002).
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accounting [of] what happened in a given transaction," which he calls
absolute truth ("Truth"). 73 "With the full Truth, inquisitorial systems can
then go on to dispense the exact and proper justice required . . . in a
case." 74 In contrast, adversarial systems reflect a willingness to
for Truth in favor of other values, which King calls
compromise the search
"pragmatic truth. 75 King freely admits that the "assertion that inquisitorial
justice systems champion absolute Truth, while adversarial systems prefer
a pragmatic truth is a daunting one to prove. '76 In his article, King focuses
on the rules of criminal procedure that exclude reliable but wrongly
obtained evidence.77
My study of tax administration supports King's thesis, perhaps in ways
he may not have anticipated (he was quite focused on judicial systems and
did not appear to consider the grand inquisitorial history of administrative
agencies). For my purposes, I stress that I am only looking at public law,
that is, law involving the government as a legal actor. I also use a more
specific (and less nuanced) dichotomy than King. I suggest that one value
that the American adversarial system prefers over Truth is the protection
of an individual's freedom to act without having to account to the state for
the act, and freedom from state monitoring or intervention: in short, a
sphere of individual autonomy ("Autonomy"). King suggests that the value
of Autonomy is supported, indeed justified, by a philosophical tradition in
to engage in
the United States that "stresses reliance on the individual
7
processes that yield an aggregated, societal good. 1
Neither preference is absolute in either system, of course, but each
stands in reverse relationship to the other. That is, an inquisitorial system
is more willing to sacrifice Autonomy in order to find Truth while an
adversarial system is more willing to protect Autonomy than to find
Truth.' 9 I extend King's idea further to suggest that each system also
prefers different types of checks on potential abuse of state power. An
inquisitorial system will tend to rely more on controls internal to the state
actor and an adversarial system will tend to rely on controls external to the
state actor.80
Tax administration, I suggest, is an inquisitorial system in both of the
senses I outline above. First, it is a system where the Service acts as both
73. Id.at 188.
74. Id.at 236.
75. Id. at 189.
76. Id. at 190.
77. Id.at 221-29.
78. Id.at 201. King supports this assertion with a brief review of works by Locke, Smith, von
Hayek, Jefferson, and Madison. Id. at 201-07. 1 accept his analysis and leave further scrutiny to
others.
79. Id.at 216, 232.
80. Id.at 230-35.
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the decisionmaker and the evidence-gatherer. Second, it is a system that
has historically valued Truth over Autonomy. As discussed above, it is at
least arguable that the basis for our system of voluntary compliance is the
idea of a "true" tax liability that all taxpayers report and pay. Until RRA
98, the Service's mission was to determine the "proper" tax, s" and
Congress and the courts had resolutely supported the Service's mission to
find Truth, even to the extent of some sacrifice to Autonomy. Third, I hope
to show that, until RRA 98, controls on abuses were chiefly internal and
that the courts relied on those internal controls when construing the law to
give the Service its broad powers.
B. The Service As Decisionmaker
1. Tax Determination
The Service makes the primary decision about a taxpayer's liability.
Section 6201 authorizes the Service "to make the inquiries, determinations,
and assessments of all taxes." This language nicely summarizes the tax
determination process: a process of inquiry and decisionmaking which
culminates in an assessment. Section 6203 defines the "method of
assessment" as "recording the liability of the taxpayer" in the Service's
books of account. Thus, at one level, an assessment is simply the formal
recordation of a tax liability in the Service's books. An assessment in no
way creates tax liability.82 It merely accounts for a liability, which is
"deemed... due and owing at the close of the taxable year."83
At a deeper level, however, the idea of assessment is the critical
demarcation between the tax determination and tax collection processes.
Assessments serve as the Service's administrative judgment of what taxes
a taxpayer owes the government. A properly recorded assessment is the

81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
82. See Bryan Camp, LimitationsPeriodsApplicableto GovernmentAction,in FEDERALTAX
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8-30 (Leandra Lederman & Ann Murphy eds., 2003); see also Lewis
v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932) (stating that the expiration of the assessment limitations
period without an assessment being recorded does not bar the Service from retaining payments
already received if they do not exceed the amount which could have been-but was not-properly
assessed within the limitations period); Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 502-03 (4th Cir.
1990) (rejecting a taxpayer's argument that, prior to assessment, there can be no tax liability and
therefore no "payment" of taxes); Bachner v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 125, 130-31 (1997), affd, 172
F.3d 859 (3d Cir. 1997) (taxpayer's refund claim reduced by the amount of correct tax liability,
including penalties, for that taxable year, even though tax and penalties were not assessed within
the limitations period).
83. Edelson v. Comm'r, 829 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1987).
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functional equivalent of a judgment against the taxpayer." No one has
explained why better than Justice Roberts in Bull v. United States: 5
Some machinery must be provided for applying the rule to the
facts in each taxpayer's case, in order to ascertain the amount
due. The chosen instrumentality for the purpose is an
administrative agency whose action is called an assessment.
The assessment may be a valuation of property subject to
taxation, which valuation is to be multiplied by the statutory
rate to ascertain the amount of tax. Or it may include the
calculation and fix the amount of tax payable, and
assessments of federal estate and income taxes are of this
type. Once the tax is assessed, the taxpayer will owe the
sovereign the amount when the date fixed by law for payment
arrives. Default in meeting the obligation calls for some
procedure whereby payment can be enforced. The statute
might remit the government to an action at law wherein the
taxpayer could offer such defense as he had. A judgment
against him might be collected by the levy of an execution.
But taxes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt
and certain availability an imperious need. Time out of mind,
therefore, the sovereign has resorted to more drastic means of
collection. The assessment is given the force of a judgment,
and if the amount assessed is not paid when due,
administrative officials may seize the debtor's property to
satisfy the debt. 6

84. Cohen v. Gross, 316 F.2d 521, 522-23 (3rd Cir. 1963) (stating that "assessment is a
prescribed procedure for officially recording the fact and the amount of a taxpayer's
administratively determined tax liability, with consequences somewhat similar to the reduction of
a claim to judgment").
85. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
86. Id. at 259-60. The use of the assessment as a substitute for a court judgment was clearer
prior to the 1952 reorganization of the Service. Before 1952, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (as the Service was then called) had little real control over tax collection because
the country was divided into sixty-four Collection Districts, each one headed by a politically
appointed Tax Collector. See ROBERT W. KEAN, HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE LAWS, REP. TOTHECOMM. ON WAYS ANDMEANS25-26 (1953) (reporting that Collectors
"were not amenable to control by the Bureau."). Only the Collector was authorized to summarily
collect tax liabilities through administrative means, such as by levy and setoff. United States v.
Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 979 (3d Cir. 1986), affd, 479 U.S. 442 (1987). The
Commissioner could collect taxes only through the adversary process of filing suit, which the
Collector could not do. Jenkins v. Smith, 99 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1938). That is why § 6501
provides that "no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be
begun after the expiration" of the three year limitation period. Thus, the assessment was the
mechanism by which the Commissioner issued his judgment on the proper tax liability and provided
the basis for the Collector to act.
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The goal of the Service's tax determination process, therefore, is to
create an assessment. The Service gets there via one of two paths. The
most common path is to rely on the taxpayer's return. Voluntary
compliance is the primary method by which the Service fulfills its duty to
make the "determinations and assessments" of tax.87 Due to sheer numbers,
the Service accepts the vast, vast majority of returns as filed, and has done
so at least since the World War II tax legislation "brought many millions
of people in small income groups into the fold of Federal taxpayers."88
While in the early post-war period, 49 out of 50 returns were accepted as
filed,89 today the number is more like 199 out of 200.90 Thus the most
common method of tax determination is through the taxpayer fulfilling the
statutory duty to accurately account for and pay the taxes owed.9 The
Service accepts the returns as filed and assesses the tax liabilities shown
on the returns.
This initial accounting is not final, nor should it be. The Service
generally has three years in which to review and correct returns for errors
92
resulting from both honest mistakes and attempts to game the system.
The Service sometimes has even more time; for example, if a taxpayer fails
to file a return or files a fraudulent return, the limitation period for

87. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.01 (Rev'd 2d ed. 2003).
88. HUGH C. BICKFORD, SUCCESSFULTAX PRACTICE 210, 212 (2d ed. 1952) (stating that in

normal practice, approximately one in fifty returns will actually be investigated and verified by
collectors or agents).
89. Id. at212.
90. REPORT RELATING TO THE IRS, supra note 34, at 6.
In fiscal year 2001, the audit rate increased slightly to .58 percent and the number
of returns audited increased to approximately 732,000. By contrast, the number
of returns audited in fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999 were approximately
1,519,000, 1,193,000, and 1,100,000-demonstrating a steady decline in number
of returns audited. The IRS continues to audit the 1,100 largest corporations every
year but the audit rate for all other corporations declined from 3 percent in 1992
to 1.1 percent in fiscal year 2001.
Id.
91. § 6201(a)(1) allows the Service to accept and assess the liability reported by taxpayers
on their return without having to verify every return.
92. § 6501(a).
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assessment is unlimited.9" This investigation of a return or a taxpayer is the
second path the Service takes to an assessment.
The second path is the audit path, sometimes followed by examining
the taxpayer's return and sometimes, if the taxpayer has not filed a return,
by examining the taxpayer's "lifestyle" and financial affairs to create a
return.94 As discussed above, this second method of tax determination is
a vital compliance tool. But this path to assessment is more circuitous than
direct reliance on the taxpayer. If the Service concludes that there is a
' it may not simply assess the
"deficiency in respect of any tax imposed,"95
deficiency if the tax is an income, estate, gift, or certain type of excise
tax.96 When the Service finds a deficiency in one of these types of taxes it
must, instead of assessing, send the taxpayer a "notice of deficiency"
indicating its intent to assess at the end of (generally) ninety days.9 7
Taxpayers then have (generally) ninety days to file a Tax Court petition for
a "redetermination of the deficiency," during which time the Service is
barred from assessing the deficiency.98 The Notice of Deficiency is also
called the "90-day letter" and is often thought of as the "ticket to the Tax
Court" since its primary function is to allow the taxpayer access to a prepayment forum to resolve any disputes as to the merits of the proposed
deficiency.99 A Notice of Deficiency carries the same weight and enjoys

93. § 6501(c)(l), (3). However, if a taxpayer has failed to file a tax return, the taxpayer can
reinstate the three year period by filing an untimely return, provided that the original failure to file
was not false or fraudulent. See Bennett v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 114, 123 (1958). Once the taxpayer
files a fraudulent return, however, the taxpayer may not reinstate the three year period by filing a
nonfraudulent return after the due date to "cure" the fraud. Badaracco v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386,
396 (1984). An amended return is thus treated as a supplemental return confessing error and not
as a substitute for the original return. Other longer limitations period may apply in special
circumstances. For example, the Service has six years to audit a return when a taxpayer understates
their gross income by more than twenty-five percent. § 6501(e)(l)(A).
94. §§ 6020, 7602. Prior to RRA 98 the Service had wide discretion to perform "lifestyle"
audits when it determined a taxpayer was living beyond his or her obvious means. § 7602 (1994),
amended by Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). The open-ended nature of these audits
created significant opposition among tax practitioners, taxpayers and politicians. See, e.g., Barbara
Whitaker, When the I.R.S. Agent Peeks Under the Mattress, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1996, at F8;
Stephen Moore, Remarks ofCA TO Institute at IRS RestructuringMeeting, 97 TAx NOTES TODAY
75-39 (Apr. 18, 1997).
95. § 6212.
96. § 6213. "Deficiency" is a difficult term of art confusingly defined in § 6211. Essentially,
a "deficiency" is difference between the proper tax and the tax reported by the taxpayer (or not, if
the taxpayer did not file a return). See Kurtzon v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1542, 1548 (1952) ("A similar
statement of the definition.., is the correct tax imposed, plus rebates, minus the tax on the return,
minus prior assessments.").
97. §§ 6212-6213.
98. § 6213.
99. It also serves both a pleading purpose and a notice purpose. See Lederman, "Civil "izing
Tax Procedure,supra note 2, at 192-203.
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the same judicial deference as an assessment; courts recognize it as the
expression of the Service's judgment on the proper tax.100
The Service may make its institutional determination of tax (whether
expressed as an immediate assessment or expressed as a Notice of
Deficiency) at one or both of two levels: the Examination level or the
Appeals level.' At the Examination level, when the Service employee
who has conducted the examination is finished, he or she prepares a report
and submits it to the first level manager.'0 2 If the report concludes that the
taxpayer owes more tax, then when the manager approves the report, the
Service will either (a) assess the tax, (b) send the taxpayer a Notice of
Deficiency, if the tax is not immediately assessable because it is a
"deficiency," or (c) send the taxpayer a notice that the Service intends to
send the taxpayer03a Notice of Deficiency in 30 days (typically called the
"30-day letter"). 1

Taxpayers who cannot reach agreement with the Service at the
Examination level can generally take their case to the Appeals level. " The
Office of Appeals has historically been composed of experienced former
examination agents whose mission "is to resolve tax controversies, without
litigation, on a basis that is fair and impartial to both the Government and
the taxpayer and in a manner that will enhance voluntary compliance and
public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service."'0 5 The
Office of Appeals essentially reviews the work of the examining agent; in
rare cases it may also spot and investigate new issues.'0 6 The Appeals
officer may meet with taxpayers and with Service employees, either alone
or together.'0 7 The Office of Appeals concludes its review by taking one of
several actions. First, it can send the case back to the Examination level for
more work.'0 " Second, it can reach agreement with the taxpayer as to the

100. See, e.g., Meserve Drilling Partners v. Comm'r, 152 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998)
(stating that a Notice of Deficiency is presumed to be a "determination" unless it reveals on its face
that the Service did not consider any information that related to the taxpayer who was the subject
of the Notice); Edwards v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 24 (2002) (explaining the general rule
that courts refuse to look behind a Notice of Deficiency to question the Service's motives and
procedures leading to the determination unless the Notice shows on its face that no determination
of deficiency was made).
101. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, at 10.02.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. There are significant differences between going to the Appeals after receiving the 90-day
letter and going there after receiving the 30-day letter, but those differences are beyond the scope
of this Article.
105. I.R.M. 8.1.3.2 (1998).
106. I.R.M. 8.6.1.4.2 (2001).
107. Id.

108. Id.
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unagreed issues, memorialized on a Form 870-AD. 0 9 Third, if no
agreement is reached and the Notice of Deficiency has not been issued,
then Appeals can issue the taxpayer the Notice of Deficiency ticket to the
Tax Court."0 Either way, the Office of Appeals' decision becomes the
decision of the Service.
At both the Examination and Appeals levels, the purpose remains the
same: to encourage taxpayer compliance through monitoring."'
Accordingly,
a Service representative in his/her conclusions of fact or
application of the law, shall hew to the law and the
recognized standards of legal construction. It shall be his/her
duty to determine the correct amount of the tax, with strict
impartiality as between the taxpayer and the Government, and
without favoritism or discrimination as between taxpayers."12
The procedures by which the Service selects returns for audit is beyond the
scope of this Article. 13 But to understand the inquisitorial nature of the
Service's tax determination process, it is important to understand that
Service employees are required to act "with strict impartiality as between
the taxpayer and the Government" at both the Examination and Appeals
level. "V
Because of its status as a judgment, a properly recorded assessment is
a critical procedural pre-requisite for the administrative collection of a
taxpayer's tax liability."' Only once the assessment is on the books may
the Service proceed to collect the liability through use of lien, levy, or
setoff powers and taxpayers are unable to obtainjudicial review unless and
109. I.R.M. 8.2.1.8 (1999); 8.8.1.1 (2001). See generally EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR
CLIENT BEFORE THE "NEW" IRS ch.6 (Jerome Borison ed., 2002).
110. I.R.M. 8.2.1.9 (1999).
111. I.R.M. 1.2.4.10 (1974) ("The primary objective in selecting returns for examination is to
promote the highest degree of voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers.").
112. I.R.M. 1.2.4.5 (1960).
113. See I EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT, supra note 109, ch.3.
114. I.R.M. 1.2.1.4.5 (1960).
115. A discussion of this aspect of assessment is beyond the scope of this Article. Note,
however, that a proper assessment is one of the steps necessary to create the tax lien, § 6321, and
is necessary before the Service can seize the taxpayer's property to satisfy the liability, § 6331. A
properly recorded assessment is also a necessary step ifthe Service wants to preserve the taxpayer's
liability beyond the applicable assessment limitations period. See, e.g., Illinois Masonic Home v.
Comm'r, 93 T.C. 145, 150-51 (1989) (stating that the Service cannot assess a transferee under
§ 6901 if the Service has not assessed the original taxpayer within the appropriate limitation period
because expiration of the assessment limitation period bars both the remedy of collecting the tax
and also extinguishes the liability of the taxpayer, a necessary prerequisite to the liability of a
transferee); Diamond Gardner Corp. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 875, 879 (1962) (same). That is, the
limitations period is a "statute of repose." United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 59 (1964)
(Douglas, J. dissenting) (citing 69 CONG. REC. 3852-53 (1956)).
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until they pay the assessed tax in full. 116 This is true regardless of whether
the assessment results from the liability reported on a return-prepared by
either by taxpayers or by the Service for taxpayers who fail to file' 7- -or,
after audit, from the Service's proposed adjustment, if it is either approved
by the Tax Court or uncontested by the taxpayer in that forum." 8 While in
this critical sense the Service acts as the primary decisionmaker as to the
taxpayer's liability, that is not the end of the story. For every lawyer at
some point learns the unhappy lesson that it is one thing to be owed
money, and quite another to collect it.
2. Tax Collection
In collecting the tax liability reflected in the assessment, the Service
again has a wide degree of autonomy-much more so before RRA 98 than
since-in making decisions about when and how to collect from which
sources. Before RRA 98, much to the envy of private creditors, the Service
could decide among a variety of potent administrative tools to aid
collection.' Unlike private creditors, the Service could generally collect
the tax withoutjudicial aid, choosing what assets to seize or, if the liability
were joint, which taxpayer to collect from. 2 0 Under section 6323 it could
file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien which would take priority over all but a

116. See § 6321 (lien); § 6331 (levy); § 6402 (setoff). Note that the Service takes the position
it can setoff a liability even before making an assessment, so long as it has sent out the 90-day letter,
from which the assessment is made automatically unless the taxpayer obtains a different judgment
from the Tax Court. See United States v. Helig-Meyers Co., 2003-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 50,287 (2003).
Otherwise, offset may not occur until an assessment is made. See id. Note further, that the Service
may use judicial process to collect a liability even when no assessment has been recorded. See
Camp, supra note 82, at 8-30 to 8-33 (explaining § 6501's three year period of limitation for
collection without assessment). That, of course, is adversarial process. I do not in any way claim
that tax administration is exclusively inquisitorial: taxpayers may always force the Service into
litigation in a traditional adversarial process by paying a tax in full and then suing for a refund.
§ 7422. The point here is that assessment entitles the Service to use an administrative collection
process that, as shall be seen below, was essentially inquisitorial in nature up until RRA 98. The
Supreme Court articulated the full payment rule in Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163
(1960). Note, however, that before filing suit, taxpayers must file a refund claim with the Service
to allow the Service a chance to correct its prior decision. § 7422(a). Note further that taxpayers'
burden of proof in refund cases is more difficult than in Tax Court cases. See discussion infra
Section lII.B.2.a.
117. § 6201(a)(1) (authorizing Service to assess based on the taxpayer's return); § 6020
(authorizing the Service to make return when the taxpayer does not).
118. See §§ 6211-6216 (containing the special rules for the deficiency process).
119. See generally Marilyn E. Phelan, A Summary of the Extensive CollectionPowers of the
InternalRevenue Service, 9 VA. TAX REV. 405 (1990) (providing a description on the state of the
law at that time).
120. Id. at 463-64.
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very few favored creditors.' 2 ' Under section 6331 it could seize or levy
first, then adjudicate ownership later.'22 Indeed, the Service "pursued the
administrative practice... of seizing any property found in the possession,
custody or control of the person against whom the tax had been
imposed."' 2 3 Section 7426 protected third parties whose property might be
seized by mistake by giving them a post-seizure cause of action for
wrongful levy. 124 This satisfied any
notion that constitutional due process
25
required an adversaryhearing. 1
Once the Service recorded its tax liability determination by making an
assessment, taxpayers before RRA 98 could not collaterally attack the

121. Section 6321 provides that the tax lien arises automatically after assessment, notice and
demand for payment, and a failure to pay, without any need for public notice, but section 6323(a)
provides that this "secret" lien is no good against four broad classes of creditors until public notice
is given. Once the Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed, then only a small group of creditors can
assert a higher priority. § 6323(b). See generally DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (4th
ed. 2001).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 731 (1985) (holding
that the Service could seize funds in a taxpayer's bank account even though account was jointly
held with a non-liable third party); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931) (finding that a
post-seizure hearing satisfied constitutional due process in tax collection seizures); Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). Section 633 1(a) authorizes the
Service to "levy," which § 633 1(b) defines as "distraint and seizure by any means." For reasons
unknown to me, the Service uses the terms "levy" and "seizure" differently in internal guidance
than the Code uses the terms. See I.R.M. § 5.11.1.1.2 (1999). In Service jargon, a "seizure" is what
is done to something that can be sold, usually tangible realty or personalty, while a "levy" is done
to something that cannot be sold, generally intangible property such as payments due the taxpayer
from a third party, or money. See id.That distinction is not evident from the statute or from its
history. Note that the GAO believes that the Service "differentiates between the levy of assets in
the possession of the taxpayer (referred to as "seizure") and the levy of assets, such as bank
accounts and wages, which are in the possession of third parties, such as banks or employers

(referred to as a "levy")."

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT, IMPACT OF COMPLIANCE AND COLLECTION PROGRAM DECLINES ON TAXPAYERS n.5,

GAO-02-674 (2002). The GAO gives no citation or reason for why it believes that to be the
Service's distinction. See id.
123. Matter ofCarlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 1978).
124. § 7421.
125. Phillips, 283 U.S. at 597-98. Court interpretations of § 6303 also support viewing the
assessment as a functional equivalent to a judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Chila, 871 F.2d
1015, 1018 (11 th Cir. 1989). That statute requires the Service to give the taxpayer notice and
demand for payment within sixty days of making the assessment. § 6303(a). Despite the
unambiguous and broad language, courts have restricted the statute's application to only situations
where the Service seeks to collect administratively. See, e.g., Chila, 871 F.2d at 1018. Courts
reason that the § 6303 notice serves a due process function analagous to notice pleading, so that
when the Service attempts, like any ordinary creditor, to obtain a court judgment, the § 6303 notice
becomes superfluous. Id. (agreeingwith the districtcourt that "the requirement of [6303] notice was
for the protection of a taxpayer only in case the IRS used the summary administrative remedies to
collect the tax that are available to it"), accordUnited States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d
974 (3d Cir. 1986), affd, 479 U.S. 442 (1987).
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determination during the collection process, that is, until after the tax
judged due by the Service was collected.126 There was no idea that
taxpayers were "due" an adversary hearing at this point in the process7
because their remedy was to pay the tax in full and then seek a refund.'
For example, the section 7426 remedy was not and is still not available for
taxpayers.128 Not only does section 7426(a) provide that the levy cannot be
contested by "the person against whom is assessed the tax out of which
such levy arose"'129 but section 7426(c) prevents taxpayers from using a
third party as a stalking horse by providing that the assessment on which
the levy is based "shall be conclusively presumed to be valid."'"3 It is
simply impossible to argue the validity of the Service's tax determination
in a wrongful levy context. More broadly, section 7421, commonly called
the Anti-Injunction Act, still prevents any "suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax."'' This again forces
taxpayers, and indeed "any person whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed,"' 13 2 to follow the inquisitorial process
established by the Code and33 stay out of adversarial process until the
government collects the tax.
The most significant restriction on the Service's decisionmaking came
in the 1976 G.M Leasing decision, where the Supreme Court held that
judicial approval was required before the Service could enter private
homes to search for and seize assets. 3 Even then, later developments
126. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 146 (1960).
127. Id. at 176.
128. § 7426(a)(1).
129. § 7426(a)(1).
130. § 7426(c).
131. § 7421(a).
132. § 7421(a).
133. Of course these generalities have exceptions. For example, the Supreme Court held that a
wife who paid her ex-husband's sole tax liabilities in order to free her home from the tax lien was a
"taxpayer" within the meaning of § 6511 (a)and so had standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(I) to sue
for a refund, even though it was not her tax she had paid. United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 53536 (1995). Also, the Court will not apply the Anti-Injunction Act in certain narrow circumstances, such
as when Congress has provided no alternative procedure for the party to be heard in an adversary
proceeding. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984).
134. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,358 (1977) (requiring a warrant for entry onto
private premises to seize assets, but allowing warrantless seizure of property in public areas). Note that the
G M.Leasingdecision itself reversed the prior practice ofwarrantless entries onto premises solely on the basis
ofadministrative determination. See United States v. Shriver, 645 F.2d 221, 221 (4th Cir. 198 1). Prior to G.M.
Leasing, the Court had viewed the matter solely as an issue of due process. See generally Phillips v. Comm'r,
283 U.S. 589 (1931). Indeed, it was the limitless nature of the discretion given to the Service by the levy
statute, § 6331 (a), that prompted the G.M Leasing court to impose a Fourth Amendment restriction on the
Service. 429 U.S. at 357-58 (rejecting government's argument that § 6331 contained sufficient internal
restraints on Service employees' discretion as to what property to seize, and concluding: "to give
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show that both the Court and subsequent courts recognized and deferred
to the Service's position as a decisionmaker.
First, the Court held that the Service could proceed through an exparte
proceeding in which the district court would grant a writ of entry upon a
showing of probable cause that taxpayer assets were within the premises.'35
Subsequent courts rejected taxpayer attempts to convert the writ
application process into an adversarial proceeding. For example, in United
States v. Shriver, the Fourth Circuit found a district' court to have
committed error in allowing the taxpayers to challenge the writ
application. 36
' In so doing, the circuit court implicitly grounded its decision
on the recognition of the Service as being the entity entrusted with making
the liability decision:
[T]he warrant should have issued upon the ex parte
application of the United States on behalf of the Internal
Revenue Service. The proceeding should not have been
converted into an adversary one or prolonged over a period of
years while taxes presumptively due and owing remain
uncollected.'
Second, while subsequent courts have split over the quantum of
"probable" required of the government, 3 ' both of the two groups use
inquisitorial logic to support their respective views. One group relies on
the fact that the writ of entry is sought in furtherance of an administrative
scheme of collection, implicitly relying on the Service's administrative
controls over the seizure process. 3 9 For example, internal Service guidance

the statute that reading would call its constitutionality into serious question. We therefore decline
to read it as giving carte blanche for warrantless invasions of privacy.").
135. Matter of Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
136. 645 F.2d at 222.
137. Id.; see also MatterofCarlson, 580 F.2d 1365. In fact, there is no reported case of a court
allowing the application for a writ of entry to be converted into an adversarial hearing.
138. See Erin Suzanne Enright, Comment ProbableCausefor Tax Seizure Warrants, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 210, 211 (1988) (dividing circuit courts between those which applied the "traditional
probable cause standard" of "fair probability" and those which applied a lesser standard of
administrative regularity and control over discretion of seizing agents).
139. Shriver, 645 F.2d at 222-23:
We are not unsympathetic with the district judge's concern over the possibility
that the revenue agents, after an authorized entry, might make an excessive levy.
The agents act under administrative instructions designed to protect taxpayers
from oppressively excessive levies, but they must be left with a substantial amount
of discretion, for, in advance of entry, they cannot determine the condition or the
probable value at a forced sale of personal property they will find.
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suggests that "pornographic materials or drug paraphernalia may have
significant monetary value, but public policy may dictate that this material
' 40
should not be sold by the government to satisfy a person's tax debt."'
Accordingly, some courts give the Service significant decisionmaking
powers once inside the premises and do not require a particularized
description of the property to be seized. 41
Other courts require a more particularized showing of "sufficient
specificity to enable the judge to make an independent determination of
whether probable cause exists and to prevent the agents from having
uncontrolled discretion to rummage everywhere in search of seizable items
once lawfully within the premises."' 42 This group also, however, imposes
the more particularized demands in recognition of the Service's
inquisitorial powers to gather the information upon which to base an entry:
The policy behind requiring such a heightened standard of
proof is that the government has unique access to the
information it used as a basis for its levy and.., fairness
mandates that the government come forward with substantial
evidence of the connection between the property levied upon
and the taxpayer.'43
Further, as a practical matter, both groups of courts impose similar
restrictions on the Service's discretion over which of the particular assets
'Actually found within the property it can seize. 44 Most courts, and the
Service, take the position that the writ application and order is not limited
to the items specified on the writ but, at the same time, Service employees

140. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., LITIGATION GUIDELINE MEMORANDUM, GL-40 (WRITS OF
ENTRY), in 2000 TAxNOTS TODAY 91-36 (June 27, 1996) [hereinafter LGM ON WRITS OF ENTRY].

For other administrative controls, see I.R.M. 5.10.3.5.1 (2003).
141. See, e.g., Shriver, 645 F.2d at 222-23. In In re Brown, No. C-84-651A, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21776 (D. Utah Nov. 26, 1984), the court explained:
[T]he standard for probable cause in an IRS writ of entry is not the same as for a
criminal warrant. Thus, in an application for such a writ of entry, the IRS must
establish by affidavit that: (I) it has a right to levy and seize assets of the taxpayer;
this means proper assessment, notice of assessment to the taxpayer, demand for
payment, and nonpayment, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213, 6303 and 6331; and
(2) there is probable cause to believe that there are assets which may be seized on
the premises to be entered.
142. United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original).
143. Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2000).
144. See, e.g., Matter ofStubblefield, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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must receive additional court approval to seize items that are not similar
to the ones approved by the court.'45
In a very real sense, then, the pre-RRA 98 statutory structure made the
Service the decisionmaker in both determining the tax liability and
deciding how to collect it. The former decision was made through either
an assessment or a Notice of Deficiency (issued either by the Examination
function or the Office of Appeals), both of which served the same function
as a judgment: to formally express a tax determination. If tax
determination were an adversarial system, the decisionmaker would not
engage in discovering the evidence necessary to the decision but would
instead rely upon the parties in interest both to decide what information
was relevant and to provide it. Likewise, if tax collection were an
adversarial system, the Service would be required to behave as a litigant
and seek approval from some neutral third party before it could decide
which collection tool to use. The only approval necessary, however, was
in the limited circumstances where the Service sought to enter private
premises to search for distrainable assets.
Not only did the Service act as the decisionmaker as to the
determination and collection of taxes, it also performed the role of
evidence-gatherer, determining what information it required and who
should provide it. After all, section 6201 requires the Service not just to
make a determination and assessment, but to also make the "inquiry"
necessary for the determination and assessment. Further, section 7601
authorizes the Service to "inquire after... all persons.., who may be
liable to pay any internal revenue tax." The next subpart explores the
extraordinary powers granted by both Congress and the courts that allows
the Service to gather the evidence necessary to both its tax determination
and tax collection decisionmaking processes.
C. The Service As Evidence-Gatherer
Practitioners and courts recognize that control of information flow to
the Service is critical to both determination and collection. Mostly, the
Service gathers the information it needs to determine taxes voluntarily
from taxpayers and third parties through the returns system, through
various information-sharing agreements with federal and state agencies,
through access to the vast public database of courthouse records, and
through informal requests. The heart of the Service's informationgathering authority is section 7602 which gives the Service various powers

145. Id. at 279 (holding that the Service was "entitled to an order that permits entry into the
premises of Stubblefield, Inc. and seizure of the listed items as well as other inventory, equipment,
and furnishings of a restaurant which belong to the taxpayer"); LGM ON WRITS OF ENTRY, supra
note 140.
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to aid its section 7601 "inquiry." The most potent power is that of the
summons. Even though summonses are not routinely issued, the following
analysis will focus on that aspect of this statute because it is there that the
logic of inquisition finds its fullest expression.
1. The Modern Summons Power
Subsection (a) of section 7602, entitled "Examination of books and
witnesses" provides:
(a) Authority to summon, etc. For the purpose of ascertaining
the correctness of any return, making a return where none has
been made, determining the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal
revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person,
or any person having possession, custody, or care of books
of account containing entries relating to the business of
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear
before the Secretary at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or
other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under
oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
Generally, when the Service needs information to perform its duties it
simply asks for, and usually gets, it.'46 Sometimes, however, either the
taxpayer or a third party refuses the request. In such cases, the Service can
issue a summons. The summons power is the key piece of the inquisitorial
puzzle because it defines the outer limits, the contours, of the Service's
inquisitorial power.' 47

146. See I.R.M. 25.5.1.4 (1999) (stating that an employee should first ask the taxpayer for
needed information).
147. See Martinez, supra note 66, at 742. As a practical matter, summonses are rarely issued,
for a variety of reasons. Revenue agents may believe, when faced with a recalcitrant taxpayer, that
resistance to the summons will drag the process on too long and so may be discouraged from
issuing a summons. Instead, a more typical response is to simply make an assessment based on
available information and aim high, thus forcing the taxpayer to disclose the information to the Tax
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It is not immediately obvious why the summons power is inquisitorial.
After all, it is not self-enforcing.' 48 While the summoned party has a legal
duty to respond, the Service cannot compel a response administratively.' 49
Instead, it must first petition a federal district court to enforce the
summons before the summoned party is exposed to the possibility of
punitive sanctions for failing to respond. 50 Nor is the enforcement
proceeding generally ex parte as is the application for a writ of entry,
discussed above. 5 ' Once the Service files a petition, the court issues a
show cause order to the summoned party, who then files an answer.'52 The
normal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.'53 There is the possibility
of discovery and a hearing.' 54 The enforcement order, if there is one, is an
Court in order to avoid a judgment. See William L. Raby, TCMP, Economic Reality, and the IRS
Summons Power, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 140-97 (July 19, 1995). Mr. Raby, an accountant, puts a
rather cynical spin on it when he asserts that "the normal recourse of the agent when the taxpayer
fails to cooperate is to set up an arbitrary deficiency, not to get involved with a summons and its
subsequent enforcement. The notice of deficiency usually motivates the taxpayer to come forward
with any proof that he has that it is wrong." Id.Those who were Service attorneys might dispute
the term "arbitrary" because revenue agents must still have a factual basis to assert a deficiency.
E.g., I.R.M., 25.5.1.4 (1999); I.R.M., 25.5.4.4.1(2) (1999). See generally Johnson, supra note 2,
at 485. There is little doubt, however, that in such situations, a revenue agent's report will contain
a bit of"water" which can then be drained in the Appeals process. Likewise, when a revenue officer
who is trying to collect a tax wants to know whether a third party is holding assets of the taxpayer,
it is often easier to issue a levy than a summons. A levy will catch the assets, if any, while a
summons simply gives the taxpayer an opportunity to move them.
148. Courts hold that compliance is voluntary and not compelled until the Service obtains a
court order. E.g., Vaughn v. Baldwin, 950 F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe administrative
summons issued to the plaintiff in this case did not make the production legally compulsory, and
because the government's right to possession stemmed from the owner's consent, the government
had no right to possession after consent was withdrawn."); Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1288
(5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, C.J., concurring) (stating that absent court intervention, a taxpayer's
production of documents in response to a summons is voluntary); see also United States v. Peters,
153 F.3d 445, 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the summoned party's compliance with a
summons was a voluntary act such that evidence so turned over was not eligible for suppression as
having been obtained by compulsion). But see Backer v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d 141, 143-44 (5th Cir.
1960) (determining that certain rights granted by 12 U.S.C. § 555 to "a person compelled to submit
data or evidence" to a government agency applied to a person appearing in response to a tax
summons).
149. See § 7604(b).
150. § 7604. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 756 (1983).
151. Backer, 275 F.2d at 143.
152. United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1975) (explaining procedure
generally adopted by courts). Note too that before the Service may petition for enforcement of
summons where the taxpayers are unknown "John Does," the Service must first obtain court
approval even to issue the summons, through an ex parte proceeding governed by § 7609(f). See
discussion in Part III.C.3.b.ii.
153. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1970).
154. See United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (remanding
to district court for further findings, including possible discovery); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d
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appealable final order without resjudicataeffect.' In short, a summons
enforcement procedure in district court looks like a Typical Adversarial
Process where the court decides, on the basis of evidence presented by the
parties in interest, what information6 the Service may use in its tax
determination or collection process. 11
In spite of these attributes, the judiciary has long recognized that while
"the government's power lies not in the fashion of the Courts of the Star
Chamber and the High Commission," nonetheless "the investigative power
of the Internal Revenue Service is fundamentally inquisitorial... in its
ability to invade, in a civilized manner, the personality and privacy of
every citizen in the United States.""' Therefore, even though summons
526,543-44(7th Cir. 1981) (establishing discovery standards for the 7th Circuit); United States v.
Stuckey, 646 F.2d 1369, 1372-76 (9th Cir. 1981) (collecting case law); United States v. Genser,
595 F.2d 146, 152 (3rd Cir. 1979) (stating that the court will not grant discovery as a matter of
course, but may permit it after an evidentiary hearing).
155. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13, 15 (1992) (finding that
compliance with summons enforcement order did not moot circuit court's jurisdiction to hear
appeal).
156. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1964) (holding that proceeding for the
enforcement of a summons issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under § 7602 is "an
adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons").
157. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 395, 414 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (reversing the circuit court's
refusal to enforce a summons). See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir.
1969) ("Taxpayer in his brief characterized the Government's efforts as a 'fishing expedition.' If
so, the Secretary or his delegate has been specifically licensed to fish by § 7602."); United States
v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967):
We think the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate the
records and affairs of taxpayers is greater than that of a party in civil litigation. His
power has been characterized by this court as an inquisitorial power, analogous
to that of the grand jury and one which should be liberally construed.
Id.; De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963):
Clearly, [the Service] may as a general rule check to determine whether a return
should have been filed where one was not, or whether more tax was due than was
actually paid, without first.showing that there was probable cause, or any cause at
all, to believe that these things were true.
Id.; Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir. 1933) (holding that Service could exercise summons
power even during taxpayer's appeal to Board of Tax Appeals (later the Tax Court) because "it is
not a power to procure or perpetuate evidence at all; it is strictly inquisitorial, justifiable because
all the facts are in the taxpayer's hands"); Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844, 849 (8th Cir.
1929) ("[Tlhe power of the Commissioner... to examine corporate books and papers is analogous
to the power of the federal grand juries.., and ...the fact that the corporation whose books and
papers are required to be produced is not under investigation is immaterial."); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 295 F. 142, 144 (S.D. Ala. 1924) ("It is monstrous... to say that... the
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enforcement requires judicial review, "it is for the agency, and not the
taxpayer, to determine the course and conduct of an audit, and 'the
judiciary should not go beyond the requirements of the statute and force
IRS to litigate the reasonableness of its investigative procedures.'"""58 It is
this freedom to be "unreasonable" in its demands for evidence that makes
the Service's power inquisitorial. As discussed further below, the putative
adversarial nature of the summons enforcement proceeding is more a lickand-a-promise than a substantive check on the Service's power to
determine what information it needs and how much information is enough
to determine or collect a tax liability. While statistics certainly do not tell
the whole story, it is nonetheless significant that in the reported outcomes
of 201 summons enforcement cases during five calendar years, district
courts apparently completely quashed only 1 and partially enforced only
14 others; that is, only about 1 out of 200 times did courts actually overturn
the Service's evidence-gathering decision.59

government could not inquire as to the moneys of its citizens who owe income taxes, and trace
these moneys through its various agencies, such as national banks, in order to ascertain the correct
income tax that is owing by the citizen."); In re Phillips, 19 F. Cas. 506, 507 (D. Va. 1869) (No.
11,097) ("The objection that the inquiries are inquisitorial in their character is too vague ....It
would, if allowed, defeat all efforts to detect every... conspiracy to defraud the treasury, and the
government would be compelled to surrender to its worst and most unscrupulous enemies.").
158. United States v. Norwest Corp., 116 F.3d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
159. LEXIS searches on file with the author. The years were picked at random. I do not, of
course, argue that the availability of court review has zero influence on Service decisions on what
information to ask for, but the discussion in the text suggests that such influence is minimal. The
Service does not make public the number of summons issued, but does report that for FY2002, it
examined just under 827,000 returns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., 2002 IRS DATA BOOK, Table 12
(2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Assuming the 827,000
is a reasonable number for a given calendar year as well as fiscal year, then even if the Service
issues summons in only one percent of the examinations, that is still some 8,000 summonses per
year. Thus, that only 44 summons went to court is a pretty small percent on almost any assumption.
Nor does there appear to be much difference in enforcement statistics pre- and post-RRA 98, as the
following table shows:
1995

1996

1997

2000

2002

Total

Enforcement granted

48

39

35

26

38

186

Enforcement granted in part, denied
in part

5

2

0

1

6

14

Enforcement denied

1

0

0

0

0

1

Total Number of Petitions to
Enforce/Quash

54

41

35

27

44

201
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A close review of how the requirements of the statute have changed
over time and how courts have interpreted serves two purposes. First, it
delineates more clearly the inquisitorial contours ofthe Service's summons
power. Disagreement over its history has led to disagreement within the
Supreme Court over its proper interpretation. 61 Second, it illustrates the
interpretive tradition that courts have created in making sense of the
summons power. Regardless of general theories of statutory interpretation,
when faced with new challenges, courts have drawn upon an interpretive
tradition of this statute, which one might call an enabling tradition.' 6' In
that sense, the history of the statute demonstrates the practical reasoning
that courts actually use to settle controversies and,
as I shall demonstrate,
62
that reasoning resounds with inquisitorial logic.

2. The Inquisitorial History of the Summons Power
This subsection examines the history of the summons power to
demonstrate how it evolved from a conditional power in its first
manifestation, to a general unconditioned power by 1954. While this
history is part of the broader story of the development of modem
administrative law, it is uniquely tied to the statute codified as
section 7602 in 1954. This subsection first looks at how Congress put two
different summons powers into the tax law between the Civil War and the
1877 Revised Statutes: one narrow and conditional, and one broad and
unconditional. It then looks at how, between 1877 and 1954, Congress
inadvertently abolished the broad summons power, how the broad
summons power came to be reinserted by the 1939 codifiers and eventually
became section 7602. During both these time periods the subsection will
explore how courts struggled to fit the summons power within adversarial
process traditions but had not settled on any uniform logic in delineating
the scope of the summons authority.

160. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 156 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The
Court today completely obliterates the historic distinction between the general duties of the IRS,
summarized in § 7601, and the limited purposes for which a summons may issue, specified in
§ 7602."). Actually, this Article suggests that the majority's reading is more consistent with the
statutory history. See id at 148-5 1. Justice Stewart failed to consider the entire history, going no
further back than § 3172 of the Revised Statutes of 1874 and apparently not realizing that the
summons power was indeed enacted to reinforce the duty to inquire, being derived originally from
§ 14 of the 1864 Revenue Act, discussed below, which was created to enforce the duty to "inquire"
found in § 12 of the same Act. Id.at 154 n. 1. See Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §§ 12, 14, 13 stat.
223 (1864).
161. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Influence of History on Procedure: Volumes of
Logic, Scant Pages of History, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 803 (1989) (arguing for greater use of history in
analyzing procedural statutes).
162. For a modem explanation of a theory ofstatutory interpretation as "practical reasoning,"
see generally WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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a. Civil War to the Revised Statutes
The summons story starts with a lacuna. In response to the huge
demands for revenue created by the Civil War, Congress passed the
Revenue Act of 1862.163 The 1862 Act was an unprecedented, radical
assertion of the federal government's taxing powers. Because of its size,
scope and complexity it has been called "the foundation of the present
internal revenue system."'" It reached all manner of occupations,
industries-even incomes. 65 The Act divided the country into separate
districts, authorized the President to appoint an assessor and collector for
each and authorized each assessor and collector to appoint assistant
assessors and deputy collectors, who did all the work. 166 The assessor was
and returns to determine the tax; the collector was to
to gather the lists
67
tax.
the
collect
The 1862 Act contained no summons powers. The focus of the Act was
on the traditional sources of revenue for the Federal government-property
(notably liquor) and licenses-so the procedures centered on obtaining
accurate lists of property subject to taxation and assigning a proper value
to that property.168 Section 7 required most classes of persons subject to tax
to file some type of list or return and directed the assistant assessor to visit
each person to obtain the lists and verify the value personally.'69 If the
taxpayer was uncooperative or was not home, the assistant was supposed
to make up the list himself "according to the best information which he can
obtain."'70 But there was no mechanism in the 1862 Act for the assistant
assessor to require any person to produce information. Thus, while
subsections 7602(a)(1) and (a)(3) trace back to the Act of 1862, the
summons power came later.
The ancestor of current section 7602(a)(2) was born two years later in
the Revenue Act of 1864.71 Congress found it necessary to revise the 1862
163. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
164. See generally AUBREY R. MARRS, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE STATUTORY
JURISDICTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 33

(1948).
165. Revenue Act of 1862 § 39-119.
166. Revenue Act of 1862 § § 2-4. See generally EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX
435-40 (2d ed. 1914) (describing actual operation of the 1862 Act).
167. Note that this tax administration structure remained in place from 1862 until the 1952
reorganization. See KEAN REPORT, supra note 86, at 25-27. The idea of the tax determination
process as separate from the tax collection process was thus placed in the structure of the agency
at its inception. Revenue Act of 1862 § 2.
168. E.g., Revenue Act of 1862 § 9 (providing a penalty for making a fraudulent list).
169. Revenue Act of 1862 § 7.
170. §§9,11.
171. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223 (1864).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Act, not only to increase revenue (by raising rates and subjecting even
more items to taxation), but also to provide for "increased care in the
construction of the machinery of collection." 72 The "machinery" was very
much based on person-to-person contact. Thus, section 11 imposed the
duty "to make a list or return, verified by oath or affirmation, to the
assistant assessor,"' 73 who, under the authority of section 12, would
"proceed through every part of their respective districts, and inquire after
and concerning all persons.., liable to pay any duty,"' 74 and would either
receive the list or return from the taxpayer or would, under the authority of
section 13, prepare the list or return based on the taxpayer's disclosures
and consent.' If the taxpayer balked, or avoided the assistant assessor,
then and only then did section 14 give assessors the power to summons
both taxpayers and "any other person as he may deem proper" and to
require the summoned party to produce
"books of account" "relating" to
76
1
business.
or
trade
taxpayer's
the
Before the assessor could use a summons, however, the following chain
of events had to occur: a person required to make a return (a) was "absent
from his or her residence or place of business at the time an assistant
assessor shall call to receive the annual list or return," (b) was properly
notified by the assistant assessor of the requirement for a list or return, and
(c) either failed "to give such list or return within the time required" or else
gave a "list, statement, or return, which, in the opinion of the assessor, is
false or fraudulent, or contains any understatement or undervaluation.""'
Only then would it be lawful for the assessor to summon
such person, his agent, or other person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the trade or business of such person, or any other
persons as he may deem proper, to appear before such
assessor and produce such book.., and to give testimony or
answer interrogatories ... respecting any objects liable to
duty or tax as aforesaid, or the lists, statements, or returns
thereof, or any trade, business,
or profession liable to any tax
78
or license as aforesaid.'

172. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1721 (1864) (statement of Rep. Stebbins). See also
SELIGMAN, supra note 166, at 440-49.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Revenue Act of 1864 § 11.
§ 12. This language was eventually codified in §7601 of the current Code.
§ 13.
§ 14.
§ 14.
§ 14.
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Section 14 was structured into three parts. After the first part listing the
conditions precedent to exercise of the summons power, the middle part
required that a summons be served by hand.'79 The last part provided for
enforcement. 180 As enacted, the section 14 summons was not selfenforcing. Once the power were triggered and the summons served, the
assessor had to then petition a federal district court.' 81 The court would
then issue a writ of attachment against the disobedient summoned party
and once the party was brought in, the court would "proceed to a hearing
of the case, and upon such hearing the judge.., shall have power to make
such order as he shall deem proper to enforce obedience to the
requirements of the summons and punish such person for his default or
disobedience."' 8 2 There was no provision in the 1864 legislation, however,
authorizing collectors to use summons. By its terms, section 14 applied
only to assessors,not collectors.
As might be expected, most of the debates in Congress over the
enactment of the 1864 Act were over tax substance and not procedure.' 83
The scope and enforcement of the summons power, however, did occasion
some debate.' The first point of contention was over the power to issue
a summons.'85 The original House Bill was unclear on what grounds a
summons could be issued but appeared to grant both the assessor and the
assistant assessor with the power to issue a summons only whenever a
particular return was alleged by someone to be false or fraudulent. 86 The
Senate proposed to limit the summons power to the assessor but widen the
grounds for issuance to all instances in which it was the opinion of the
assessor that the return was false or contained undervaluation or

179. § 14.
180. § 14.
181. § 14.
182. § 14. In further attempt to improve the "machinery of collection," the Revenue Act of
1864 created enforcement positions other than assessor and collector. Section 4 authorized the
appointment of five "revenue agents" to "aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of frauds
upon the internal revenue, and in the enforcement of the collection thereof." Section 5 authorized
the appointment of additional "inspectors" and provided that both the inspectors and "revenue
agents aforesaid" would have "all the powers conferred upon any other officers of internal revenue
in making any examination of person, books, and premises which may be necessary in the discharge
of the duties of their office."
183. There was no debate in the House on §§ 4, 5, or 14 as originally proposed in the House
Bill (H.R. 405). Section 4 as originally proposed in the House Bill did not contain the clause "and
in the enforcement of the collection thereof." That language was added by Senate amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2438 (1864). Likewise, the House's § 5 did not contain the
phrase "and revenue agents aforesaid," which was also added by Senate amendment. Id. Both
amendments were approved by the House without comment. Id. at 2996.
184. Id.at2439-41.
185. Id.at 2440.
186. Id.
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understatements.' 87 One Congressman objected to this amendment and
asked the House to reject the amendment as violating
every idea of individual right and liberty which belongs to the
common law and to our people. The clause as amended
proposed to allow an assessor upon mere suspicion, no matter
how baseless it may be, that a party has made a false oath, to
examine into all of his private accounts, to call for his books,
and make himself master of all the business transactions of
the party....

... It allows, without any probable cause, every little petty
officer of all this number scattered through the whole country,
to take advantage of his suspicion, whether founded or
unfounded, to institute an investigation into the private affairs
of the citizen. 8 '

Despite this objection, the House approved the amendment.8 9
The second point of contention was over the method of enforcing a
summons. 9 ° The original House Bill authorized the assessor to apply for
an attachment against persons who refused to obey the summons "as for
a contempt" and then stopped. 9 ' The Senate Finance Committee proposed
to add "and for the purpose of enforcing such attachment said assessor
shall be vested with all the powers exercised by judges of the district courts
of the United States in like cases."' 19 2 Several senators objected to this
amendment, agreeing with Senator Davis' exclamation: "Why, sir, it is
clothing a pigmy with the power to wield a thunderbolt."' 93 In the end, the
Senate compromised by requiring a judge to order the arrest of a person
who refused to answer a summons and once brought before the judge, to
"make such order as he shall deem proper" to enforce the summons and
punish the miscreant.' 94 This Senate amendment was objected to in the
House where some members proposed that a court be first required to issue
a show cause order before ordering an arrest and punishment.'95 However,
the House voted down that proposal and accepted the Senate
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 2997 (statement of Rep. Brown).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (statement of Sen. Davis).
Id.at 2997.
Id.
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amendment. 96
1 In practice, some courts refused to issue an attachment and
order the arrest without first issuing a show cause order, 9 7 while other
courts had no problem with ordering the jailing of a recalcitrant taxpayer
until proper answer was made to the summons.'9 8
Congress continued to tinker with "the machinery of collection."
Section 9 of the Revenue Act of July 13, 1866 modified the procedure for
summons enforcement so that the judge, instead of making "such order as
he shall deem proper" was instructed to make "such order as he shall deem
proper, not inconsistent with the provisions of existing laws for the
punishment of contempts."' 9 9 And the assessor's summons power was
explicitly extended to any district beyond the assessor's district where the
summoned party was to be found.2°°
Section 49 of the Revenue Act of July 20, 1868 added a new summons
power. That section authorized the appointment of up to twenty-five
"supervisors of internal revenue" in as many districts whose job it was to
"see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal taxes
are faithfully executed and complied with; to aid in the prevention,
detection, and punishment of any frauds in relation thereto, and to examine
into the efficiency and conduct of all officers of internal revenue."' ' To
enable these newly created officers to perform their job, section 49 further
provided that:
for such purposes he shall have power to examine all persons,
books, papers, accounts, and premises, and to administer
oaths and to summon any person to produce books and
papers, or to appear and testify under oath before him, and to
compel a compliance with such summons in the same manner
as assessors may do.2°2
Litigation in the early 1870's highlights the difference between the
conditional section 14 summons powers and the unconditional section 49
summons powers. In Stanwood v. Green,20 3 the supervisor for the states of
Alabama and Mississippi (Stanwood) used his section 49 authority to
summons to a bank for "all books of accounts and papers containing
entries of accounts between the banking house of said J. & T. Green and

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
In re Chadwick, 5 F. Cas. 401, 402 (D. Mass. 1870) (No. 2570).
In re Phillips, 19 F. Cas. 506, 507 (D,Va. 1869) (No. 11,097).
Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 98, 102 (1866).
§ 9.
Revenue Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 49, 15 Stat. 125, 144-45 (1868).

202. § 49.
203. 22 F. Cas. 1077, 1077 (D. Miss. 1870) (No. 13,301).
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all other persons.2' °4 The bank refused. °5 When the supervisor obtained an
attachment, the bank moved to quash it, offering the court a variety of
reasons to limit the scope of the summons authority.2 0 6 First, the bank
urged the court to construe the language in section 49 "in the same way
that assessors may do" as making the supervisor's summons powers coextensive with the section 14 assessors' powers. 0 7 Since the bank had
done nothing to trigger the assessors' section 14 summons powers, the
summons was invalid. The court rejected this argument by noting that
section 49 placed the supervisor under more extensive duties than
assessors and "to enable him to perform any one or all of these duties he
is invested with these extraordinary powers, as they are termed, without
which .. . he would be unable to perform the duty assigned him."20 8

Therefore, "the [summons] powers are of a different character
altogether."209 Different duties meant different powers.
The court also rejected the idea that the supervisor was bound to tell the
bank why the supervisor wanted the summoned records, "for such a
disclosure might have defeated the very object of the examination."2 '
Finally, the court rejected the bank's argument that to construe the statute
so broadly would render it unconstitutional. 2" ' The court reasoned that
because judicial approval was required in order to enforce the summons,
Congress had "not left it to the supervisor to be the judge of the extent of
his powers in such cases." ' At the same time, the court blithely declared
that "it is not to be presumed that the supervisor would desire to inquire
into the private affairs of citizens for any other purpose than those
connected with his official duties."2 3 In other words, the Service's ability

204. Id.at 1077.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1078.
207. Id.at 1079.
208. Id. at 1078-79.
209. Id. at 1079.
210. Id. Cf In re Becker, 3 F. Cas. 20, 22 (E.D. Mo. 1875) (No. 1208) (refusing to enforce a
summons which did not recite the statutory language under which it was issued, holding "[i]t is not
necessary that the summons should state who is charged with an offence, for the work in hand is
a mere investigation, possibly to ascertain whether any offence has been committed. Still the
summons should indicate to what the proposed evidence relates. If this be not correct, and the
broadest interpretation of section 3163, as to all persons, etc., is to obtain, then even the ordinary
rules as to subpoena duces tecum for the protection of private rights are overthrown.").
211. Stanford,22 F. Cas. at 1079.
212. Id.at 1079. Supervisor Stanwood got just a little careless in a later case, when he issued
a summons in the morning to require a bank to produce its records that afternoon, but neither he
nor the summons said where to produce the records. See United States v. Fordyce, 25 F. Cas. 1143
(N.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,130). In that case, after the bank proved that the bank officers went
around town looking for Stanwood, the court discharged the contempt. Id. at 1144.
213. Stanford, 22 F. Cas. at 1079.
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to gather evidence must have a legitimate purpose, but at the same time the
court would presume a legitimate purpose.2 4
The contrasting case is In re Chadwick,which construed the section 14
summons powers of assessors.2 " In that case, the assessor had summoned
a corporation's books to aid in his determination of a shareholder's
income. 26 The first issue was procedural. Recall that Congress had
considered and rejected requiring a show cause order before a court could
enforce a summons through a writ of attachment.217 In Chadwick the
government argued that the court was bound by the statute to issue an
attachment after the government presented its case in a ex parte
proceeding. 2 8 And indeed, the statute did read "[i]t shall be the duty of
such judge.. .to hear such application, and, if satisfactory proof be made,
to issue an attachment., 219 The court rejected the argument and issued a
show cause order to the corporation to appear and defend its
noncompliance with the summons.220 In so doing, the court disregarded
both the language and history of the statute in favor of analogizing this
procedure to cases in chancery, where show cause orders were "done every
day in the circuit court in patent causes., 221 It held that it had an inherent
power to give the summoned
party an opportunity to appear in court to
222
defend against arrest.
The substantive issue was whether section 14 allowed the assessor to
summons the books and records of someone other than the taxpayer (here
a corporation) for books and records not related to the taxpayer's trade or
business (but which would certainly tend to show whether the taxpayer

214. To the same effect, see In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1869) (No. 9375),
where the Georgia supervisor issued a summons in order to aid the Virginia supervisor's
investigation of Virginia taxpayers. To arguments that the Georgia supervisor thereby exceeded
authority, the court replied "a public officer is presumed to act in obedience to his duty, until the
contrary appears." Id. at 1296. If the rationale in these cases sounds familiar, of course, it is because
that rationale eventually became the dominant rationale in summons law. See discussion infra Part
III.C.3.
215. 5 F. Cas. 401 (D. Mass. 1870) (No. 2570).
216. Id. at 402.
217. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
218. Chadwick, 5 F. Cas. at 402.
219. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226 (1864).
220. Chadwick, 5 F. Cas. at 402.
221. Id.
222. Id. The court cited to § 32 of the Judiciary Act. Id. That provision, however, just
empowers courts to cure defects of form in any paper. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 32, 1 Stat.
73, 91 (1789). A better approach might have been to cite the courts powers under the All Writs Act,
and then reason that a show cause order is simply a lesser included power to the writ of attachment.
All Writs Act, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789). The point remains, however, that by construing
the statute to permit a show cause order, the court insisted on an adversarial method and not a onesided, inquisitorial method.
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received income). The court held that the "whole scope and purpose" of
section 14 was to allow the assessor "to examine the taxpayer's
books ....

To effectuate this object, it adds agents and all other persons

having care or custody or even bare possession of the books. This is the
whole of the enactment. It is impossible to misunderstand it."' 223 The court

acknowledged that
I agree that in some cases [examining a third party's books]
might be very convenient; but I doubt whether this
convenience would make up for the very great inconvenience
which the companies and their officers must suffer ....

The

argument from convenience may fairly enough be said to be
balanced, but not so the argument from the construction of the
statute itself. There is nothing in the statute which makes
corporations partnerships or the books of a corporation the
books of the individual shareholders.... [this] only proves

that the law may to some extent, and in some cases, fail to
furnish full evidence. 224
On the one hand, this distinction between section 14 and section 49
became less important by 1877, for two reasons. First, in 1872 Congress
abolished the position of assessor and transferred his duties and powers to
the collectors, including the restricted section 14 summons power which
remained unchanged.225 Second, in 1876,226 Congress abolished the
supervisors positions transferring their internal audit duties and powers to
the Commissioner and providing that "all other powers conferred, and
duties imposed, by said section upon supervisors, are hereby conferred and
imposed upon collectors.' ' 227 Thus, both the old assessors summons powers
of section 14 and the old supervisors summons powers of section 49 were
lodged together in the collectors.
On the other hand, the distinction between the restrictive section 14
authority and the broad section 49 authority remained important because
the two sections were separately codified in the first codification of all the
laws. Called the Revised Statutes, this codification was the precursor to the
United States Code, and was made absolute law first in 1874,228 and then
by reenactment in 1877.229 Title 35 ofthe Revised Statutes covered Internal
Revenue. The codifiers split the section 14 summons powers into Revised

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Chadwick, 5 F. Cas. at 402.
Id. at 403.
Act of Dec. 24, 1872, ch. 13, § 1, 17 Stat. 401 (1873).
Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, 19 Stat. 143, 152 (1876).
Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287.
Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, § 3, 18 Stat. 113 (1874).
Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. 82, § 2, 19 Stat. 268 (1877).
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Statutes (R.S.) sections 3173, 3174 and 3175.230 Section 49 became R.S.
section 3163. What happened next illustrates the strange journey of the
inquisitorial section 49 powers, which were lost and then regained,
ultimately coming to rest as section 7602(a)(2) of the 1954 Code.
b. Revised Statutes to the 1954 Code
After enacting the Revised Statutes into law for a second time in 1877,
it took almost 50 years before Congress got its "acts" together into another
codification-this time called the U.S. Code.231 One problem with the
Revised Statutes had been that there was no mechanism for incorporating
new statutes into the Code.232 Thus by 1925 Congress had produced 23
more volumes of the Statutes At Large in which it had impliedly repealed
well over 1000 sections of the Revised Statutes.233 Included in the mass of
legislation was a long series of Revenue Acts, some of which repealed all
provisions of prior Acts and substituted new ones and some of which
repealed only parts ofprior Acts and some of which had no clear directions
either way.234
A careful tracing of the various Revenue Acts between 1877 and 1925
reveals that Congress did not significantly modify the restrictive section 14
assessor summons power that had been codified in R.S. sections 3173,

230. Section 3173 began by imposing a duty on every "person, partnership, firm, association,
or corporation made liable to any ... tax imposed by law" to make a return or a list of taxable
objects. This derived from § I1 of the 1864 Act. Although the word "any" was broad, the
procedures contemplated only the enforcement of taxation on property and licenses, since the
income tax had been allowed to expire in 1871. SELIGMAN, supra note 166, at 464 n.5. It then set
forth two proviso clauses. The first authorized the collector to make up a list or return based on
information provided by persons who had neglected to submit a required list or return. This derived
from § 13 of the 1864 Act. The second proviso imported the first part of § 14, which provided the
authority to issue summons after the proper triggering events, with only slight change in language.
Section 3174 imported the middle part of§ 14, explaining how summons were to be served. Section
3175 contained the last part of section 14, providing the method of enforcement, and made no
changes to the prior law. The "inquiry" part of§ 12 became R.S. § 3172.
231.

See Roy G. Fitzgerald, Preface to THE CODE OFTHE LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES (1926),

reprinted in 26 U.S.C.S., at vii (1934).
232. Raymond J. Cannon, Preface to UNITED STATES CODE 1934 EDMON (1935), reprinted

in 26 U.S.C.S., at v (1934); see also Consolidationand Codificationofthe Internal-RevenueLaws;
HearingBefore the Senate Committee on Finance, 76th Cong. (1939) (testimony of Colin F. Stan
and John Hanes); 74 Cong. Rec. 467-71 (1930) (statement of Rep. Fitzgerald).
233. See Cannon, supra note 232.
234. Generally, up until the revenue laws were once again consolidated into the 1939 Code,
each Revenue Act contained an "extension" provision like section 1100 of the 1926 Revenue Act:
"All administrative, special, or stamp provisions of law, including the law relating to the assessment
of taxes, so far as applicable, are hereby extended to and made a part of this Act." Act of Feb. 25,
1926, ch. 27, § 1100, 44 Stat. 110, 111 (1926).
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3174, and 3175.235 Congress did, however, abolish the broad section 49
supervisors summons power. When, in 1879, Congress authorized the
Commissioner to appoint general revenue agents to aid him,236 it amended
R.S. section 3163 by completely substituting new text for the old text.
While the new text still provided that "[e]very collector within his
collection-district and every internal-revenue agent shall see that all laws
and regulations relating to the collection of internal taxes are faithfully
executed and complied with, and shall aid in the prevention, detection, and
punishment of any frauds in relation thereto, 237 it did not provide (as the
old text did) that the collector had "power to examine all persons, books,
papers, accounts, and premises, to administer oaths, and to summon any
person to produce books and papers, or to appear and testify under oath
before him, and to compel a compliance with such summons in the same
manner as assessors may do. 238 In this way, the amendment deleted the
broad section 49 supervisors summons powers.2 39 There is no recorded
explanation for the deletion. One might suspect the reason: Congress had
abolished the assessors a few years before and had transferred their power
to the collectors, so the reference to "in the same manner as assessors may
do" would seem to be redundant. And so the summons power baby was
thrown out with the redundant reference bathwater.
The deletion ofthe section 49 summons powers did not seem to trouble
the Service. Despite the deletion, applicable Treasury Regulations
nonetheless took the position that the section 49 summons power was still
vested in the collectors. For example, the regulations in effect in 1915
provided that:
Under the provisions of section 1 of the act of August 15,
1876 (sec. 3163a, Compilation of 1911), it is [the collector's]
duty to see that all laws and regulations relating to the
collection of internal taxes are faithfully executed and
complied with, and to aid in the prevention detection, and
punishment of any frauds in relation thereto, and for such
purposes he is empowered to examine all persons, books,
papers, accounts, and premises, to administer oaths, and to

235. Congress amended R.S. § 3173 several times. Act of Mar. 1, 1879, ch. 125, § 3, 20 Stat.
327, 330 (1879) (changing return due dates); Act of Aug. 24, 1894, ch. 394, 28 Stat. 558, 558-59
(1894) (adding income tax returns); Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913) (changing
return due dates); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 1, 39 Stat. 796 (1918) (adding that
person, includes corporations, joint-stock companies or associations, or insurance companies. This
definition was eventually placed in § 7701(a)(1)).
236. Act of Mar. 1, 1879 § 12, 20 Stat. 329.
237. Act of Mar. 1, 1879, ch. 125, § 12, 20 Stat. 328.
238. Revenue Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 49, 15 Stat. 125, 144-45 (1868).
239. Act of Mar. 1, 1879 § 12, 20 Stat. 327, 328.
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summon any person to produce books and papers, or to
appear and testify, under oath, before him.24°
By 1928, the section 49 supervisors summons powers reappeared in the
laws, in a roundabout way. In 1925, after Congress again turned its
attention to codification of all federal law, it authorized the publication of
the first edition of the United States Code.24' Unlike the Revised Statutes,
it was not to be the law, but only "prima facie evidence of the law" out of
a concern that some laws had been missed.242 The organizers of the U.S.
Code, which was published in 1926, collected both the tax statutes in the
Revised Statutes and all the later laws into title 26 of the U.S. Code. Title
26 was divided into 23 Chapters. Chapter 3 concerned Assessments and
Collections. Just as the codifiers of the Revised Statutes had broken
section 14 into three statutes, so did the compilers of the 1926 Code break
the summons process into multiple sections. The main part of R.S.
section 3173, which set forth the taxpayer's duty to make returns, became
26 U.S.C. section 93. The section 3173 proviso clauses which had
incorporated the triggering events of section 14 became 26 U.S.C.
section 94, while the R.S. section 3174 provisions governing manner of
service became section 95, and the R.S. section 3175 judicial enforcement
provisions became section 96.
The broad section 49 summons power-transferred to the
Commissioner and collectors in 1876, codified as R.S. section 3163 in
1877, and then deleted in 1879-became 26 U.S.C. section 1544. Recall
that section 49 gave supervisors the "power to examine all persons, books,
papers, accounts, and premises" in fulfilling their duties, with these powers
being transferred to the collectors by the 1876 Act abolishing the
supervisors.243 In 26 U.S.C. section 1544, the compilers of the 1926 U.S.
Code simply reprinted the R.S. section 3163 version of the statute as made
applicable to collectors by the 1876 Act, and seemingly ignored the fact
that Congress had abolished this summons power in 1879.244 Thus,
section 1544 read:
Every collector within his collection district shall see that all
laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal
240. TREAS. DEP'T, REGULATIONS NO. 1, REGULATIONS CONCERNING ASSESSMENTS !5(1917).

Early regulations were much closer in tone and substance to the current I.R.M. than to current
regulations.
241. See H.R. REP.No. 76-6, at 1(1939).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 201-2 and accompanying text.
244. 26 U.S.C. § 1544 (1926). The more likely explanation is that the Codifiers recognized
that both the Service and taxpayers were acting as if the baby were still in the bathtub and that R.S.
§ 3163 was still authority.
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revenue taxes are faithfully executed and complied with, and
shall aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any
frauds in relation thereto. For such purposes, he shall have
power to examine all persons, books, papers, accounts, and
premises, to administer oaths, and to summon any person to
produce books and papers, or to appear and testify under oath
before him, and to compel compliance with such summons in
the same manner as provided in section 1515.
There was only one problem with this reincarnation of the old
section 49 supervisors summons powers in the 1926 U.S. Code: it was not
the law, or even prima facie evidence of the law. Thus, when the collector
of New York district issued a summons to Messrs. Muccini and Caplis to
appear on July 5, 1933 and "then and there testify before me in a certain
matter arising under the Internal Revenue Laws, depending before me
wherein this office is attempting to enforce collection of the income tax
liability assessed against one John M. Phillips now deceased," both the
district and circuit courts in the Second Circuit refused to enforce the
summons. 245 This is the only reported case, however, to deny enforcement
of the summons and, presumably, the Service issued, and taxpayers
complied with, many similar summons.
Thus, as matters stood in 1928, the Service's powers of inquisition were
contained in the following statutes. First, 26 U.S.C. section 94 codified the
essential summons powers of R.S. section 3173. It gave the power only to
the collectors and then only upon the occurrence of the triggering events
dating back to section 14. Second, 26 U.S.C. section 1544, which also
applied to collectors only, codified the broader powers which had been
given supervisors in section 49 of the 1868 Act and codified at R.S.
section 3163. Finally, 26 U.S.C. section 1247 gave revenue agents
examination powers-that is, the power to "examine any books, papers,
records," etc.
for the purpose of auditing a return-but not summons
246
authority.
245. Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that sections 94 and
1247 of the 1926 U.S. Code did not provide authority for the collector to issue a summons in aid
of collection and, although section 1544 of the 1934 U.S. Code would provide such authority, it
had not been enacted into law at the time the summons was issued and so provided no authority).
246. In addition to the two summons powers, the codifiers combined into 26 U.S.C. § 1247
of the 1926 Code old § 5 of the Revenue Act of 1864, which had given revenue agents and
inspectors the power to make "any examination of persons, books, and premises," ch. 173, § 5, 13
Stat. 223, 224 (1864), and Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1305, 40 Stat. 1142 (1919), which had
expanded those powers. As combined, Revenue Act of 1919, ch. 18, § 1305, 30 Stat. 1142 (1919)
read:
The Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return
or for the purpose of making a return where none has been made, is hereby
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After 1928, a different set of codifiers, led by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, began work creating a new Internal Revenue Code. In 193 0, they
published a complete substitute for title 26 of the United
States Code, containing all the law of a permanent character,
relating exclusively to internal revenue, in force on December
1, 1930. This was not a mere duplication of the old-title, for,
in addition to correcting errors and eliminating obsolete
matter, certain omitted provisions were added and the title
completely rearranged in a manner considered logical and
useful.247
The Joint Committee's version was substituted for the U.S. Code version
in 1932 and was enacted into absolute law in 1939.248
The 1939 Code revised the structure of the summons statutes. First, the
section 1247 examination powers became section 3614(a) of the 1939
codification which also added section 3614(b) to give the Commissioner
the same powers with respect to determining the liability of a transferee.249
Second, section 3615(a) of the 1939 Code used the essential summons
language from R.S. section 3173 as previously codified at section 94 of the
1926 U.S. Code, providing that:
It shall be lawful for the collector, subject to the provisions of
this section to summon any person to appear before him and
produce books at a time and place named in the summons,
and to give testimony or answer interrogatories, under oath,

authorized, by any [revenue agent or inspector] designated by him for that
purpose, to examine any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing upon the
matters required to be included in the return and may require the attendance of the
person rendering the return or of any officer or employee of such person, or the
attendance of any other person having knowledge in the premises, and may take
his testimony with reference to the matter required by law to be included in such
return, with power to administer oaths to such person or persons.
Id. Congress reenacted this statute in 1924 (Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1005, 43 Stat. 340)
and 1926 (Revenue Act of 1926 § 1104, 44 Stat. 113) and amended it in 1928 (Revenue Act of
1928 § 618, 45 Stat. 878) to substitute "officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
including the field service," for "revenue agent or inspector." While this statute did not clearly give
revenue agents a summons authority it did confirm the ability of the revenue agents to examine
certain items, although nothing more than "any books, papers, records or memoranda."
247. S. REP. No. 76-20, at 4 (1939).
248. I.R.C., pt. 1,ch. 1-48, 53 Stat. 1 (1939). Until that time, however, it was not even prima
facie evidence of the internal revenue laws. Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1934).
249. I.R.C., ch. 34, § 3615, 53 Stat. 435, 439 (1939).
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respecting
any objects or income liable to tax or the returns
thereof.259
Section 3615(b) listed four acts which would trigger the summons power,
section 3615(c) described the persons subject to the summons power,
section 3615(d) described how service was to be made, and
section 3615(e) provided for the enforcement ofthe summons. Finally, the
broad section 49 supervisors' powers which had been codified at 26 U.S.C.
section 1544 were transferred, without change in language, to section 3654
of the 1939 Code. When the 1939 Code was enacted into law, its sections
also became the sections of the U.S. Code. One finds the language of these
sections unchanged up through the 1952 edition of the U.S. Code.
The latest codification of the Internal Revenue Code was on August 16,
1954.211 The essential summons power was placed in section 7602, with
the same language as is used today. This section appears to be a
consolidation of section 3614, 3615, 3632(a) (concerning the
Commissioner's power to administer oaths) and 3654. The derivation
tables in the appendix to the codification, however, list only sections 3614,
3615(a) and 3632(a) as being incorporated into section 7602(a) and not
section 3654.252 The most reasonable reading of the codification history,
however, is that section 7602(a) incorporates the summons power
contained in section 3654 of the 1939 Code because none of the other
precursor statutes allowed the summons power to be used for collection
matters.25 3 First, the introduction to the tables contains this careful caveat:
"No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction or
intent shall be drawn or made by reason of such tables. 25 4 Thus, the
omission in the tables of section 3654 as a precursor to section 7602 does
not mean that the section was repealed or not incorporated into the 1954
Code. Second, courts did not hesitate to enforce collections summonses
250. § 3615.
251. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68A Stat. 1 (1954). While
Congress reenacted the Internal Revenue Code in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2085 (1986), it pretty much preserved the 1954 codification scheme, particularly as to the
procedural provisions in section 6000 et seq. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
SUMMARV'OF CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON HR 3838 (TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986) 79 (Comm. Print
1986) ("The conference agreement enacts into law the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. That is, the
conference agreement reenacts the provisions of the 1954 Code---as in effect on the date of
enactment of the bill-together with amendments as made by the conference agreement.").
252. I.R.C. app. Table 1(1954).
253. See Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1934) (quashing collection
summon and holding that sections 94 and 1247 of the 1926 U.S. Code did not provide authority
for the collector to issue a summons in aid of collection and, although section 1544 of the 1934
U.S. Code would provide such authority, it had not been enacted into absolute law at the time the
summons was issued and so could not provide authority).
254. I.R.C. app. Table 1 (1954).
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under the 1939 Code,255 and the drafters of the 1954 Code carefully
explained that the enactment of section 7602 "contains no material change
from existing law."256 Therefore, the best reading of the legislative history
of section 7602(a) is that it was meant to consolidate the powers given by
subsection 3614, 3615 and 3654 of the 1939 Code, which included the
powers given to supervisors by the 1868 Act. Such has been the
interpretation apparently given by the Supreme Court.25 7
Accordingly, the current information-gathering powers are contained
in Subtitle F of the Code, Chapter 78, Subchapter A, section 7601 through
7613. Sections 7601 and 7602 contain the Service's general inquisitorial
powers, which trace back to both section 12 and section 14 of the 1864
Act25 8 and, more importantly, to section 49 of the 1868 Act.2 9 The middle
part of the old section 14 found its way into current section 7603, which
instructs how the Service must serve summons, and the section 7604
provisions for the judicial enforcement of summons trace back to the last
part of section 14. No longer, however, are the old conditions prerequisite
to the section 14 summons necessary for enforcement." Section
7602(a)(2) is in effect the codification of section 49 of the 1868 Act. 6 ' As
the next subsection will discuss, courts have interpreted these provisions
since 1954 broadly using an inquisitorial logic and, until recently, to the
extent Congress has responded to such interpretations, it has been to affirm
and codify them to reinforce the inquisitorial nature of the tax
determination process.
3. The Inquisitorial Logic of Summons Opinions Since 1954
The above examination of the summons power shows its statutory
expansion from a conditional power, linked to only certain functions and
then usable only after a specified chain of events occurred, to the modem
text codified in 1954. It also showed how the evidence-gathering power
expanded from being simply an aid to tax determination to being an aid for
tax collection as well. The following discussion will show that as the
Service's use of its summons tool expanded since 1954--taking on new

255. See, e.g., Jarecki v. Whetstone, 82 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. II1. 1948), affJdsub noma. Sauber
v. Whetstone, 199 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (enforcing collection summons under § 3654).
256. See H. R. REP. 83-133, at A436 (1954); S. REP. 83-1622, at 617 (1954) (stating that "this
section corresponds to that of the House bill").
257. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310 (1978) ("Section 7602
derives assertedly without change in meaning, from corresponding and similar provisions in
§§ 3614, 3615, and 3654 of the 1939 Code.") (footnotes omitted).
258. See Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §§ 12-14, 13 Stat. 223, 225-27 (1864).
259. See Revenue Act of 1868, ch. 186, § 49, 15 Stat. 125, 144-45 (1868).
260. Compare Revenue Act of 1864 § 14, with I.R.C. §§ 7601-7603 (2000).
261. Compare Revenue Act of 1868 § 49, with I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2000).
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dimensions as it sought to investigate new and different problems in tax
compliance-so did judicial interpretation of section 7602 and related
statutes expand to accommodate the Service's increased needs for
information. Such a result was not inevitable in that the statutes could
reasonably have been construed narrowly instead of expansively. But time
and again when new issues raised the question of who would control the
information accessible to the Service, the court ultimately deferred to
Service control. To the extent Congress responded to these decisions, it
created procedural safeguards consistent with the inquisitorial process of
tax determination, such as requiring more high-level internal review of
certain summonses, or prohibiting use of summonses once another
governmental institution entered the investigation.262 Until RRA 98,
Congress imposed few substantive restrictions on what information the
Service could summons.2 63

262. Additionally, Congress 6ften explicitly excludes the Service from general restrictions
placed on government investigatory powers contained in statutes other than the Tax Code. It has,
however, sometimes restricted the Service's information-gathering powers in situations where other
policy considerations become more important than tax determination or where tax determination
is not at issue. For an example of the former situation, compare the Right to Financial Privacy Act
(RFPA), 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1978), with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18
U.S.C. § 2703 (1986). In the RFPA Congress excepted the Service from the strictures ofthat statute
as long as the Service followed the information-gathering procedures authorized by the Tax Code.
See Neece v. United States, 922 F.2d 573, 578 (10th Cir. 1990). Congress did not make any
exception in the ECPA, however. The Bankruptcy Code provides an example of limits on the
Service's summons ability where tax determination is not an issue. II U.S.C. § 362 (2002). The
strong bankruptcy policy of giving debtors "breathing room" from creditors extends to the Service.
Thus, when a person files for bankruptcy protection, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) automatically prohibits
"any act to collect.., a claim against the debtor" even by a government entity, with no exception
for the Service. Of course, this prohibition extends only to tax collection. Although the I.R.C.
permits summonses to be used for tax collection purposes as well as tax determination purposes,
the general prohibition of the Bankruptcy Code limits the scope of summons powers for tax
collection. In re Pyramid Restaurant Equip. Co., 24 B.R. 455, 456 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982)
(finding that the service violated automatic stay by issuing collections summons to corporate
Chapter 11 debtor's bank).
263. Pre-RR98 restrictions, however, were generally consistent with the inquisitorial model.
For example, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1033 (1984), Congress
added § 7611 to restrict inquiries and examinations of churches. This statute required significant
internal review, notices and conferences to the targeted church before the Service could begin either
an inquiry or an examination. Even here, however, the statute does not restrict the scope of
information which the Service could obtain; it is aimed at a particular type of examination. By
attempting to curb unnecessary church examinations, § 7611 served the same purpose as § 7605's
attempt to curb unnecessary second examinations of any taxpayer. Notably, § 7611 (e) provides that
the exclusive remedy for violation of its notice and internal review provisions is that a court stay
a summons enforcement proceeding "until the court finds that all practicable steps to correct the
noncompliance have been taken." This provision thus precludes a court from imposing an
evidentiary exclusion rule. In this way § 7611 is quite consistent with the inquisitorial model of tax
administration. In contrast, RRA 98 added § 7525 (potentially excludes from the Service's
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This subsection will illustrate the thesis that, when given a choice
between narrow and expansive interpretations of I.R.C. section 7602, the
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Service's summons powers
expansively, using inquisitorial logic. By that I mean the Court based its
decision on one or more of the following rationales: (a) an expansive
interpretation was necessary to preserve the Service's role as decisionmaker or evidence-gatherer; (b) Truth trumped Autonomy as the value
promoted by the statute; and (c) potential abuse should be or was actually
limited through internal bureaucratic controls, and external adversarial
controls were inappropriate. I will first review the landmark decision
UnitedStates v. Powell,26 in which the Court decided the Service did not
need probable cause to issue a summons, using all three rationales. I will
then review three additional issues which presented opportunities to either
expand or restrict the Service's summons power through statutory
construction. Each issue was ultimately resolved in the Supreme Court.
And for each issue, the Court adopted the construction that expanded
power, using one or more of the rationales that I am calling inquisitorial
logic. To the extent Congress responded to the judicial decision, it was
always to affirm the substance of the Court's decision.
a. Probable Cause
The year 1954 is significant not only as the year in which the Internal
Revenue Code was completely overhauled and re-codified, but also as the
first full year of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. Even tax geeks
know 1954 as the year of Brown v. Boardof Education.265
Scholars widely agree that during the Warren years the Court
dramatically expanded individual liberties as against the state:
The Warren Court... will be remembered for that legacy.
The Court's decisions were guided by a broad, humanitarian
vision of the role of the judiciary and of the Constitution as a
living document. The Warren Court expanded concepts of
equality, due process, and individual liberty, handing down
decisions that redefined notions of justice and fairness. In the
area of civil rights, the Warren Court helped usher in
revolutionary and irreversible changes in race relations. It also
issued landmark First Amendment decisions such as New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Engel v. Vitale, expanding the

summons entire classes of documents), § 7602(c) (restricting Service contacts with third parties),
§ 7612 (restricting the Service's ability to obtain computer source code). See discussion infra Part
IV.B.4.
264. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
265. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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protections afforded the free press and strengthening freedom
from state-sponsored religion. It implemented "one person,
one vote" in Reynolds v. Sims, changing our entire political
system. And in its criminal justice decisions, the Warren
Court established groundbreaking rules in cases such as
Gideon v. Wainwright, Miranda v. Arizona, and Mapp v.
Ohio, for the first time implementing some of the Bill of
Rights's most fundamental promises and giving life to the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The rules were as
elementary as the one holding that everyone charged with a
crime has the right to be defended by counsel.26 6
Of course, scholars recognize that the Court did not become
immediately "liberal" the day Earl Warren took his oath of office.26 7 The
consensus view seems to be that "[a]fter the 1962 term, the Warren Court
emerged as the powerful institution of liberal change against which Nixon
and others railed. The Court routinely took a strong liberal position in
eighty percent of civil liberties cases. 268
The seminal case on the summons power is one of the other twenty
percent. In 1964, the Warren Court, supreme defender of liberties against
the overreaching state, decided in UnitedStates v. Powell that the Service
did not have to demonstrate even probable cause to obtain judicial
enforcement of a summons. 269 A close examination of the decision and its
context demonstrates the power of the inquisitorial model of tax
administration because in Powell the Court explicitly rejected a plausible
alternative construction of the statute based on a view oftax determination
as adversarial process in favor of a construction based on inquisitorial
logic.
In Powell the Service had issued a summons to Max Powell, President
of William Penn Laundry, Inc. in March 1963 to reexamine certain books
and records of the corporation for 1958 and 1959.270 Powell refused and

266. Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairnessvs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 313, 314-15 (1999) (citations omitted).
267. Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND. L. REV.
309, 315 (1995).
268. Id. (citing to Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, DecisionalTrends on the Warren and
Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 104
(1989)).
269. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964). Powell has been cited by courts 1,758
times (1,861 total citations less 103 non-court citations, such as law reviews, annotated statutes, and
treatises, per Shepards queries on LEXIS as of Mar. 22, 2003). To put that number in perspective,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) has been cited by courts only about 438 more
times (8,185 total citations less 5,989 non-court citations per Shepards queries on LEXIS on Mar.
22, 2003).
270. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1963).
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the Service sought enforcement of the summons in district court under
section 7604.271 Powell argued that the Service had already examined these
records and had determined the corporation's tax liability for those years,
which the corporation had paid.2" Further, at the time the Service sought
to reexamine the records, the normal three year limitations period had
ended. 73 The Service could therefore only assert a tax liability against the
taxpayer on a theory that the taxpayer had submitted "a false or fraudulent
return with the intent to evade tax,"274 and for that the Service bore the
burden of proof. 5 Further, the Service was faced with the prohibition in
section 7605(b) against "unnecessary examination" which it could
overcome only by showing why the reexamination of the taxpayer's books
was necessary.276 The only explanation offered by the Service, however,
was that it "ha[d] reason to suspect" that the corporation had filed false
returns for 1958 and 1959.277 The Service gave nary a hint as to the basis
for its "reason to suspect."
The district court had enforced the summons.27 The Third Circuit had
reversed, using a two-step rationale. 279 First, the Circuit panel agreed that
since the three year limitation period had ended, then "logically," a
reexamination of the corporate records "must be 'unnecessary' within the
meaning of section 7605(b) unless something has been discovered by the
Secretary's delegate which might cause a reasonable man to suspect that
there has been fraud in the return., 28 1 Since this was true, then the
adversary nature of a summons enforcement proceeding provided the
second step of the rationale. The court noted that section 7604
[r]equires a "hearing" on the application to enforce the
administrative summons at which'satisfactory proof shall be
made. We think this provision means that the court shall
decide on the basis of the showing made in the normal course
of an adversary proceeding whether the agent's suspicion of
fraud is reasonable.... This the court cannot do unless the
agent discloses whatever may have created his suspicion.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.; see § 6501(a).
274. § 6501(c)(1).
275. § 7454(a).
276. Powell, 325 F.2d at 915; § 7605(b) ("No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary
examination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be
made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.").
277. Powell, 325 F.2d at 915.
278. Id.
279. Id. at915-16.
280. Id. at915.
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Since the agent in this case failed to make such
disclosure... his28application for judicial assistance should
have been denied.
In so ruling, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit,2" 2 and
joined with the First Circuit,283 which had used a similar rationale.
The Supreme Court rejected both steps of the Third Circuit's adversaryprocess based analysis. First, the Court rejected the "logic" that the
section 7605(b) prohibition against "unnecessary" examinations required
an affirmative showing of necessity.28 4 If the Service needed the taxpayer's
records "in order to determine the existence or nonexistence of fraud," that
reason alone was enough to make the examination not "unnecessary. ,285
Importantly, the Court conceded that "a more stringent interpretation is
possible, one which would require some showing of cause for suspecting
fraud., 28 6 Such an interpretation was out of place in an inquisitorial tax
determination process, however, "because it might seriously hamper the
Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing
him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject which he desires
to investigate, and because the legislative history of section 7605(b)
indicates that no severe restriction was intended. '287 The Court then used
the legislative history of the statute to demonstrate how it should be read
in light of the inquisitorial nature of tax determination. The Court read that
history as a Congressional effort to suppress "unnecessary visits and
inquisitions after a thorough examination is supposed to have been had. 2 8
281. Id. at 916 (citations omitted).
282. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1959).
283. O'Conner v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365, 369-70 (1st Cir. 1958):
[W]e cannot adopt the Government's contention that to obtain an order for
enforcement as to a "closed" year all that the Secretary or his delegate needs to
show is the honesty of his subjective belief that fraud existed in such a year. The
reason for this is that in the Government's view the necessity for an examination
into a closed year would for all practical purposes be left to administrative
determination and § 7605(b) would be relegated to hardly more than a pious
exhortation directed to the tax authorities. As a practical matter, according to the
Government's contention, the court's function under § 7604 would be reduced to
little more than that of summarily affixing its stamp of approval to administrative
action ....
Id.
284. Id. at 52, 53.
285. Id. at 53.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 54.
288. 61 CONG. REc. 5855 (Sept. 28, 1921) (statement of Sen. Penrose), quoted in Powell,379
U.S. at 54.
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To the Court, the statute's purpose was to "curb low-echelon revenue
agents" by "requiring such agents to clear any repetitive examination with
a superior.""' The purpose was therefore to require internalmanagement
checks within the Service and not to create external, adversary checks once
the Service had followed proper procedures to conclude that a
reexamination was necessary.290 The Court further supported its reading by
noting that when section 7605 was reenacted in 1926, a more restrictive
substitute measure was defeated, "which would have limited the
Commissioner
to two examinations appertaining to returns of any one
29 1
year.

The Supreme Court also rejected the second step of the circuit panel's
analysis, again using the inquisitorial nature of the tax determination
process to support broad information-gathering powers. By analogy to
other agencies, the Court suggested that the Service
has a power of inquisition... which is not derived from the
judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury,
which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to
get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not.292
The Court concluded by transforming the inquisitorial logic into doctrine:
courts should enforce tax summonses whenever the Service shows that (1)
the investigation for which the summons is issued has a legitimate purpose,
(2) the summons seeks information which may be relevant to that purpose,
(3) the Service does not already have the information sought, and (4) the
issuing employee has complied with any administrative steps required by

289. 379 U.S. at 56. Later courts have followed Powell's reasoning to rely on the Service's
internal administrative checks to control unnecessary examinations. See, e.g., United States v.
Schwartz, 469 F.2d 977, 983 (5th Cir. 1972).
We do not believe the use of the word "inspection" in Section 7605(b), as
contrasted with the words "unnecessary examination or investigations" can be so
restricted as to mean that there is an 'inspection' every time the agent or special
agent looks at a book of account of a taxpayer. The word 'inspection' must, in all
reason, have some relation to the activities of the agents in making the

examination authorized under the statute.
Cf.id. at 985-86 (Bell, J.,dissenting) (arguing that a majority of courts misread Powell on the
second inspection issue, that courts had created an illegitimate doctrine of"continuing inspection"
to undermine the controls placed on examinations by 7605(b)).
290. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 56, 58.
291. Id. at 55, n.13.

292. Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
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the Code (such as the section 7605(b) requirements for a "second"
inspection).293
The Powell Court acknowledged that taxpayers could challenge the
summons in a court hearing and suggested that the summons should be
quashed if a taxpayer could show that the summons had been issued for an
improper purpose "such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him
to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good
' Indeed, next to alleging procedural
faith of the particular investigation." 294
deficiencies, allegations of improper purpose are perhaps the most
common objections raised in summons enforcement proceedings. How the
Court has responded to them further illustrates the inquisitorial nature of
tax determination.
b. Improper Purpose
The Powell requirement of "legitimate" purpose means that the Service
may not use its summons powers for an "improper" purpose.2 95 Since
Powell, taxpayers have constantly claimed that certain uses of the
summons power are improper. The following subsections explore three
areas where taxpayers have made reasonable assertions of abuse, based on
adversarial logic, but the Court has rejected those claims, based on
inquisitorial logic: that the Service may not gather evidence for solely
criminal investigations; that the Service may not use its powers to gather
evidence about unknown taxpayers so as to fish around for taxpayers to
audit; and that the Service may not use a legitimate examination as a
pretext to gather evidence for a purpose other than that examination. The
common doctrinal response to each charge has been to enforce a summons
so long as the Service has any plausible legitimate purpose for it, even if
improper purposes are mixed in. In short, inquisitorial logic allows the
Service to decide what evidence it needs to gather in order to discover
Truth, even at the cost of Autonomy.
i. Criminal Investigations
First, the Service sometimes uses its summons powers to investigate
potential criminal violation of the Code. As many courts and
commentators have observed, the Code is "a law enforcement system in
which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined."'2 96 For

293. Id. at 57-58. This is the standard four-part test recited in most summons enforcement
cases and standard tax procedure treatises. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, at 13.04[ 1];
FEDERAL
TAx PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supranote 82, at 6.01 [2] [a].
294. Powell 379 U.S. at 58.
295. See id.
296. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 309 (1978).
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example, fraudulently filing an inaccurate tax return can lead to civil
penalties or to an indictment for tax evasion.29 7 Likewise, an employer's
failure to collect, account for, or pay over income taxes required to be
withheld from employee paychecks can lead to either a civil penalty or
imprisonment.298 Thus the Code contains both civil and criminal sanctions
for the exact same conduct.299 Of course, the Service cannot itself
prosecute a taxpayer; it can only recommend to the Department of Justice
("Justice") the initiation of a criminal prosecution.3"' Once that happens,
then the Service loses control of the prosecution and the Assistant United
States Attorley presents the government's case to a grand jury who decides
what, if any, additional information is needed before deciding whether
prosecution is warranted.30 '
Although the Code mixes criminal and civil liability, the Service's
internal structure sharply divides the civil and criminal investigative
functions. If, during the course of a civil audit, a revenue agent develops
a firm indication of fraud on the part of the taxpayer, the revenue agent
must immediately stop work on the civil case and turn the file over to the
Criminal Investigation division (CI) where a special agent then investigates
the case for criminal prosecution.3" 2 The special agent's primary function
is to find evidence to support a criminal prosecution.3 3 At the end of the
special agent's investigation, CI decides if the case warrants prosecution
or not.3" If so, and if counsel agrees, the Service sends a referral letter to
297. Compare § 6663 (providing a civil penalty when "any underpayment of tax required to
be shown on a return is due to fraud"), with § 7207 (setting forth a criminal penalty for "[alny
person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary any list, return, account, statement, or
other document, known by him to be fraudulent").
298. Compare § 6672(a) (providing a civil penalty for "[a]ny person... who willfully fails
to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any such tax [imposed by this title] or the payment thereof'), with § 7202
(setting a criminal penalty for "[any person... who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax"), and § 7201 (authorizing a criminal penalty for "[a]ny person who
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment
thereof.").
299. The difference turns on state of mind. Thus, the term "willfully" is interpreted differently
when applying the civil penalties than when applying criminal penalties. See Domanus v. United
States, 961 F.2d, 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992). See generally Bryan T. Camp, Dual Constructionof
RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61, 87 (1994) (demonstrating how
the statutory same term is sometimes given dual interpretations in differing contexts).
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2000) (authorizing District Attorneys to prosecute federal
crimes); § 7122(a) (allowing the Service to compromise criminal cases only "prior to reference to
the Department of Justice for prosecution").
301. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, § 12.13[2].
302. The revenue agent may still assist the special agent and work under the special agent's
direction. See id. § 12.13; see also infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
303. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, § 12.03.
304. Id.
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Justice." 5 If not, CI returns the case to the revenue agent who then resumes
the civil investigation.3 6 The bottom line is that a special agent's presence
in an investigation indicates that the Service is considering criminal
prosecution, but it is not conclusive because CI may decide to kick the case
back to the civil side.30 7 This sharp division of function, and the suspension
of the civil audit pending the outcome of the criminal investigation, is
designed to prevent taxpayers from arguing that the Service violated the
Fourth Amendment by "tricking" them into revealing information by
masking a criminal investigation as a civil one.308
The classic objection to allowing the Service to use a summons to
prepare a criminal case is found in UnitedStates v. O'Connor.3 9 There the
taxpayer had already been indicted by the Grand Jury and Justice was
preparing to file its bill of particulars. 30 The Service issued the summons
to help Justice prepare its case.31' With his usual eloquence, Judge
Wyzanski rejected this process on the grounds that it would allow the
Executive branch to trench on the powers of the Grand Jury:
The Constitution of the United States, the statutes, the
traditions of our law, the deep rooted preferences of our
people speak clearly. They recognize the primary and nearly
exclusive role of the Grand Jury as the agency of compulsory
disclosure. That is the inquisitorial body provided by our
fundamental law to subpoena documents required in advance
of a criminal trial, and in the preparation of an indictment or
its particularization. 3t 2
The Supreme Court limited O'Connor's holding in Donaldson v.
UnitedStates. 3 13 There, the Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that
the Service's use of a summons in a CI investigation raised the same
concerns expressed by Judge Wyzanski.' 4 The Court recognized that a CI
investigation was generally for both civil and criminal purposes. 3 15 It noted

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Since the consent
given by [the taxpayer] was obtained by deception, the microfilming of the documents constituted
an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
309. 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at250-51.
313. 400 U.S. 517, 533 (1971).
314. Id.
315. ld. at 535 ("[Tlhe special agent may well conduct his investigation jointly with an agent
from the Audit Division; ...their combined efforts are directed to both civil and criminal
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that the O'Connor holding was limited "to the situation of a pending
criminal charge or, at most, of an investigation solely for criminal
purposes" and that "[a]ny other holding. . . would thwart and defeat the
appropriate investigatory powers that the Congress has placed in 'the
Secretary or his delegate."' 316
Despite this limitation on O'Connor, taxpayers picked up on the
italicized language to argue that the Service could not use its summons
powers solely to prepare a criminal case for recommendation to Justice.3" 7
Taxpayers argued that section 7602(a) limits the legitimate purposes of a
summons to the purposes there listed and those purposes did not include
criminal investigation. In United States v. LaSalle National Bank,3"' the
District Court agreed and quashed a summons that the Service admitted
was issued by a criminal investigator solely because that particular
investigator wanted to develop a criminal case against the taxpayer:
The recommendation for criminal prosecution is certainly the
event which definitely determines the focus of the Internal
Revenue Service upon criminal prosecution as the end and
goal of its investigation. It is apparent, however, that this
focus and determination may be arrived at, under certain
circumstances, before the actual recommendation for criminal
prosecution has been made. In the event such focus and
determination has been arrived at the time of the issuance of
the Internal Revenue summons, the fact that it precedes the
formal recommendation for criminal prosecution is not
relevant. An Internal Revenue summons under such
circumstances is not issued in good faith.3" 9
Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court, the
Supreme Court did not. 20 It held that it was the institutionalposture of the
investigation which determined whether the summons power was
encroaching on the prerogatives of the grand jury and exceeding the
" ' Just because "a single agent attempts . .. to
authority of the Service.32
build a criminal case" did not mean that the Service, as an institution, had
infractions; and... any decision to recommend prosecution comes only after the investigation is
complete or is sufficiently far along to support appropriate conclusions. The fact that a full-scale
tax fraud investigation is being made does not necessarily mean that prosecution ensues when tax
liability becomes apparent.").
316. Id. (emphasis added).
317. See, e.g.,United States v. Morgan Guarantee Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
318. No. 75 C 3842, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16235 (N.D. I11.Mar. 9, 1976).
319. Id. at*2-*3.
320. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 303-04, 313 (1978).
321. Id. at 312-13,316.
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committed to criminal prosecution.322 That would not happen, the Court
emphasized, until the formal referral to Justice deprived the Service of the
ability to compromise the case.323 Such a referral would come only after
significant internal review by supervisors and other offices within the
Service.324 It was this "multilayered and thorough" review which the Court
said would "provide the taxpayer with substantial protection
against the
3 25
hasty or overzealous judgment of the special agent.
While clarifying that any summons issued after a formal referral to
Justice was impermissible, the five member Court majority stopped short
of declaring that any summons issued before a referral was therefore
permitted.3 26 It acknowledged that the Service could defeat the formal
referral rule by delaying the recommendation to Justice even when "there
is an institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service merely
would like to gather additional evidence for the prosecution. 3 27 To this the
four Justices in dissent took issue, charging that allowing taxpayers the
opportunity to litigate-and thereby engage in discovery-the issue of
"institutional good faith" before a formal referral would "produce little but
endless discovery proceedings and ultimate frustration of the fair
administration of the Internal Revenue Code. 3 2' Accordingly, the dissent
would have adopted the bright-line formal referral rule and would have
categorically enforced any summons issued before referral of the case to
Justice.
Soon after LaSalle, Congress amended section 7602 by (1) codifying
the formal referral rule to prohibit use of summonses "if a Justice
Department referral is in effect," and by (2) adding a new subsection
explicitly authorizing the Service to issue summonses for "the purpose of
inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws. 3 29 These modifications, taken
together, codified the dissent's view in LaSalle.33 ° If Congress had made
only the first modification to section 7602, there could be a reasonable
argument that the modification did not preclude the possibility that a
summons issued before a formal referral could still be improper if the
taxpayer could show that there was no possible civil consequence to the
investigation. This result would follow because section 7602(a) does not

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Seeid. at318.
Id. at317.
Id. at 320 (Stewart J., dissenting).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a) (1982).
LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 320 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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explicitly authorize a summons for a criminal investigation and so the
courts could plausibly read the statute as requiring some civil component
to the investigation that the summons was intended to aid, as did the
Powell majority.331 Once Congress made the second modification,
however, courts cannot ignore that a criminal investigation is, by itself, a
proper purpose.332
The LaSalle opinion follows Powell in giving the Service extremely
wide latitude in deciding what information it needs to investigate a
taxpayer. Both cases rely on the rectitude of the bureaucracy to prevent
"overzealous" individual employees from abusing the summons powers.333
This reliance on internal controls is a hallmark of inquisitorial logic, for it
places the control against abuse not on an adversarial process using an
outside decisionmaker but instead on unilateral administrative review.
More importantly, both LaSalle and the Congressional response explicitly
value Truth over Autonomy. That is, from the taxpayer's view, there is no
substantive difference between the Service's criminal investigators
intruding into the taxpayer's affairs and any other criminal investigator's
intrusion: both are government agents trying to build a case for the state to
impose penal sanctions against a citizen. Autonomy is invaded equally.
And yet the Service's civil need to discover the taxpayer's true liability
trumps the intrusion.
ii. Third Party and John Doe Summons
No discussion of the inquisitorial nature of the Service's evidencegathering powers would be complete without reviewing the expansion of
the summons powers from the particular to the general. That is, over time
the Service has moved from summonsing a particular taxpayer under audit
to summonsing third parties about unknown taxpayers in order to obtain

331. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1964).
332. The Sixth Circuit recently canvassed the field in Scotty's Contracting& Stone, Inc. v.
United States, 326 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2003), joining the five other circuits who have ruled on the
issue, holding that the Service "may validly issue a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602, as
amended in 1982, for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation." Id. at 787. Dicta from other
circuit cases, however, suggest that the issue may not be completely settled. See Hintze v. I.R.S.,
879 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The taxpayers here might well have prevailed, moreover, had
they succeeded in showing that the IRS was pursuing its investigation for the sole purpose of
building a case on anticipated criminal charges.") overruled on other grounds by Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992); United States v. Lawn Builder of New England,
Inc., 856 F.2d 388, 391-92 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that "the IRS must not have abandoned the
pursuit of civil tax determination or collection" although no such allegation had been made by the
taxpayer in the case). In UnitedStates v. Michaud,907 F.2d 750 (7 Cir. 1990) (en banc), the seven
member majority ducks the issue, see id. at 752 n.2, while the four member dissent vigorously
argues for the holding adopted in the other circuits, id. at 756-57.
333. See LaSalle, 437 U.S. 298; Powell, 379 U.S. 48.
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sufficient information to open audits on them. Call it "research" or call it
"fishing," the story of this expansion illustrates the inquisitorial nature of
tax administration.
Recall that the original restrictive section 14 summons power from the
1864 Act contemplated a personal interaction between the Service
employee and the taxpayer. The typical view was that summonses were
needed to obtain the taxpayer's books and records and so would be issued
to the taxpayer.334 Even after enactment of the 1954 Code it was not settled
just when the Service could obtain a third party's records. For example, in
Local 174 v. United States, the Service was investigating the President of
Local 174 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Frank
Brewster. 3" The Service issued a summons to Local 174 for all records
"which in any way refer or relate" to transactions between Brewster and
the Local.336 The local brought some records but not all and the Service
petitioned for enforcement of the summons, providing a list of examples
where the Service already knew the Local had paid for Brewster's personal
expenses (such as a house, a car, club fees) which payments Brewster had
not reported as income.337 On this showing, the district court agreed that
the Local should turn over all of its records.338
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a 2-1 split. The majority took the
adversarial process view, declaring it "fundamental error" that both the
parties and the court treated summons enforcement as something other
than "just another lawsuit., 339 That is, "the revenue agents cannot be the
'sole judges as to the scope of the examination. '34 Instead, "' [t]hey must
satisfy the Court that what they seek may be actually needed. Otherwise,
they would be assuming inquisitorial powers beyond the scope of the
statute. ', 34 1 If the court merely allowed the Service to look at all the
Local's files, without independently determining the degree to which the
Service really needed any particular document, then such action "would
constitute the administrative enforcement officials the judges of relevance
and in the meantime deprive the Local of its right of privacy., 342 The error,
in short, lay in the district court's failure to treat the proceeding as an
adversary proceeding: "If the order had required production in court so that
testimony could be heard and the judge could exercise an independent

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See discussion of the § 14 summons powers in In re Chadwick supra notes 215-24.
240 F.2d 387, 388 (9th Cir. 1956).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 390 (quoting Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 33 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D. Cal. 1940)).
Id. at 391.
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judgement as to what documents or entries were relevant, it might have
'
been upheld."343
Judge Pope dissented, taking the inquisitorial process view." He
thought "the majority opinion indicates a misapprehension of the nature
and character of this proceeding" and objected to the majority's "apparent
insistence upon treating the administrative action as though it were an
adversary proceeding to which there were named parties.
In my view the majority have completely missed this point
which is that the right to issue the subpoena and to have it
enforced stems from the right of the tax officials to carry on
an investigation merely on suspicion that the law is being
or even just because (they) want assurance that it is
violated,
34 6
not.

Local 174 was decided in 1956 and expressed a minority viewpoint
even then, being shortly overruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court on its
doctrinal point.347 It well illustrates, however, how differing views of tax
determination as an adversarial or inquisitorial process led to different
outcomes.
Before Powell, even the Supreme Court sent mixed messages on just
how much of an adversary check the summons enforcement hearing was
supposed to be. In Reisman v Caplin,decided in 1963, just one term before
Powell, the Court noted that "[a]ny [summons] enforcement action under
this section [section 7402] would be an adversary proceeding affording a
judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving
complete protection to the witness.,,348 At the same time, however, the
Court did not address who as between the Service and the district court
judge was the arbiter of relevancy of documents held by third parties.
Rather, the Court's focus was instead on the mechanism of how a taxpayer
could quash a third party summons before the third parties turned over
documents that the taxpayer believed were protected by privilege or
otherwise unavailable to the Service.349 In fact, there was no allegation in

343. Id. at 393.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 393, 394.
346. Id. at 394 (internal quotes omitted).
347. See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Herman, 353 U.S. 322,323 (1957) (upholding enforcement
of a Civil Aeronautics Board subpoena without specific findings of relevancy by the judge); Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d. 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1959) ("This opinion [Herman] was announced
subsequent to the Huber and Local 174 cases and in effect overruled the holdings of those cases.");
see also United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 169, n.15 (5th Cir. 1971).
348. 375 U.S. 440, 446.
349. Id. at 445.
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Reisman that the Service lacked the power to obtain records from a third
party in relation to the investigation of a specific taxpayer.
It is important not to read too much into the Reisman statement that the
summons enforcement is an adversarial process. The Court there simply
meant that the Service could not unilaterally impose civil or criminal
sanctions against a summoned party. The Reisman opinion thus revisited
the 1864 debate over where the contempt power should be lodged and
correctly read that legislation as putting the power of contempt into the
court's hands. But to say that civil or criminal sanctions for refusing a
summons could only happen after a hearing before a neutral third party
does not speak to who is the evidence-gatherer. And it was in the very next
term after Reisman that the Court affirmed, in Powell, the inquisitorial
notion that the Service's wide discretion over what information to obtain
was subject to only the slightest of judicial checks. aS
After Powell, it was settled that the Service could obtain information
from third parties concerning a specific taxpayer who was under a specific
investigation. The lower courts were still reluctant, however, to allow the
Service to obtain information from third parties about unknown taxpayers
where the Service had no specific investigation pending.35 ' For example,
when the Service learned that someone had made the highly unusual
deposit of $40,000 in well-worn $100 bills in the Commercial Bank of
Middlesboro, Kentucky, it wanted to know who made the deposit.3" 2 So it
issued a summons to the Bank (served on Mr. Bisceglia, a Vice President)
for "[t]hose books and records which will provide information as to the
(persons) or (firms) which deposited" the money.353 The Bank refused to
respond.354 The Service admitted that it had no idea whether there was any
tax liability involved and "that it neither suspected nor was it investigating
'
a particular person or taxpayer."355
The district court modified the
summons to ask for all "deposit tickets" instead of "books and records"
and ordered the summons enforced.356
The Bank appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which agreed with the Bank's
primary argument that section 7602 did not authorize the Service to issue

350. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
351. E.g., United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that § 7602
"only allows the IRS to summon information relating to the correctness of a particular return or to
a particular person and does not authorize the use of open-ended Joe Doe summonses").
352. United States v. Bisceglia, No. 1966, 1972 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13471, at *1-*2 (E.D. Ky.
June 1, 1972), rev'd 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
353. Id.
354. Id. at *2.
355. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1973).
356. Bisceglia, No. 1966, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471, at *6.
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summonses regarding an investigation into unknown persons, or "John
Does. '
In this section [7602], Congress has not authorized the IRS to
examine records pertaining to the financial affairs of an
indefinite number of unspecified persons for the purpose of
ascertaining the identity of one or some of those persons who
may be taxpayers and liable for taxes. Instead, the section
presupposes that the IRS has already identified the person in
whom it is interested as a taxpayer before proceeding 5
While the court recognized that it was "required to 'liberally construe
the powers given the governmental agency' by section 7602," it
vehemently rejected any interpretation of the statute that would permit the
summons at issue.359 It criticized the district court's "sweeping
interpretation of this section" for going "beyond mere statutory
construction.
The Supreme Court reversed. Building on the inquisitorial logic of
Powell, the Court majority relied explicitly on the idea of tax
determination as an inquisitorial process:
Of necessity, the investigative authority so provided is not
limited to situations in which there is probable cause, in the
traditional sense, to believe that a violation of the tax laws
exists. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The
purpose of the statutes is not to accuse, but to inquire.
Although such investigations unquestionably involve some
invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-reporting
system, and the alternatives could well involve far less
agreeable invasions of house, business, and records.36'
The key intellectual move made by the majority was to link section 7602
to section 760 1's duty to "inquire" after "allpersons.., who may be liable

357. Bisceglia, 486 F.2d at 710. Since most summonses are issued with respect to a particular
taxpayer, the pre-printed header of Summons Form 2039 reads "In the Matter
Of:
."The Service would typically fill in the blank with "John Does"
when the taxpayer was unknown. These types of summons thus became known as John Doe
summonses.
358. Bisceglia,486 F.2d at 710. The court did not therefore reach the Bank's second argument
that to enforce this particular summons violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches because the Service admitted it had no idea whether there was any tax
liability connected with the deposit. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1995).
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to pay any internal revenue tax. 3 62 The duty could not be confined, said
the Court, solely to known persons:
It would seem elementary that no meaningful investigation of
such events [large cash deposits by unknown persons] could
be conducted if the identity of the persons involved must first
be ascertained, and that is not always an easy task. Fiduciaries
and other agents are understandably reluctant to disclose
information regarding their principals, as respondent was in
this case. Moreover, if criminal activity is afoot the persons
involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures
to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is
unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such
persons, the broad inquiry authorized by § 7601 will be
frustrated in this class of cases.363

The dissent thought the Court's opinion was "a breathtaking expansion
of the summons power," remarking that "[tihere are obviously thousands
of transactions occurring daily throughout the country which, on their face,
suggest the possibility of tax complications for the unknown parties
involved. ' 3 64 The dissent claimed that the majority ignored the legislative
history of the summons statute in that "Congress has never made that
power 3coextensive
with the Service's broad and general canvassing
65
,
duties.
The dissent was correct in the narrow sense. As discussed above, the
1864 Revenue Act did not contemplate summonses being issued to anyone
except the taxpayer, and then only under certain conditions. The broader
power to summons "any" person came later, in section 49 of the Revenue
Act of 1868 and the powers eventually merged together. But the majority
was correct in the larger sense. Congress did in fact link the summons
power to the duty to inquire. As discussed above, the 1864 Revenue Act
placed the duty of inquiry in section 12, the procedures for performing that
duty in section 13, and the summons power in section 14, being triggered
by the failure of the section 13 procedures to carry out the section 12 duty.
Thus the majority in Bisceglia proved the Sixth Circuit correct:
interpreting section 7602 as authorizing John Doe summonses was going
beyond "mere" statutory construction because the majority based its
decision not so much on standard tools of statutory construction (plain
language, legislative history, etc.) as on the structure of the tax

362.
omitted).
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 149 (quoting § 7601) (emphasis supplied by the Court) (internal quotation marks
Id. at 150.
Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
Id. at 155.
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determination system. The majority emphasized that the inquisitorial
nature of the system required the Service be able to investigate unknown
taxpayers and it was sufficient protection against abuse that "[o]nce a
'
summons is challenged it must be scrutinized by a court."366
Justice Blackmun gave a prophetic concurrence in Bisceglia. Contrary
to the dissent's claim that the floodgate of summonses lay open because
every transaction had "possible" tax consequences, Justice Blackmun
explained that courts should approve a John Doe summons only when the
summons "was issued pursuant to a genuine investigation" against an
"ascertainable group" of taxpayers.367 That is, Justice Blackmun noted,
approval should come when "[t]he Service was not engaged in researching
some general problem; its mission was not exploratory."368
Congress agreed with Justice Blackmun and, in the Tax Reform Act of
1976, enacted section 7609 to govern third-party summonses in general
and section 7609(f) and (h) to govern John Doe summonses in particular.3 69
As a substantive matter, section 7609(f) follows Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in that it permits the Service to serve John Doe summonses
only when the Service (1) has a "reasonable basis" to believe that (2) an
"ascertainable group or class of persons" may not have complied with a tax
law, and (3) the Service cannot readily obtain the information other than

366. Id. at 146.
367. Id. at 152.
368. Id.
369. Pub. L. No. 94-155. Congress was also responding to Donaldson v. UnitedStates, where
the Court had concluded that taxpayers did not have sufficient interest in third party summonses
to allow them to intervene in an enforcement proceeding to quash the summons. 400 U.S. 517, 531
(1971). As originally enacted, § 7609(b) gave taxpayers the ability to direct the third party not to
comply with the summons, thus forcing the Service to bring an enforcement action. The statute gave
the taxpayer a right to intervene in the enforcement action. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
95-155, § 7609(b). In 1982, at the behest of the Service, Congress removed the ability to direct a
third party not to comply and instead gave the taxpayer the ability to file a petition to quash (and
retained the right to intervene) thus placing the burden on the taxpayer to initiate a court proceeding
to stop the third party from complying with the summons. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 33 1(a). In this respect the statute reflects a belief in the enforcement
proceeding as an adversarial check on the Service. As discussed in the main text, however, the
actuality of a proceeding to either enforce or quash a summons is its use as a method of avoiding
penalties for disobeying a summons and not to any significant degree a check on the Service's
decision on what information it wants. In other words, since it was so difficult for a litigant to find
any substantive grounds on which to limit the Service's decision on information to obtain, allowing
taxpayers to participate in the proceeding did not make the system less inquisitorial. Note, too, that
until 1998 § 7609 applied only to summons issued to a defined class of third parties labeled "third
party recordkeepers." Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 7609(a)(l)(A). These were
generally financial institutions, accountants, credit agencies and others who regularly kept data on
a large number of transactions and provided such data to customers. See id. at § 7609(a)(3). The
section was expanded to all third parties, again at the request of the Service, in RRA 98. Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206 § 3415(a).
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from the summoned party. Of greater interest, however, is the procedure
Congress chose to implement these requirements: section 7609(f) does not
allow the Service to even serve a John Doe summons until "after a court
proceeding" in which the Service establishes the three substantive
prerequisites. Significantly, section 7609(h) provides that the court
proceeding is to be ex parte and grants district courts subject matter
jurisdiction to conduct the proceeding. These amendments, then,
potentially required the Service to take two trips to court to obtain
information through a John Doe summons: first to obtain permission to
issue the summons and, perhaps second, to obtain an order enforcing the
summons.
The House Committee Report to the 1976 Tax Reform Act3 7 suggests
that Congress was not trying to impose an adversarial process check on the
Service's discretion on what information it needed. While the Report
generally approved of Bisceglia's inquisitorial justification for issuing
John Doe summonses, it sought limits on the Service's discretion beyond
internal controls.37' It sought to apply those limits, however, consistently
with the inquisitorial process by making the issuance decision subject to
an ex parte proceeding using the less-than-probable-cause standard of
Powell:
It is enough for the Service to reveal to the court evidence that
a transaction has occurred, and that the transaction (in the
context of such facts as may be known to the Service at that
time) is of such a nature as to be reasonabl[y]suggestive of
the possibility that the correct tax liability with respect to that
transaction may not have been reported [correctly].3 72
Courts have applied section 7609(f) consistently with the idea that the
new process was to check only arbitrary or bizarre decisions and not to
create a new adversarial check on the Service's summons powers. For
example, in the late 1970's the Service began a project to investigate barter
exchanges and those who participated in them. To support the project, it
served John Does to various barter exchanges, seeking their membership
lists. 373 Demonstrating that members of one barter exchange tended to
under-report income was enough "reasonable basis" to support John Doe

370. H.R. REP. No. 94-658 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 2897.
371. Id. at311.
372. Id. (emphasis added).
373. When a particular tax dodge comes to the Service's attention, it generally creates special
projects to deal with it. In this case the Service began a "Barter Exchange Project Unreported
Income Program" in 1979. See United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1176-77 (6th Cir. 1983)
(describing the program).
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summonses against other barter exchanges for their membership lists even
if it fell short of "probable cause."374
More importantly, summoned parties have attempted to argue, in the
enforcement proceeding, that the Service failed to meet its burden in the
exparte issuance proceeding. In early cases, they were successful in being
allowed to raise the substantive section 7609(f) requirements in the
enforcement proceeding, even if they were not successful on the merits.375
It did not take long, however, for the majority of courts to reject that
position. As the Second Circuit explained:
By requiring that the application [to issue a John Doe
summons] be made . . .ex parte, we believe Congress
intended that the question whether a John Doe summons
could be served should not become embroiled in an adversary
proceeding. Nothing in the legislative history or on the face
of the statue suggests that Congress intended to permit a
summoned party to challenge the showings which are a
requisite for service of a summons. Were this the case, the
enforcement proceedings would, contrary to the legislative
intent, "so delay tax investigations by the... Service that they
'would' produce a problem for sound tax administration
376
greater than the one they seek to solve.
iii. Dual Purpose
The degree to which the Service can obtain information about unknown
taxpayers from third parties was not resolved by section 7609(f). As
explained above in Part II, the Code contains a huge web of reporting
requirements which attempt to capture the flow of money in myriad types
of transactions. Chapter 68 imposes a substantial number of either
"Additions to Tax" (Chapter 68A) or "Assessable Penalties" (Chapter
68B) for various failures to comply with the reporting requirements. The

374. See In re Tax Liabilities of Matter of John Does, Members of the Columbus Trade Exch.,
671 F.2d 977, 979 (6th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the Service that "Congress did not intend to
impose stringent restrictions on the Service's investigatory function, but merely sought to prevent
the indiscriminate exercise of the John Does summons power."); see also United States v.
Pittsburgh Trade Exch. Inc., 644 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1981).
375. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345, 1347, 1350 (10th Cir.
1982) (rejecting Service's claim that the University could not object to the summons on the grounds
that the summons lacked the reasonable basis requirement of § 7609(0(2) but also finding that the
Service had met the reasonable basis requirement), vacated and remanded by 459 U.S. 1095
(1983).
376. Agric. Asset Mgmt. Co. v. United States (In re Tax Liabilities of John Does), 688 F.2d
144, 148-149 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-938, at 371, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3800); accord United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1983).
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amounts are treated as tax. The Code is redundantly explicit that the
Chapter 68 penalties and additions to tax "shall be paid upon notice and
demand377and shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as

taxes.

These reporting requirements allow the Service to engage in pretextual
investigations of the correctness of a reporting requirement (and hence the
"tax" due even if the entity itself reports no tax liability, such as a
partnership), in order to discover substantial information about an entire
group of taxpayers who are not themselves under audit-yet. For example,
issuing a John Doe summons to barter exchanges for their membership
lists opened the Service to the risk of district courts refusing to find
"reasonable basis" for issuing the summons, or worse, being forced to
litigate the "reasonable basis" in the enforcement proceeding. So the
Service instead began opening audits of barter exchanges themselves and
asking for the membership lists as part of the audit. Most barter exchanges
were set up as either corporations or partnerships and so had a separate tax
liability or, in the case of partnerships, a separate reporting requirement.
Initially, the Service met with mixed success, with the Sixth Circuit
requiring the Service to use section 7609(f) in United States v.
Thompson,3 7' and the Eighth Circuit enforcing the summons
regardless of
3 79
the dual purpose in United States v. BarterSystems, Inc.
Once again, the cases reflect two plausible holdings based on differing
visions of the degree of autonomy the Service should have in deciding
what information it needed and how much was enough. On the one hand,
the Sixth Circuit emphasized that to allow the Service to use the regular
summons process simply by claiming that the "In The Matter Of' referred
to a specified taxpayer (the barter exchange), when the real object was to
obtain information about unknown taxpayers, completely undercut the
Congressional decision to have courts review investigations about
unknown taxpayers:
We do not believe that the IRS can avoid the requirements of
section 7609(f) merely by identifying the record keeper as a
person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.
Nor do we believe that even a legitimate investigation of a
record keeper's own tax liability can be used to exempt the
377. E.g., § 6665(a)(1) applying to any "additions to the tax, additional amounts, and penalties
provided by this chapter"; § 6671 (applying to "the penalties and liabilities provided by this
subchapter). Section 6671 repeats word for word § 6665(a) and there seems no particular reason
for its existence. It is simply redundant. Both statutes also provide that "any reference in this title
to 'tax' imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to the tax, additional
amounts, and penalties provided by this [chapter] [subchapter]."
378. 701 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1983).
379. 694-F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982).
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IRS from following section 7609(f) procedures when at the
time of its issuance a summons in fact also pertains to the
liability of other unidentified persons. To hold otherwise
would present the IRS with an irresistible invitation to avoid
the clear Congressional safeguards of section 7609(f). 380
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit, citing to the Supreme Court's
repeated statements in Powell,Bisceglia,and Donaldson,emphasized that
the summons powers should be construed to maximize the "effective
performance" of congressionally approved purposes absent an "express
statutory prohibition."38 ' The court found that the Service's investigation
of the barter exchange was a congressionally-approved purpose (that is, it
met the "legitimate purpose" test of Powell) and that section 7609(f) did
not expressly apply in this circumstance because it expressly applied only
to any summons "'which does not identify the person with respect to
whose liability the summons is issued."'382 In short, unless and until
Congress revised the statutory language, the Service could choose
alternative methods ofacquiring the same information (the barter exchange
membership list).
We hold that the John Doe summons procedures... do not
apply to the issuance of a summons which has the purpose of
determining a known taxpayer's liabilities and produces the
fallout or further effect of discovering information that would
aid in identifying unnamed taxpayers and investigating their
tax liabilities.383
The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the circuit split in United States
v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc.384 where, during an examination of a holding
company whose various subsidiaries licensed certain tax shelters, the
Service asked for a list of its licensees.385 As had the barter exchanges, the
taxpayer offered to provide all the information regarding transactions with
its licensee, but with identifying information redacted.386 The taxpayer also
offered to provide the Service with a randomly-selected list of licensees to
meet the Service's asserted need for verification.38 7 The Service conceded
that one of its purposes in obtaining the list was to make "further inquiry"

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Thompson, 701 F.2d at 1180, n.8.
Barter Sys., Inc., 694 F.2d at 167.
Id. at 167-68 (quoting § 7609(f)).
Id. at 169,
469 U.S. 310 (1985).
Id. at 311.
Id.at 312.
Id. at 323.
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into whether the licensee "correctly reported their income tax liabilities."388
The district court enforced the summons and the Second Circuit affirmed,
agreeing with the Eighth Circuit that such a "dual purpose" did not require
the Service to use the section 7609(f) procedures.389
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. Like the Eighth Circuit, the
Court first set up a heavy presumption in favor of upholding the Service's
decision of how to gather information, citing to "a formidable line of
precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed
enforcement authority of the [IRS] if [this] authority is necessary for the
effective enforcement of the revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary
legislative purposes."39 Next, the Court decided that the plain language of
section 7609(f) was ambiguous as to "whether the statutory reference to
'the person' should be read as 'every person' or whether it should be read
as 'at least one person."' 39 Therefore the Court turned "to consider
whether dual purpose summonses give rise to the same concerns that
prompted Congress to enact section 7609(f)." 392 It characterized those
concerns as preventing the Service from looking around for targets to
investigate when it had no "legitimate investigation of an ascertainable
target" because such "fishing expeditions" infringed on taxpayers privacy
rights to be free from government intrusion in their lives.39 3
The strong inquisitorial base of the Tiffany decision is masked by its
ostensible use of an adversarial process rationale. The Court characterized
section 7609(f) as a substitute for the adversarial check provided by the
summons enforcement proceeding. Congress enacted it, the Court asserted,
because a party who, not itself under investigation, receives a John Doe
summons "might have little incentive to oppose enforcement vigorously.
Then, with no real adversary, the IRS could use its summons power to
engage in 'fishing expeditions' that might unnecessarily trample upon
taxpayer privacy."39' 4 Therefore, the Court concluded, the section 7609(f)
substitute was not necessary when the summoned party was itself under
investigation because "the summoned party will have a direct incentive to
oppose enforcement. In such circumstances, the vigilance and self-interest
of the summoned party-complemented by its right to resist

388. Id. at 313.
389. United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1983).
390. Tiffany, 469 U.S. at 318 (quoting United States v. Euge, 447 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1980))
(modification found in Supreme Court opinion).
391. Id. at 319.
392. Id. at 320.
393. Id.
394. Id. (emphasis supplied to indicate that the Court was implicitly distinguishing between
necessary and unnecessary trampling on taxpayer privacy).
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enforcement-will provide some assurance that the IRS will not strike out
'
arbitrarily or seek irrelevant materials."395
The Court acknowledged that "Congress... did not seek to ensure that
the IRS have an adversary in all summons proceedings" and that "[it] is
possible that the summoned party, even if it is itself being investigated,
will not oppose enforcement, and that as a result the IRS might obtain
some information that is relevant only to the liabilities of unnamed
taxpayers. 396 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that "where the summoned
party is itself being investigated, that party's self-interest provides
sufficient protection against the evils that Congress sought to remedy when
it enacted § 7609(f).""9
The Court's adversarial process rationale is specious; it does not truly
explain the holding. Think again about the Service's investigation of the
barter exchanges. Whether the Service proceeded by a John Doe summons
or by a dual purpose summons, the barter exchanges had the exact same
motivation, and the exact same opportunity in the summons enforcement
proceeding, to raise the exact same arguments against enforcement of the
summons. Likewise, the incentive of Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. to protect its
client base was the same whether it received a summons titled "In the
Matter of John Does" or titled "In the Matter of Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc."
The Court's purported distinction between either the willingness or ability
to resist a summons turning on whether the summoned party itself was
under investigation contradicts the Court's own analysis in Bisceglia.3 98
Ironically, the Court "proved" its adversarial process point by concluding:
"Here, for example, Tiffany argued vigorously-albeit
unsuccessfully-against enforcement of the summonses."3'99 A check
which is unsuccessful as a rule is no check at all and the Court's
observation falls into the category of rules observed more in the breach
than in the execution.
The adversarial process rationale makes the Court's conclusion circular.
This is evident by the Court's holding that "by definition, the IRS is not
engaged in a 'fishing expedition' when it seeks information relevant to a
legitimate investigation of a particular taxpayer. In such cases, any
incidental effect on the privacy rights of unnamed taxpayers is justified by
395. Id. at 321. The Court also used adversarial logic to reject the Sixth Circuit's argument that
allowing the Service to open an investigation on the taxpayer holding the desired records would
undermine § 7609(f). Id. at 322 ("[I]n such a case," the Court opined, "the summoned party would
still have a sufficient interest in opposing enforcement .
.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975) ("Fiduciaries and other agents are
understandably reluctant to disclose information regarding their principals, as respondent was in
this case.").
399. Tiffany, 469 U.S. at 321.
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the IRS's interest in enforcing the tax laws. ' That is true only by
definition and by a definition which begs the question of what is or is not
"fishing." At bottom, the Court's view is that a certain amount of "fishing"
is part of the inquisitorial mandate and Congress, in section 7609(f), added
a non-adversarial process to check only the most blatant forms of it.
That Tiffany Fine Arts is more accurately based on inquisitorial logic
is apparent in the Court's heavy reliance on its own precedents, themselves
built on inquisitorial logic, to conclude that "'restrictions upon the IRS
summons power should be avoided "absent unambiguous directions from
Congress."""'40 In addition to the cases discussed above, the Court here
cited to its opinion in United States v. Arthur Young, where the Court
enforced the Service's summons against the taxpayer's accountants for the
accountant's "tax accrual" workpapers, documents that reviewed and
analyzed the weaknesses and problematic positions in the taxpayer's
return.4"2 The Court there rejected some very sound arguments for creating
a type of work-product immunity for the particular work product.4 3 Citing
to the need for "disclosure, and the concomitant power of the Government
to compel disclosure," the Court refused to create a new privilege to shield
relevant information from the Service.4"' This again raises the value of
finding the "true" tax liability over competing values; otherwise, "our
national tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed."'"0 5
Further, note the Court's reaction to Tiffany's offer to provide the Service
with a random sample of its licensees so the Service could contact them.40 6
Once the court decided that the Service was not required to follow the
section 7609(f) procedure, it quickly held that the Service was entitled to
the full enforcement of its summons.40 7 It was no objection that the Service
wanted more documents than it could process, because "[w]e have never
held... that the IRS must conduct its investigations in the least intrusive
way possible."" 8 Likewise, Tiffany's offer would in effect remove the
evidence-gathering function from the Service. "The decision ofhow many,
and which, licensees to contact is one for the IRS-not Tiffany-to

400. Id.
401. Id. at 318 (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984)
(quoting Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 150)).
402. 465 U.S. 805, 807-09 (1984).
403. See id. at 810,814-17.
404. Id. at 816.
405. Id.
406. Tiffany, 469 U.S. at 323.
407. See id. at 322-24.
408. Id. at 323.
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make."4 °9 It was for the Service, not the taxpayer and not the courts, to
decide which of all the possibly relevant records to scrutinize.4 10
D. Summary
The above discussion demonstrates how the Service has historically
functioned as both decisionmaker and evidence-gatherer in both the tax
determination and tax collection processes. Further, it has shown how both
Congress and the courts have operated within an inquisitorial frame of
reference when enacting reforms or deciding controversies by judging
issues in light of what would best accomplish the Service's mission of
searching for Truth (in the form of the "proper" or "true" tax liability). It
is true that all of this takes place within an overall adversarial system of
justice. But that adversarial method of dispute resolution does not even
become available until after the Service has gathered its evidence and
made its determination or collection decision. Thus, for example, note
again how the central Powell holding that the Service does not need
probable cause to enforce its summons places Truth above Autonomy.4"

409. Id.
410. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the cases regarding conditional enforcement
of summonses also engage in inquisitorial versus adversarial logic, with the inquisitorial logic
winning out. See, e.g., United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) (limiting district courts
to either enforcement or denial of summonses and prohibiting them from attaching conditions on
the use of the summoned information in the enforcement order); United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d
1341 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same).
411. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Lower courts routinely adopt that logic. For
example, "in light of the unique inquisitorial mandate of the IRS, its burden of demonstrating
'substantial need' to overcome the [work product] privilege should be reduced." United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) affd in part,rev 'd in part, 677
F.2d 211 (2nd Cir. 1981), aff'd in part,rev'din part,465 U.S. 805 (1984). On similar logic, courts
refuse to attach conditions to the Service's ability to use the information summoned because to do
so would improperly interfere with the Service's decision as to what actual purpose to put the
information.
The cases decided since Powell have shown that the requirement of legitimate
purpose means nothing more than that the government's summons must be issued
in good faith pursuant to one of the powers granted under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7602.... We find no case requiring the government to delineate a specific and
narrow purpose, and then holding that the summons will be enforced only insofar
as it is relevant to that purpose. Indeed, the cases discuss not what the actual
purpose is, but whether the summons was issued in good faith pursuant to a
legitimate investigation, that is, an investigation authorized by section 7602.
United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1262-63 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)
(reversing district court's conditional enforcement order because "the district court erred by
ignoring the general and overarching institutional purpose of the IRS and by determining relevancy
as against the specific suspected wrongdoing asserted by a single IRS agent.") (internal citations
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Contrast that holding with the same Court's jurisprudence in criminal law
where, by creating the exclusionary rule to enforce the probable cause
requirement for police searches, the Court places Autonomy above Truth.
Further, when the adversarial system does come into play, the scales of
justice have traditionally been weighed heavily in the government's favor,
in deference to the "imperious need" for taxes identified by Justice
Roberts," 2 and in recognition that voluntary compliance links to
perceptions of fairness which themselves link to the need for the Service
to have the power of inquest to determine the "truth" of the tax matter.
The next section considers the rhetoric and reality of RRA 98. It
explores the extent to which the public conversation before the statute, the
language of the committee reports, and the provisions actually enacted turn
away from the inquisitorial model of tax administration towards an
adversarial model. I hope to show that the taxwriters not merely
misunderstood the mechanics of how the Service operates-although I
shall give one rather striking example of the taxwriters' ignorance at that
level-but, more importantly, how certain restructuring and reform
provisions are based on an adversarial process paradigm that (a) removes
decisionmaking and evidence-gathering powers from the Service and
attempts to create new types of neutral third parties so that the Service is
reduced from decisionmaker to litigant, and (b) promotes Autonomy over
Truth.4" 3 Just how far the new statutes will be pushed in that direction
remains unclear. The provisions have caused confusion in the courts, with
no real relief for taxpayers from the abuses to which the reforms were
directed. To put it mildly, RRA 98 is not Congress' finest work product.
W4 1 4 statute.
To put it bluntly, RRA 98 is the quintessential FUBAR
IV. RRA 98: SWINGING PENDULUM OR SHIFTING PARADIGM?

Pre RRA 98 Service Mission Statement:
The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the
proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve the
public by continually improving the quality of our products
and services; and perform in a manner warranting the highest
degree of public confidence in our integrity, and fairness.4 5

omitted); see also United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997).
412. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
413. 1do not mean to suggest that RRA 98 was simply the product of Congressional ignorance
of the prior paradigm, but discussion of the other causes for the excesses of RRA 98-such as
political opportunism, or the failure of the Congressional oversight and hearing process-are
beyond the scope of this Article.
414. In PG-rated parlance, FUBAR is the acronym for "Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition."
415. S. REP. NO. 105-174 at 8 (1998).
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Post RRA 98 Service Mission Statement:
Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by
applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.416
At the start of the Senate Finance Committee hearings in September
1997, Senator Roth declared: "[w]hat we seek to do is help the IRS get
back to its mission statement.""4 7 By the end of the legislative process ten
months later, however, the newly enacted RRA 98 had abandoned that goal
and instead required the Service to "review and restate its mission to place
4 18
a greater emphasis on serving the public and meeting taxpayers' needs."
I suggest that both the change in the mission statement and the felt need
to statutorily direct that change is symbolic of RRA 98, but not in the way
most commentators have noted. Most commentators have focused on the
absence of the word "collect" in the new mission statement.419 Indeed, this
absence is all the more striking because when the Service posted two
proposed versions of a revised mission statement on its website for public
comment, both versions still contained the phrase "collect the revenue."42'
The deletion of "collect" has generated a spirited debate about how far the
"pendulum" has swung, and should swing, between "service" and
"enforcement," which are widely viewed as two agency missions
fundamentally at odds with each other.4 2'
416. INTERNAL REvENuE SERVICE, THE AGENCY AND ITS MISSION, at http://www.irs.gov/irs/
article/0,,id--98141,00.html. (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
417. Practicesand Procedures,supra note 24, at 4.
418. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 1002 (1998).
419. See, e.g., Christopher Bergin, Tax Analysts' Executive DirectorAddresses IRS's Split
Personality, 2002 TAX NOTEs TODAY 98-57 (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2002-12126) ("What's
missing? In the new mission statement the words 'collect taxes' do not appear."); Donald C.
Alexander, Former CommissionerAlexanderMuses on the Service, 1999 TAxNOTESTODAY 69-86
(1999) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 1999-13496) ("What is missing is any mention of collecting
taxes.").
420. Delmar R. Threadgill, FEI Critiques IRS's Draft Mission Statements, 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 187-88 (1998) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 98-29088) (reprinting both drafts).
421. See, e.g., Practicesand Procedures,supra note 24, at 28 (statement of Joseph F. Lane,
enrolled agent, chairman, National Government Relations Committee, the National Association of
Enrolled Agents, Gaitherburg, M.D.) ("[P]erhaps one of the ways of approaching the problems we
are dealing with in tax administration was to divide the IRS into two separate agencies, one for
taxpayer service, and the other for tax law enforcement."); see also Robert Reno, Who's getting
ripped: The IRS or Taxpayers?, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Sept. 2, 2000, at 15A ("The pendulum of
Washington outrage seems to be swinging in an opposite direction toward the notion that the IRS
is in danger of becoming less a ripper agency and more a ripped-off one."). Compare William
Stevenson, IRS 'sPrimaryFocus on Service is the Right Way To Go, 2003 TAx NOTES TODAY 121-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

79

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

A more telling change, however, is that neither the two proposed
mission statements nor the one actually adopted contain the notion of a
"proper" or "correct" tax. 422 It is the absence of this concept, I suggest, that
signals a shift in the relative importance of truth and autonomy values such
that Autonomy now trumps Truth in tax administration in a way that it did
not before. Further, both the rhetoric and reality of RRA 98 remove certain
decisionmaking and evidence-gathering functions away from the Service
and put them into the hands of neutral third-party or quasi-third-party
decision-makers. In both of these ways, RRA 98 represents more of a shift
of the paradigm than a swing ofthe pendulum, albeit a partial shift, leaving
tax administrators to reconcile a mix of processes that arguably work at
cross-purposes.
Subsection A looks at how the rhetoric signals this shift by: (a) denying
the existence of a "true" tax liability and (b) decrying the Service's ability
to make tax determination or tax collection decisions without approval
from a neutral third party after hearing from the taxpayer. Subsection A
then contrasts the 1998 reform rhetoric with that from the previous great
reorganization of the Service between 1950 and 1953. Subsection B then
examines how particular RRA 98 provisions carry out this shift in one or
more of the following ways: (a) creating circumstances where Truth yields
to Autonomy in a way it did not before RRA 98; (b) removing or reducing
the Service's ability to make the unilateral tax determination and tax
collection decisions described in Part III-B; and (c) reducing the Service's
ability to gather information as described in Part III-C.
A. The Bark
Debate over the structure and function of tax administration simmered
for years after the 1986 Tax Reform Act.423 The sensationalist hearings
held by the Senate Finance Committee in September 1997 brought it to a
boil. The Senate Finance Committee had spent about a year carefully
gathering the stories that would fuel the hearings,4 24 and they became the

22 (June 23, 2003) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2003-15042) (title says it all), with Alvin D. Lurie,
Killed With Kindness or How We Stopped Hating the IRS, 2003 TAx NoTES TODAY 145-35 (July
28, 2003) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2003-17551) (contending that enforcement should be primary
mission). See generally Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003) (detailing effects of RRA 98 on Service compliance operations).
422. I confess not to be the first to notice this. See Threadgill, supra note 420, at 7 (objecting
to the absence of the word "proper" in both drafts).
423. For a good synopsis of this history, see Adriana Wos-Mysliwiec, Note, The Internal
Revenue Restructuringand Reform Act of 1998: Does it Really Shifi the Burden of Proofto the
IRS?. 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMEw. 301, 306-07 (1999).
424. See Practicesand Procedures,supranote 24, at 200 (Testimony of Mike Dolan, Acting
Commissioner) (referring to the opening announcement of the investigation); See generally id. at

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss1/1

80

Camp: Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Parad

20041

TAXADMINISTRATIONAS INQUISITORIAL PROCESS

fire that fed reform.425 The rhetoric cooled somewhat in hearings held in
January 1998 when the Senate Finance Committee returned to the dull,
expert-witness-driven format of traditional oversight.426 In April 1998,
however, the Committee sought to keep the heat on the Service with yet
more sensational and titillating stories of abuse.42 7 The September and
April hearings were high political theater and, as with most theater, were
mostly fictional: the dramatic allegations made from behind face screens
and voice screens were generally unsupported.428 But from the heat of the
moment, RRA 98 emerged.

323-24 (opening statement of Sen. Roth) (describing the course and methodology of the Committee
investigation).
425. See, e.g., IRS Restructuring: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Finance on HR.
2676, 105th Cong., S. HRG. 105-529, at 52-53 (1998) [hereinafter IRS Restructuring] (statement
of Rep. Rob Portman, Chair, National Commission on Restructuring the IRS (noting that the House
had passed legislation based on the Restructuring Commission's recommendations, "[b]ut it was
this committee, the Finance Committee's work and particularly your hearings last September that
really focused all of America on the need to fundamentally reform this troubled agency."); IRS
Oversight, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, S. HRG. 105-598, at 10 (1998)
[hereinafter IRS Oversight] (statement of Sen. Don Nickles) ("I have got about a dozen things that
we added that was not [sic] in the House bill, [but] is in the Senate bill.").
426. See IRS Restructuring,supra note 425.
427. See IRS Oversight, supra note 425.
428. See David Cay Johnston, Inquiries FindLittle Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2000, at C I ("Most of the crucial testimony in the 1997-98 hearings that preceded the new law,
contending abuses by I.R.S. agents, has proved to be unfounded, based on false or misleading
testimony or disproved in subsequent court actions."); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INVESTIGATION OF

ALLEGATIONS OF TAXPAYER ABUSE AND EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT 2 (1999) reprintedin 2000 TAX

NOTES TODAY 80-13 (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2000-11630)
Based on our investigation, we did not find any evidence to support the allegation
that IRS managers' decisions to "no-change" or "zero-out" proposed tax
assessments were improper.... We found that each manager had acted within his
or her discretion and openly discussed relevant issues with both the employee and
senior management. Their decisions were approved by appropriate individuals and
were documented in the files. These managers followed IRS policies and
procedures related to auditing taxpayers....
Generally, we found no corroborating evidence thatthe criminal investigations
described at the hearing were retaliatory against the specific taxpayer. In addition,
we could not independently substantiate that IRS employees had vendettas against
these taxpayers. Our investigation did find that decisions to initiate the
investigations were reasonably based on the information available to IRS at the
time and were documented in agency files when they were made. Further, we
found no evidence that IRS employees had acted improperly in obtaining and
executing the search warrants.
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1. Autonomy and Truth
The rhetoric was hot: "Criminals have more rights in this country than
taxpayers do. It shouldn't be that way. That's wrong, and we're going to
fix it." said Republican Bill Archer. 29 Not to be outdone, Democrat Dick
Gephardt in a separate news conference on the same day grimly declared:
"Today, accused violent felons have more rights in court than law-abiding,
tax-paying citizens. And that's wrong."43
Upon cool reflection, most listeners might well dismiss these
statements as hysterically overwrought nonsense, since the statements
ignore the fundamental difference between criminal and civil sanctions.
Yet, when restated in a more neutral tone, the statements do recognize a
fundamental difference between adversarial and inquisitorial processes:
there are times where Truth yields to Autonomy in the criminal justice
system in a way it does not in the tax collection system. That is, an
adversary system (i.e. criminal justice system) will protect Autonomy by
policing the government's evidence-gathering in a way that the
inquisitorial tax system will not. The most obvious example is the
exclusionary rule: the sanction meted out in criminal trials for unwanted
government intrusion on Autonomy is to deny probative evidence which
would help establish Truth.43 ' It may not happen often, but it happens, in
criminal tax trials as well as other criminal trials. In contrast, one is hard
pressed to find any application of the exclusionary rule in a civil tax
proceeding.432 In that sense the rhetoric connects to a theme that resounds
in American history and political culture: inquisitorial systems are
antithetical to the basic American cultural and political value of the right
to be left alone.

429. Representative Bill Archer, News Conference (Oct. 21, 1997) (transcript available on
LEXIS in FDCH Political Transcripts).
430. Representative Dick Gephardt, News Conference (Oct. 21, 1997) (transcript available on
LEXIS in FDCH Political Transcripts).
431. See King, supra note 72, at 209-12.
432. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976) (refusing to suppress, in
a civil tax proceeding, evidence which the Los Angeles Police had illegally obtained and then given
to the Service). See generally Craig W. Budner, Note, The ExclusionaryRule's ApplicationIn Tax
Proceedings:Reconcilingthe Rule'sPurposeforTax Defendants, 68 TEx. L. REV. 789,789 (1990)
(concluding that "[c]ourts.. . have failed to give the rule its full effect in tax proceedings"). Prior
to Janis, only one circuit court had suppressed evidence in a civil tax matter. See Pizzarello v.
United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1969). Since Janis, however, courts have almost
uniformly refused to apply the exclusionary rule in civil tax cases, even where the Service itself
committed the illegal search and is not simply using the fruits of another agency's illegal search,
as in Janis.See, e.g., United States v. Speck, No. C-97-828 EFL, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8795, at
*9-13 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1997) (reviewing cases). But see Vander Linden v. United States, 502
F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (excluding evidence in civil proceeding).
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The RRA 98 rhetoric comparing tax determination to criminal justice
was surprisingly robust. It was simply too powerful to let go. 433 For
example, when former Commissioner Margaret M. Richardson explained
her opposition to shifting the burden of proof in tax cases, Senator Roth
interrupted in this colloquy:
Ms. Richardson.... What concerns me, and I think many
people who have worked in the tax area, is that the taxpayer
really is in possession of the facts and does have the
knowledge aboutThe Chairman.Isn't a person accused of a crime, a murder,
also the one, peculiarly, with the knowledge and information?
Ms. Richardson.Well, we are talking4about civil proceedings
here, not criminal proceedings....
At the same time that the rhetoric elevated the value of Autonomy
through comparing tax determination with criminal convictions, it also
deflated the idea of a "true" tax liability. After all, the less one believes in
Truth, the less power it has against Autonomy. For example, if determining
one's tax liability becomes so complicated that reasonable minds can
disagree on the "proper" tax, then it becomes difficult to maintain that
there is a "proper" tax at all. Tax liabilities become contingent on
circumstances, the most important being the identity of the decisionmaker.
It thus becomes easier to view the Service's tax determination and
collection decisions as illegitimate exercises of powers and it becomes
easier to promote Autonomy over Truth.
It is for this reason that an undercurrent of distrust about "true" tax
liability-much less noticeable than the criminal justice rhetoric but
nonetheless detectable-assumes an importance that might otherwise
escape notice. For example, in another news conference shortly after the
September Senate Finance Committee hearings, Rep. Bill Archer, Chair of
the House Ways and Means Committee, explained why he thought that the
"bigger part of the problem is the complexity of the code itself:"
Because, income is a subjective term. No two people agree on
precisely what is income for tax purposes. And as a result, the

433. In the actual statute, however, Congress reverted to form by repeatedly excepting criminal
investigations from the protections otherwise granted taxpayers. For example, § 7602(c) restricts
the Service's ability to contact third parties, except in criminal investigations; § 7612 restricts the
Service's ability to summons source code software, except in criminal investigations; § 7609
protections were expanded to all third party summonses, except those issued in criminal
investigations; under § 7525 taxpayers can keep secret certain prior communications with their tax
advisors in civil audits, but not in criminal investigations.
434. IRS Restructuring,supra note 425, at 68.
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Congress over the years has been redefining it. And
redefining it. And redefining it. And, I don't think that will
ever stop as long as income is the base of our tax system. And
we charge the IRS with an enormous responsibility to go
through and evaluate big, gray areas. And that is not a good
tax system.435
Of course Archer, and some others who sounded this theme, were using
it to segue into their arguments for alternative taxing regimes, such as flat
taxes or consumption taxes. While this theme provides a predicate for
those arguments, it also provides the predicate for devaluing Truth relative
to other important social values, such as Autonomy.
Archer was not alone in linking the rhetoric of complexity to the
Service's inability to determine the true tax. Senator Roth likened the Code
to "a mine field for most Americans, and even too complex to be
efficiently and consistently administered by the Internal Revenue
Service. 436 And even in the budget hearings, held by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Treasury and General
Government, the Chairman, Sen. Campbell, noted that "[tiaxpayers are
tired of being notified years after they have filed that they have an
additional tax obligation, which has by then grown to several times the
initial debt because of interest and penalties. 437 Implicit in that statement
is a denial that there is a "true" liability. The Service's redetermination has
not simply found the correct
liability but has in fact changed it to add a
4 38
new, additionalliability.
The same theme can be found in reports from the more neutral General
Accounting Office. For example, in its report to Senator Roth on the
results of its independent investigation into the April 1998 allegations of
Service abuse, the GAO concluded that the allegations were substantially
untrue, but nonetheless
several of these cases are illustrative of concerns raised in our
prior work. We previously reported that (1) the complexity

435. Representative Bill Archer, News Conference (Sept. 30, 1997) (transcript available on
LEXIS in FDCH Political Transcripts). Of course, Archer was trying to segue into his favorite
reform: consumption tax. See id.
436. IRS Oversight, supra note 425, at 2.
437. Internal Revenue Services Methods, HearingBefore a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 2 (1998).
438. In contrast, those senators who opposed the hearings still emphasized the importance of
"truth" in tax reporting. "Americans expect that everyone else who enjoys the benefits that taxes
pay for will shoulder their share of the burden as well.., that everyone is filing returns and the
amounts claimed on those returns are accurate and true." IRS Oversight, supra note 425, at 3
(opening statement of Sen. Max Baucus).
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and vagueness of the tax code cause differences in
interpretation and (2) the tax system creates a tension in
seeking a proper balance between the tax administrator's need
for information and the taxpayer's burden in providing
information.439
In contrast to their doubts about the existence of "true" liability,
members expressed no doubts regarding citizen rights to be free of
government intrusion. In almost all the hearings between September 1997
and April 1998, in almost every statement, in the questioning of almost
every witness, and in almost every press conference, Senators and
Representatives continually expressed concerns about the Service's ability
to reach into taxpayers' personal affairs for, assertedly, no legitimate
reason.
I think we are all concerned about stories that we hear every
day from our constituents about how they are being abused,
about how heavy handed the IRS is, and how it uses tactics
that we would view, and I think the average American would
view, as inappropriate." '
This image is what gave the hearings such punch: the vision of "the
biggest network of potential intrusion into the privacy of every American"
jack-booting its way into the living rooms and lives of good American
citizens.41 In the Senate hearings, Senators were repeatedly shocked,
shocked to discover that "[t]he IRS can seize property, paychecks, and
even the residences of the people it serves. Businesses can be padlocked,
sometimes causing hundreds of employees who are also taxpayers to be
put out of work." 2 These intrusions caused fear and loathing as witnessed

439. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, CommITTEE ON FINANCE,
U.S. SENATE, supra note 428. Note that this is not a publically available document on the GAO
website. Tax Analysts obtained it under a Freedom of Information Act Request. It is interesting to
note that this GAO report, which could be read as critical of the Senate Finance Committee
hearings, was not released nor commented on by the Finance Committee member, Senator Roth,
who requested it, even though Senator Roth issued a press release touting the tepid results of
another GAO report, investigating allegations of Service management retaliation for whistle
blowing, which found that the Service's records were not sufficiently well kept to either support
to rebut the charges. See id.; see also Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., Roth Release on GAO Report on
Alleged IRS Employee Misconduct, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 118-100 (1999) (Tax Analysts Doc.
No. 1999-21306).
440. Practicesand Procedures, supra note 24, at 16 (opening remarks of Senator Phil

Gramm).
441. Representative Bill Archer, News Conference (Sept. 30, 1997) (transcript available on
LEXIS in FDCH Political Transcripts).
442. Practicesand Procedures,supra note 24, at 2 (statement of Senator William V. Roth).
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by the display of abused taxpayers "whose lives have been altered by IRS
actions. These men and women have related their sometimes tragic
experiences, not out ofvindictiveness or mean-spiritedness, but out of deep
concern and a fundamental belief that such a violation
of their civil rights
443
should not have taken place, not in America.
2. Checks and Balances
The rhetorical response to the litany of abuses recited at the hearings
was to speak the virtues of adversarial process. Witnesses testified that
asserted abuses came about because the Service had unreviewed power to
make tax determination and tax collection decisions. "The IRS can take a
taxpayer's home by just the signature of the district director alone. The
irony of that rule is that it was part of the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights." 4 "
In other words, the inquisitorial paradigm reliance on internal checks was
not working.
Seizures may be done for status and promotions as much
as for enforcement. Not only are levies and seizures measures
of an employee's performance, but so is the number of cases
referred to the Criminal Division.
In other words, while there may be no basis in fact for a
criminal referral, a taxpayer's life may well be turned upside
down simply to keep an employee's or district's performance
statistics up.
Liens and levies may be filed against those whom the IRS
knows have no liability for a particular tax. Parents, relatives,
a company employee may have liens filed against their
property or have a paycheck levied in order to get the real
taxpayer to comply '4 What was needed to cure these abuses was an adversarial check. "See,
the problem that you have is that you have got an internal conflict of
interest within the IRS. They are their own judge and jury over people's
lives. Let us remove that. This will cure the 'Ivory Soap's' worth of
taxpayer abuse. 446 Specifically, the rhetoric asserted that only an

443. Id.Again, note that Senators who opposed the hearings sought, unsuccessfully, to counter
this theme with one of tax compliance: "How can we spend 4 days talking about a handful of cases
that the IRS might or might not have mishandled yet not spend a single minute talking about how
some Americans are flouting the tax laws?" IRS Oversight,supra note 425, at 4 (opening statement
of Senator Max Baucus).
444. Practicesand Procedures,supra note 24, at 40 (testimony of Robert Schriebman).
445. Id. at 3-4 (opening statement of Senator William V. Roth) (describing forthcoming
witness testimony).
446. Id. at 58 (testimony of Robert Schreibman).
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adversarial process where a neutral third-party decisionmaker reviewed
and approved Service actions could provide the appropriate checks and
balances and prevent the abuse of citizen autonomy:
I am still totally convinced that the problem is this agency
has too much unchecked power. An agency in a free society
should never have the ability to investigate, evaluate, and
basically prosecute, all wrapped up into one. There clearly is
an absence of checks and balances within this agency, and I
think it needs to be changed.
* ' .With the Internal Revenue Service, you have no
external checks, and I think, basically, that is the problem." 7
As Senator Roth summed it up: "Perhaps most importantly, reform must
go beyond a few minor improvements of strengthening taxpayer
protections to literally addressing the balance of power between the
taxpayer and the agency."448
3. Old Whine In New Bottles: The Contrast
Between 1998 and 1953
RRA 98 was not the first time that Congress reorganized the Service.
An equally significant reorganization took place in the early 1950's, after
the House Ways and Means Committee spent some two years investigating
what was then called the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("Bureau") and
issued its chief findings in a 1953 report commonly called the King
Report.44 9 As in 1997 and 1998 Congress held high-profile hearings
exploring allegations ofcorruption and abuse. Although the events leading
to and resulting in the reorganization of the Bureau into the Service are
beyond the scope of this article, even a cursory comparison between the
1997-1998 Senate Finance Committee activities and the 1951-1953 Ways
and Means Committee activities demonstrates two rather startling
contrasts.
The first contrast is in rhetoric. As demonstrated above, the 1998
reformers spoke in terms of outrage over alleged Service employee
447. IRS Oversight,supra note 425, at 211 (opening statement of Senator Phil Gramm). Note
again the use of the word "prosecute," implicitly labeling tax determination as a criminal process.
448. IRS Restructuring,supra note 425, at 4 (opening statement of Senator William V. Roth).
449. H.R. REP. No. 82-2518 (1953) [hereinafter KING REPORT]. The Committee's work was
done chiefly through a Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, chaired
alternatively by Cecil R. King (D-N.Y.) and Robert W. Kean (R-N.J.) depending on which party
controlled the House at the time. A follow-up report from the Subcommittee to the full Committee
in later 1953 is known as the "Kean Report." SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
LAWS, 82NDCONG., INTERNALREVENUE INVESTIGATION (Subcomm. Print 1953) (by Representative
Robert W. Kean) [hereinafter KEAN REPORT].
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misconduct and, in so doing, stressed the need for outside "independent"
bodies to check the power of Service employees, not trusting the
employees or internal management to prevent the alleged abuses. In
contrast, the 1953 reformers spoke in far more balanced tones:
Revelations by your subcommittee of misconduct at
various levels of the Bureau have received much public
attention. That the apparent criminality of certain Bureau
employees should have come to light only as a result of a
congressional investigation proves that the heretofore existing
self-policing devices of the Bureau ...have been gravely
inadequate.
...Public confidence in the integrity of employees of the
Bureau... is essential to preservation of this self-assessment
system. The new measures to eradicate corruption in the
Bureau... will contribute to such public confidence. Equally
important,however, to the preservationoffaith in the honesty
of the Bureau is the careful avoidance of unfounded and
unsubstantiated
charges against the Bureau and its
450
employees.
The reactions of the 1953 Congress to the abuses uncovered, however,
were very different from the reactions of the 1998 Congress. Whereas the
1998 rhetoric advocated the creation of external adversarial checks and
balances, the 1953 reformers advocated stronger internal checks and
balances through creation of an internal Inspection Service to investigate
allegations of abuse and, through periodic audits of employees and net
worth reports, to guard against the "revenue officer who derives profit
from abuse of his office. 45 '
Admittedly, the remedies discussed above are not
infallible. It is clear, however, that they will be of great value
to the Bureau in preventing a recurrence of the conditions
exposed by your subcommittee. Careful investigation by the
Inspection Service of each report... together with diligent
enforcement of the new net worth questionnaire and auditing
programs, should result in substantial elimination of
corruption in the Bureau without injury to the great mass of
honest and efficient employees.452

450. KING REPORT, supra note 449, at 5 (emphasis added).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 7.
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The second contrast makes these rhetorical differences all the more
surprising. Both the 1998 and the 1953 reformers spoke of exposing abuses
within the Service organization. Yet the 1953 reformers truly found abuse
and corruption running rampant in the system. They developed their case
for reform after two years of extensive and careful investigations, which
resulted in the removal or resignation of an extraordinary number of highlevel officials, including the Assistant Commissioner in Charge of
Operations, the Chief Counsel, the Assistant Attorney General in Charge
of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and nine of the sixty-four
Collectors, three of whom were also criminally prosecuted.453 Additionally,
the subcommittee directed the Service to investigate all Bureau employees
"against whom seemingly derogatory information had been received" and
disciplinary action was recommended in over 17% of the cases
reviewed.454
In contrast, the 1998 reformers truly did not find abuse and corruption
in the Service, much less running rampant. When the smoke cleared and
the mirrors were put away, the General Accounting Office,455 the Treasury
Inspector General's Office, and the Service's Inspection Office all
performed thorough inquiries of all allegations made.456 The most
significant finding made was that Service management employees had
shared condensed statistical data on seizures with field employees in an
inappropriate manner through one particular document.45 7 The document
had been cleared by the Office of Chief Counsel on the condition that
certain language be removed.458 While that language was indeed removed,
later revisions reintroduced the same concepts and senior management
failed to catch the error before distributing the document and directing that
it be shared with field employees.4 9 Consequently, there were violations
of law and policy regarding use of enforcement statistics in every District.
In February 1998, Commissioner Rossotti created a special panel of
senior government officials, all from outside the Service, to review all

453. KEAN REPORT, supra note 449, at 3 (documenting the resignation or removal of nine
collectors); KING REPORT, supra note 449, at 2 (documenting the other terminations).
454. KING REPORT, supra note 449, at 6.
455. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S.
SENATE, supra note 428.
456. See Amy Hamilton, IRS Misuse of Statistics-The Findingsand the Fallout, 98 TAX
NoTEs TODAY 189-5 (Sept. 30, 1998) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 98-29258).
457. See id. This was the finding of the Treasury's Office of the Inspector General and the
Service's internal Inspection Office. Id. The GAO focused on the claims made by witnesses in the
April 1998 hearings, finding them unsupported. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, supra note 428.

458. Hamilton, supra note 456.
459. Id.
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allegations and all the investigations generated by the hearings.460 The
special panel finished its work in September, concluding that there was a
clear failure of leadership as a result of which mid-level managers
increased emphasis on collection tools, specifically seizures.46' However,
"no direct connection has yet been established between the violations of P1-20 and TBOR before the Panel and specific Collection actions such as
seizures that may have been inappropriate. 4 62 Further, "there is nothing in
the record before the panel that indicates these infractions resulted in
activity that could be characterized
as an illegal seizure or potential
463
mistreatment of taxpayers.
The 1997 and 1998 Senate Finance Committee "investigations"
resulted in no criminal prosecutions, no forced resignations, no removal
from office. The sole individual implicated in the congressional hearings,
a mid-level manager in the Arkansas-Oklahoma District, was "portrayed
as a national symbol for collection abuses ... and characterized as a
collection rogue by the national press. ',464 And yet, of the twenty
allegations against this individual--described in an eighty page narrative
report with 2,200 pages of attachments reflecting interviews with 140
people, including every revenue officer and manager in the individual's
office-only six violations of policy were substantiated, none involving
abuse of specific taxpayers. 465 Collectively, the follow-up investigations on
the 467 cases of alleged seizure abuses against taxpayers resulted in a
finding that the Service followed all applicable rules and regulations in 337
cases and the violations in the other 130 were generally foot-faults, such
as not investigating all alternatives to seizure, seizing an asset that could
result in a significant hardship to the taxpayer who owed the tax, and not
making enough attempts to contact the taxpayer personally before making
the seizure.46 6 After reviewing the results of these investigations, the
special panel concluded that the inappropriate activity documented did not
support any disciplinary action greater than a suspension of fourteen
days. 467 The panel concluded that "more severe action was not appropriate,
and if taken, would not withstand third party scrutiny. ,468 And yet after
reviewing the same results, Senate Finance Committee Chair William Roth
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. (quoting the special panel's conclusions).
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. One related to improper tracking of a document. The others related to improper use
of statistics in personnel evaluations and in setting group goals. Id.
466. See Amy Hamilton, IRS Releases Reviews ofSeizure Activity, ExaminationDivision, 80
TAX NOTES TODAY 160 (July 13, 1998).
467. Hamilton, supra note 456.
468. Id. (quoting panel report).
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concluded they were "a stunning confession of the sins of the IRS." 469 The
independent panel simply disagreed with the politician running for reelection.
In sum, although the rhetoric was hot in 1997 and 1998, the actual
factual case for reform was lukewarm at best. Nonetheless, the taxwriters
managed to cook up a goulash of statutes in the RRA 98 which had some
real bite.
B. The Bite
The words "Restructuring" and "Reform" in RRA 98's title are apt. The
Act reflected a basic distrust of the Service's ability to make the "right" tax
determination and collection decisions, a basic distrust of the Service's
evidence-gathering powers, and a belief that internal administrative checks
were not enough to preserve the correct balance between Autonomy and
Truth. While the legislative process, particularly the input of the Service
(unwelcome as it was) moderated much of the wildness of the rhetorical
proposals, the same ideas are present in the statute: (a) removal of
decisional authority from the Service and into either "external" or
"internal" third parties, thus transforming the Service from a
decisionmaker into a litigant; and (b) a shift, in certain situations, to
preferring Autonomy over Truth. After first discussing some of the
significant structural changes that affected both decisionmaking and
evidence-gathering powers, this subsection will then consider those
changes primarily affecting the Service's tax determination powers, tax
collection powers, and evidence-gathering powers.
1. Adversarial Structural Changes
Five of RRA 98's structural changes illustrate this Article's thesis. Two
indirect restrictions on the Service's decisionmaking powers lay in the
creation of the external Oversight Board and an "external" internal
inspection function. Three other structural changes more directly affected
the Service's ability to make tax determination and tax collection
decisions. First, Congress transformed the Office of the Taxpayer
Advocate (OTA) from a function providing "internal" administrative
review to one providing quasi-adversarial review, with the effect of
diluting the Service's decisionmaking authority. Second, Congress took the
first steps in turning the Office of Appeals from a management review
process into an administrative law judge review process. Third, Congress
externalized the Service's internal procedural manual by transforming it

469. Amy Hamilton, New IRS Internal Audits: A 'Stunning Confession'? 80 TAX NoTEs
TODAY 286 (July 20, 1998).
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into binding law, again with the effect of diluting the Service's
decisionmaking authority. Each of these moves replaced inquisitorial
process with adversarial process. I shall discuss each in turn.
a. External Decisionmakers
The most widely noted structural changes in RRA 98 were creation of
two external oversight functions: the Oversight Board47 ° and the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). 4"' These changes only
indirectly impinged on the Service's substantive tax administration
decisionmaking. They did however, reflect a basic distrust-inherent in the
adversarial process view-that internal oversight can prevent inquisitorial
powers from being abused. In this way they represent a partial shift
towards adversarial process.
The connection between the Oversight Board and abuse is not
immediately obvious. The idea of an Oversight Board came from the
earlier IRS Restructuring Commission, co-chaired by Sen. Kerry and Rep.
Portman. The Commission's recommendation had nothing to do with
preventing abuses; the Commission had not found abuse to be a
problem.472 Consistent with that idea, RRA 98 provides that the purpose
of the Oversight Board is to "oversee the Internal Revenue Service in its
administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the
execution and application of the internal revenue laws or related statutes
and tax conventions to which the United States is a party."47' 3 The Senate
Finance Committee justified the Oversight Board by noting that "while the
Treasury is responsible for IRS oversight, it has generally provided little
consistent strategic oversight or guidance to the IRS. The Secretary and
Deputy Secretary have many other broad responsibilities and generally
' Rep. Newt Gingrich put it
leave the IRS largely independent."474
more
bluntly: "The Secretary of the Treasury is too busy to manage the IRS. '475
After the September 1997 hearings, however, taxwriters had no
difficulty tying the Oversight Board recommendation to the prevention of
abuse. Gingrich did so in the course of criticizing President's Clinton's
creation of an internal oversight board: "In other words, [Clinton's]
response to the dozens of horror stories we have heard from innocent

470. § 7802.
471. § 7803.
472. PracticesandProcedures,supranote 24, at 10 (statement ofRepresentative Steny Hoyer)
(quoting the IRS Restructuring Commission which found "'very few examples of IRS personnel
abusing power."')
473. § 7802(c)(1)(A).
474. SEN. REP. No. 105-174, at 11 (1998).
475. Representative Newt Gingrich, Remarks at the National Press Club (Sept. 30, 1997)
(transcript available on LEXIS in FDCH Political Transcripts).
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taxpayers over recent weeks is that we leave exactly the same people in
' Rep. Grassley
charge who have already failed to solve the problem."476
4
made the same tie-in during the September hearings. " The point is not
that these are logical statements or connections, but that they evidence a
distrust of internal administrative oversight as a check on the Service's
powers.
Likewise, Congress created TIGTA because it was concerned that the
internal Office of the Chief Inspector "lacks sufficient structural and actual
autonomy from the agency it is charged with monitoring and overseeing.
Further the current relationship between the Treasury IG and the IRS
Office ofthe Chief Inspector does not foster appropriate oversight over the
IRS. '478 How TIGTA's role as an external decisionmaker affects the
Service's decisionmaking will become clearer in the discussion ofthe "Ten
Deadly Sins" below.
b. Quasi-External Decisionmakers: Offices of Taxpayer
Advocate and Appeals
Traditionally, "internal" oversight had been performed through
managerial review. For example, before RRA 98, the Code provided that
a working level revenue officer could not seize and sell a taxpayer's
primary residence without obtaining approval from the District Director.4 79
As noted above by one of the witnesses at the September 1997 hearings,
this had actually been a reform in TBOR I. It was a reform consistent with
inquisitorial process.
Although as a statutory matter, the TBOR I reform created only one
layer of review, as a functional matter, it created four separate formal
approvals because the revenue officer had to go up the chain of review:
first to his or her group manager, then to the Collection Branch Chief, then
to District Counsel, and finally to the District Director. Additionally, there
were often other layers of review because the Branch Chief and District
Director each had deputies who would generally participate in a decision
of that magnitude and the review process in the District Counsel's office
often involved at least two attorneys reviewing the file, the working level
attorney and that attorney's line manager. This process was not necessary

476. Id.
477. See Practice& Procedures,supranote 24, at 6. Grassley criticized the Service's repeated
invocation of§ 6103 to refuse to answer questions concerning specific cases. Grassley thought that
doing so "also protects the privacy of those who abuse the taxpayers' rights, who mislead Congress,
and who might use collection quotas in tax enforcement despite their illegalities. Such abuses occur
when independent oversight is lacking .... Hence, the commission's recommendations for an
independent board over the IRS." Id.
478. S.REP, No. 105-174, at 29 (1998).
479. § 6335(e)(1) (1997).
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for most other levies; in most cases it was the revenue officer alone who
made the decision of which assets of the taxpayer to levy without
managerial review for each and every attempt. But it was necessary for
some others (such as when seizing and selling the taxpayer's asset would
cause problems for third parties, such as nursing home residents). The
Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) helped employees know when they
needed to obtain supervisory approval of levies.
This kind of managerial review is part of an inquisitorial system of tax
administration because internally reviewed decisions are still institutional
decisions, only made by higher-level employees rather than lower-level
employees or, in a less hierarchical system, by larger rather than smaller
groups of employees.4"' It is this kind of internal review which the
Supreme Court relied on as part of its inquisitorial logic. For example, in
United States v. Arthur Young 48 ' the Court declined to create an
accountant-client privilege to protect certain documents from Service
scrutiny, partly because
the IRS has demonstrated administrative sensitivity to the
concerns expressed by the accounting profession by
tightening its internal requirements for the issuance of such
summonses. Although these IRS guidelines were not
applicable during the years at issue in this case, their
promulgation further refutes respondents' fairness argument
and reflects an administrative flexibility that reinforces our
decision not to reduce irrevocably the § 7602 summons
power.48 2
Before RRA 98, the OTA fit comfortably into this inquisitorial
paradigm of management review. The predecessor to the OTA was the
Office of the Ombudsman, created in 1979 to oversee operation of the
Problem Resolution Program (PRP). PRP was designed to provide
continuous administrative review over the tax collection process.48 3
Because so much of the Service's operation, including tax collection, was
automated, taxpayers were vulnerable to computer failure since computer
programs could not account for the variety of individual circumstances.484
Taxpayers were also vulnerable to human failure as well since, like a

480. The extent to which a bureaucracy is and is not hierarchical is a fascinating area of study,
far beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to say that my eight year experience in the Office of
Chief Counsel was that the organization was simultaneously quite hierarchical and quite flat.
481. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
482. Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted). See also discussion of Powell, supra notes 269, 289,
411.
483. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 215.
484. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, at § 15.0211].
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computer program, the IRM could not account for and give proper
instructions for all circumstances. The Ombudsman reviewed all cases
where taxpayers complained that collection actions were inappropriate,
whether initiated by computer or by employees.485 The Ombudsman was
restricted to hearing only those complaints from taxpayers who could show
that the collection action was causing or about to cause them "significant
hardship. 486 The PRP's structure involved detailing revenue officers to
work as Problem Resolution Officers (PROs), giving them broad exposure
in seeing how other parts of the Service worked (or not), and then sending
them back to their posts of duty, hopefully to carry back and apply their
new knowledge. While on detail to the PRP, PROs remained career
Service employees who, while working with the Ombudsman, still worked
for the top management layers in each geographic Collection function.48 7
Over time, Congress codified the Service's administrative initiative. In
1988, in the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR I), Congress authorized
the Ombudsman to formalize its decisions about the appropriateness of
certain collection activities in Taxpayer Assistance Orders (TAOs).488
Congress continued the limitation on OTA jurisdiction to situations where
a taxpayer was suffering or about to suffer a "significant hardship. 489 In
1996, Congress renamed the Ombudsman as the Taxpayer Advocate in
TBOR 11.490 In all these reforms, Congress did not change the PRP
structure. Career Service employees still reviewed the decisions of other
career Service employees. Thus, the Service remained the institutional
decisionmaker about what collection actions to take. For what it is worth,
practitioners believed it to be a successful program.49'

485. Id. at § 15.02[2].
486. Id.
487. See NAT'LTAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNALREVENUE SERV., THENATIONALTAXPAYER
ADVOCATE'S REPORT To CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 2004 OBJECTIVES, app. 1 (2003) (Tax Analysts
Doc. No. 2003-16146).
488. § 7811. TBOR was enacted as part of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647 102 Stat. 3342 (1998). Subtitle J of the legislation was the first
Taxpayer Bill of Rights which created § 7811.
489. § 7811 (a)(1)(A). In 1996, Congress renamed the Ombudsman the "Taxpayer Advocate"
(TPA) in TBOR II. The TPA's name was again changed in RRA 98 to the "National Taxpayer
Advocate" (NTA) to distinguish the head of the office from the field TPAs. For simplicity, I shall
use "NTA" to refer to that position, whether it was called Ombudsman, Taxpayer Advocate, and
National Taxpayer Advocate.
490. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 101(b)(l)(B), 110 Stat. 1452, 1455
(1996).
491. Practices & Procedures, supra note 24, at 30. (testimony of Robert L. Goldstein,
Chairman, Relations with IRS Committee, New York Society of Certified Public Accountants)
("The Problems Resolution Program has been extremely successful and praised by practitioners and
taxpayer[s] alike, and offers an example of how different attitudes by IRS personnel, taxpayers and
their representatives emerge when the customer-service model is used.").
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RRA 98 made significant changes to the PRP. It established the OTA
as an independent administrative body within the Service consisting ofthe
National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) and a system of local taxpayer
advocates.4 92 The Service renamed the new OTA organization the
Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS).4 93 The legislation ensured
independence by (a) placing all TAS employees under direct line authority
of the NTA, (b) making the TAS a separate career path for employees, thus
severing TAS employees from Service employees, (c) requiring that the
NTA not be otherwise employed by the Service for the 2 years before
appointment and 5 years after resignation, (d) providing that the NTA
answered only to the Commissioner for decisions in individual cases, (e)
requiring the NTA to submit annual reports directly to Congress, without
review by the Service, and (f) providing that TAS employees need not
"disclose to the Internal Revenue Service contact with, or information
provided by" taxpayers.494 Further, RRA 98 expanded the TAS jurisdiction
from cases where a taxpayer alleged significant hardship to other
appropriate situations, notably "an immediate threat of adverse action" or
"a delay of more than 30 days in resolving the taxpayer account
problems 495
Like the pre-RRA 98 OTA, the pre-RRA 98 Office of Appeals fit
comfortably within the inquisitorial paradigm. The functional predecessor
to Appeals became the Office of Appeals as part of the Reorganization
Plan #1 in 1952.496 In contrast to the OTA, which provided administrative
review over collection, Appeals traditionally provided administrative
review over the tax determination process. 497 As described above in
Section III-B, the decision of Appeals was the decision of the Service. PreRRA 98, Appeals settled over 90% of the cases that came to it.498 The way

492. See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE NATIONAL
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S FiSCAL YEAR 2002 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2001) available

at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tas02obj.pdf. (last visited Aug. 3, 2003).
493. Id.
494. § 7803(c). Further supporting the independent nature of the TAS is the Service's ruling
that the confidentiality section, § 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv), permits TAS employees to ignore the general
reporting requirements of § 7214(a)(8), which generally requires Service employees to report
taxpayer wrongdoing. See I.R.S. Notice CC-2001-40 (Aug. 16, 2001).
495. § 7811(a)(2).
496. LAURENCE F. CASEY, I FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE §§ 1.7-1.9 (1955).
497. Before RRA 98, Appeals handled only a small volume of collection issues; taxpayers
were not confident that Appeals had either the expertise or inclination to perform a useful review
function in collection situations. See Practices & Procedures,supra note 24, at 26 (testimony of
Joseph F. Lane).
498. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK (1996), availableathttp://www.irs.ustreas.gov/

taxstats/article/0,,id=97216,00.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) (showing Appeals settled 93.6% of
the cases it received); Curt Rubin, The New Ex ParteRule and Its Impact on IRS Appeals, 1999
TAX NOTES TODAY 74-118, 3, n.3 (1999) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 1999-14374).
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Appeals worked was that when taxpayers disagreed with a tax
determination decision, usually made by a revenue agent and memorialized
in a document called a Revenue Agent Report (RAR), they would protest
the decision to the revenue agent's supervisor and, if not satisfied, to
Appeals. Once received by Appeals, the assigned Appeals Officer would
conduct an in-house review, which would involve reviewing the RAR with
its author. The appeals officer would decide what additional information
he or she needed, if any, and from whom. The appeals officer would often
meet independently with the revenue agent and with the taxpayer.499 If the
taxpayer had invoked the Appeals process before being issued a Notice of
Deficiency, then Appeals would issue the Notice of Deficiency on behalf
of the Service which, as explained in Section III-B, represents the Service's
decision on tax liability and is given great deference by the courts.
RRA 98 contained two provisions which significantly changed the
relationship between Appeals and the rest of the Service.5" First, an offCode provision set up an exparte rule. Section 1001 of RRA 98 provided
that the Service must "ensure an independent appeals
function... including the prohibition ...of ex parte communications
between appeals officers and other Internal Revenue Service employees to
the extent that such communications appear to compromise the
independence of the appeals officers."' ' Second, section 3421 of RRA 98
(codified as I.R.C. subsection 6320 and 6330) expanded Appeals'
involvement in tax collection by creating an administrative appeals process
for certain collection decisions and directing that Appeals be the reviewing
function. I consider the adversarial process inherent in those "Collection
Due Process" provisions below.
In sum, RRA 98 took what had been two successful internal review
processes-in the Office of Appeals and the Office of the National
Taxpayer Advocate-and transformed them into quasi-adversarial
processes. While keeping these offices nominally within the Service's
chain of command, Congress restructured their relationship with the rest
of the Service functions so that they would operate more like external
checks rather than internal checks. In doing this, Congress diluted the
Service's ability to make tax determination and tax collection decisions
because the "independent" function became an arbiter between the Service
and the taxpayer, making the Service less the decisionmaker and more the
litigant. Thus, the more that the newly independent "internal" functions
make decisions, the more they turn the inquisitorial process of tax

499. See Rubin, supra note 498, 4, 19.
500. RRA 98 does not officially create the office; it just assumes its existence in two
provisions. See §§ 1001, 3421.
501. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 1001(4) (1998).
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administration into an adversarial process of tax administration. This effect
becomes more evident upon a closer examination of two problems that
have arisen with respect to these structural changes.
First, transformation of the OTA into the "independent" TAS created
the potential problem of a "shadow Service" within the Service, a gadfly
decisionmaker, sapping decisional authority from the Service. Specifically,
while it is clear that the TAS can override proceduraldecisions made by
the Service (usually in tax collection, but sometimes in tax determination
as well, such as helping taxpayers get access to Appeals), what remains
unsettled is the extent to which the TAS can override substantive decisions
using the TAO power. On the one hand, section 7811 authorizes a TAO to
make the Service "cease any action, take any action as permitted by law,
or refrain from taking any action, with respect to the taxpayer
under... any other provision of law which is specifically described by the
On the other hand, the ellipses here
National Taxpayer Advocate . "..."502
are important because what comes in them is a list of purely procedural
provisions and so the general phrase "any other provision of law" could be
construed to mean any other provision like the procedural provisions listed
before, thus restricting TAO authority to procedural matters only." 3
Each of the first two National Taxpayer Advocates responded to this
potential problem, albeit with different approaches. The first Taxpayer
Advocate, W. Val Oveson, declared bluntly "I am committed personally
to testing my authority in TAO issues."5 °4 And so he did, attempting, for
example, to direct the Service to make an offset bypass refund after it had
already performed the offset.50 5 That is, whenever a taxpayer overpays one
tax liability but owes money on another (or has other unpaid government
debts), the Service has the discretion to either refund the overpayment or
offset it against the other liability.50 6 Normally, the Service offsets the
overpayment. An "offset bypass refund" is when the Service decides to
bypass its normal procedure and refund the overpayment to the taxpayer
because the taxpayer shows that he or she really and truly needs the

502. Id.§ 7811.
503. This premise, of course, is an application of the well-settled principle ejusdem generis
that a general catchall phrase which follows a specific list of items is "construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."
SUTHERLAND, 2A STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 47.17 n.4 (1992). This principle is no stranger to
tax statutes. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. I.R.S., 117 F.3d 607, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (construing
term "data" in § 6103(b)(2)(A)).
504. Quoted in Sheryl Stratton, New Taxpayer Advocate, Man on a Mission, 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 205-3 (1998) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 98-31546).
505. See Tech. Adv. Mem. CCA 199913028 (Feb. 2, 1999).
506. § 6402. For some types of debts, such as unpaid child support obligations, the Service
has no discretion but must perform the offset. § 6402(c).
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money." 7 In one case, the TPA was apparently convinced that a taxpayer
was suffering a significant hardship by not receiving the overpayment and
tried to issue a TAO to order the Service to refund an overpayment. But the
Service Center had already applied the overpayment to another debt. The
TAO ordered the Service Center to undo the offset and issue a refund
instead. The Service refused, with the Office of Chief Counsel explaining
that "[o]nce the overpayment is credited, and the liability is paid, the
overpayment ceases to exist.., and there is no authority for the Secretary,
absent clerical or mathematical error, to reverse a508tax payment properly
credited to an outstanding liability of a taxpayer.
This attempted TAO illustrates how the TAS can potentially operate to
dilute the decisionmaking authority of the Service. In effect, the Service
had decided to collect a taxpayer's tax liability through the offset of an
overpayment. As discussed above, pre-RRA 98 that decision would have
been the end of the matter: the Service's discretion on how to collect the
taxes owed was administrative and required no third-party decisionmaker
to approve. To the extent the PRP would become involved, it would
participate in the decision as part of the Service. Post-RRA 98, however,
the TAS becomes, in effect, a third-party decisionmaker to review the
Service's collection action and it makes its decision after weighing and
reviewing the available evidence, gathered from both the Service and the
taxpayer.
The second National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina E. Olson, has been more
circumspect, and more conflicted. In her first report to Congress she raised
as simply an issue "to explore" the question of whether TAS employees are
"merely facilitators or mediators between taxpayers and other IRS
functions" or whether they should "be authorized to render substantive
determinations in taxpayer cases?"50 9 In another part of the report,
however, she asserted that "[i]t is a misnomer to describe the Taxpayer
Advocate Service's authority to resolve taxpayer problems as 'merely'

507. See CCA 199913028, supra note 505.
508. Id.; see also Fine v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 684, 689 (1978) The Service
is not authorized or directed by anything in the Code, as petitioner contends, to
"reverse the offset of the husband's liability and reinstate the amount as it existed
prior to the overpayment." Indeed, a procedure of crediting and reversing credits
tentatively allowed could create chaos in the administration of the tax laws.
But see Comm'r v. Newport Indus., Inc., 121 F.2d 655, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1941) (upholding reversal
of erroneousapplication of payment and collecting cases supporting "the general rule that within
the period of limitations the Commissioner may reopen his own administrative rulings and
findings.").
509. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 487, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
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procedural.. While it is true that Taxpayer Advocate Service employees
cannot and should not make substantive determinations in cases, they can
still influence the outcome of a case."510 These statements-particularly the
term "merely"-lean towards a view that the TAS should take
decisionmaking authority away from the Service, one way or another. At
the same time, she cautioned that "The Taxpayer Advocate Service must
not set itself up as a second IRS." '
The potential for the TAS to dilute the decisionmaking authority of the
Service, as to substantive tax determination and tax collection decisions,
is also addressed in the 2001 Delegation Order from the Commissioner to
the National Taxpayer Advocate in which he delegates certain authorities
but not others. 1 2 The Delegation Order attempts to set boundaries on the
TAS. It explicitly declares that:
This delegation does not permit employees of the Taxpayer
Advocate Service to overrule determinations made by
employees of other IRS functions who have been delegated
comparable authority. To the extent the Taxpayer Advocate
Service employee disagrees with such a determination, a TAO
may be issued explaining the basis for disagreement and
ordering the function to reconsider its determination." 3
Further, it adopts (referencing an attached but unreleased legal
memorandum from the Office of Chief Counsel) the ejusdem generis
principle and confines TAO authority to statutory provisions similar to the
procedural ones listed in section 78110514
At this time, the extent to which RRA 98 has succeededin transforming
the TAS into a true third-party decisionmaker is unclear. What is clear,
however, is that RRA 98 replaced an inquisitorial structure with a structure
more amenable to adversarial process. The more the TAS exercises
independent judgments about tax determinations and tax collections, the
more it reduces the Service to just another party in an adversarial
process. 5"5 Instead of being trained to exercise neutral judgment without

510. Id. at 5-6.
511. Id.
512. Memorandum From the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Regarding delegation of
Authority to the National Taxpayer Advocate and Guidelines for Issuing Taxpayer Assistance
Orders (Jan. 17, 200 1) (reprinted in 2001 TAXNOTES TODAY 72-16 (Jan. 25, 200 1)(Tax Analysts
Doc. No. 2001-10757)).
513. Id. 3.
514. Id. 10.
515. One should not confuse the number of TAOs issued (very few) with the decisional
authority of the TAS. It is the ability of the TAS to issue TAOs which gives them the decisional
authority, not the actual use of TAOs. In practice, TAS employees try to first persuade the Service
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favor to the taxpayer or the government, Service employees can, with some
justification, tell themselves: "I do not have to worry about going too far
in the government's favor. If I am wrong, the taxpayer can take it to the
TAS." As the current National Taxpayer Advocate herself recently wrote,
the current structure "leads to two very different types of
relationships-partnership and adversarial-between Taxpayer Advocate
Service (TAS) employees and other Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
' In other words, to the extent the TAS is not the Service, it
employees."516
is therefore not the Service making the tax determination or tax collection
decision. The process thereby becomes less inquisitorial and more
adversarial. As a result, the TAS's role in tax administration and its
relationship with the Service remains problematic and contingent on the
leadership of the particular National Taxpayer Advocate.517
The second tax administration problem is caused by the exparte rule.
RRA 98's prohibition of exparte communications from Service employees
to Appeals Officers is a more subtle dilution of decisional authority than
the creation of the TAS as an agency-within-an-agency. The effect,
however, is similar in that it isolates Appeals from the other Service
components, transforming it into an "other" decisionmaker. Further, it
transforms the process by which Appeals makes its decisions into an
adversarial process with the taxpayer on one side and the Service function
(whether Exam or Collection) being appealed from on the other side.

employees to follow the TAS employee's decision voluntarily. As Nina Olson observed:
And they can use as the persuasion the fact that the taxpayer assistance order
exists-that's awfully persuasive. If I'm saying to someone, 'Look we can settle
this now or I can bring a lawsuit, now which would you rather do? I may lose my
lawsuit in the end, but you're going to be tied up and it's not going to be a lot of
fun. Now do you want to do that or do you want to sit down and talk to me
directly?' If you do it in that way, then the taxpayer assistance order becomes a
very powerful tool and you never have to use it. But you may have to.
Amy Hamilton et al., TaxpayerAdvocate Nina Olson Opens IRSReforms Next Chapter,2001 TAX
NOTES TODAY 73-1 (2001) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2001-10901).
516. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 487, at 1.
517. Thus, under the first National Taxpayer Advocate, the TAS locked horns with the Service.
The second National Taxpayer Advocate has taken a more balanced approach with her concept of
partnership, her focus on advocacy over raw power, and her work in creating an institutional history
within the Service of including the TAS in the planning stages of various initiatives and projects.
See generally NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 487; Hamilton et al., supra note 515. The
requirement that the National Taxpayer Advocate be an "outsider" only exacerbates the difficulty
of keeping the TAS "within" the Service.
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The ex parte rule itself is a creature of adversarial process."' "As a
general rule, ex parte communications by an adversary party to a decisionmaker in an adjudicatory proceeding are prohibited as fundamentally at
variance with our conceptions of due process. '51 9 As implied by the quote,
the rule only exists where you have two adversarial parties and a
decisionmaker. The rule is a necessary corollary to the "dialectic of the
adversary system. '520 It exists to ensure that the decisionmaker is not
unduly influenced by one of the adversarial parties by providing each
litigant equal access to the decisionmaker and equal opportunity to hear
and respond to what the other side says.
The potential transformative effects of the ex parte rule on Appeals
procedures are explored in Curt Rubin's thoughtful commentary on the
extent to which the new ex parte rules potentially require the Service to
"reconsider how Appeals fits into the overall scheme of tax administration
and how Appeals Officers will interact with other IRS officials in
performing Appeals' settlement role. 52 ' Mr. Rubin details quite well the
adversarial process which the ex parte rule could arguably require. For
example, he notes that when a case is protested to Appeals, the very
transmittal of the administrative file, along with additional information
provided to Appeals by the revenue agent which "typically contains the
5 22
thoughts and opinions of the revenue agent" is a communication.
Therefore, it could be that "allowing the appeals officer access to such
information, without giving the taxpayer the same access and a chance to
respond to such
information, is an ex parte communication prohibited by
523
the 1998 act.
The Service has not actually gone that far, concluding that "[t]he
statutory provision cannot... be interpreted as mandating a major redesign
of the fundamental processes Appeals has traditionally followed to carry
out its dispute resolution mission. 5 24 Nonetheless, the infliction of an ex
parterule on Appeals is a subtle step on the road to turning the Office of

518. See, e.g., United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[l]n our system,
adversary procedures are the general rule and ex parte examinations are disfavored. Adversary
proceedings protect the defendant's due process rights by providing the defendant a chance to
explain or rebut the prosecution's arguments.").
519. Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
520. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, J.R. & W. WILIAM HODES, I THE LAW OFLAWYERING § 3.3:501
(2d ed. Supp. 1992).
521. Rubin, supra note 498, 9 36.
522. Id. at 22.
523. Id.
524. Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404. The Service based this conclusion, in part, on the
fact that only ex parte communications which "'appear to compromise the independence' of
Appeals" were prohibited, in contrast to an earlier proposal which would have made Appeals fully
independent and would have prohibited "'any communication."' Id.
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Appeals into an administrative law court, similar to how the Board of Tax
Appeals was viewed in its early days. 2 '
c. Elevating the IRM into Law
The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) is a bodacious compendium of
instructions to Service employees. It translates both the tax administration
statutes and the Service's official policies into practical terms that
employees can follow. Think of it as a computer program written for
humans: it sets out the algorithms regulating each functional component
of the Service according to the Service's interpretation of the laws. It
translates broad principles into rules of action. It not only tells employees
how to make decisions but also tells them what records to keep, what
computer codes to enter and, basically, what "i's" to dot and what "t's" to
cross when executing the decisions that they make. Although publically
available, the IRM has long been considered an "internal" document,
written for the benefit of employees and not taxpayers. 26
The extent to which government agency personnel are bound by their
internal processing rules and regulations has long been an issue in
administrative law in general. For example, in UnitedStates v. Caceres,'2
the Supreme Court held that conversations taped by a Service employee
were admissible in a later criminal trial because the taping did not violate
either the Constitution or statutes even though the Service employee had
violated IRM procedures in taping. 28 In so holding, the Court emphasized
the necessity of preserving a sphere of autonomy for administrative
agencies to regulate the conduct oftheir employees without elevating those
regulations to the level of law:
Regulations governing the conduct of criminal
investigations are generally considered desirable, and may
well provide more valuable protection to the public at large
than the deterrence flowing from the occasional exclusion of
items of evidence in criminal trials. Although we do not
suggest that a suppression order in this case would cause the
IRS to abandon or modify its electronic surveillance
525. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716,725 (1929) ("The Board ofTax
Appeals is not a court. It is an executive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the
parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative
inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.").
526. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Goldman, 644 F. Supp. 101, 102 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (agreeing with the government that "the IRM is an internal handbook and ... the instructions
and guidelines contained therein are not mandatory and do not convey upon the taxpayer any
substantive rights").
527. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
528. Id. at 744, 757.
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regulations, we cannot ignore the possibility that a rigid
application of an exclusionary rule to every regulatory
violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the
formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial
and police procedures. Here, the Executive itself has provided
for internal sanctions in cases of knowing violations of the
electronic-surveillance regulations. To go beyond that, and
require exclusion in every case, would take away from the
Executive Department the primary responsibility for
fashioning the appropriate remedy for the violation of its
regulations. But since the content, and indeed the existence,
of the regulations would remain within the Executive's sole
authority, the result might well be fewer and less protective
regulations. In the long run, it is far better to have rules like
those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional
erroneous administration of the kind displayed by this record,
than either to have no rules except those mandated by statute,
or to have them framed in a mere precatory form.52
Caceres involved the potential suppression of evidence in a criminal
trial. 3 The Court acknowledged that civil cases brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act might present a different picture.53' Courts
routinely rely on Caceres, however, to uphold the validity of civil agency
actions when Service employees violate IRM provisions. 32 Moreover, I

529. Id. at 755-56.
530. Id. at 743. Lower courts have varied in their enthusiasm for applying Caceresin criminal
contexts. CompareUnited States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 541-42 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting in dicta
that the provision in the IRM requiring civil revenue agents to stop their investigation and turn the
matter over to special agents was mandated by the constitution) with United States v. Kontny, 238
F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing McKee as an "outlier[] ... reflecting a common but
perhaps excessive hostility to the Internal Revenue Service"). Both McKee and Kontny, however,
agree that "a taxpayer may challenge a conviction by relying on the Manual's provisions, so long
as the taxpayer's challenge was based on an alleged violation of a constitutional right." McKee,
192F.3d at 541; see Kontny, 238 F.3d at 819 ("It is true as we have noted that Caceresleft the door
slightly ajar by indicating that it might be a denial of due process to induce reasonable reliance on
the regulation and then pull the rug out from under the defendant .....
531. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754.
532. E.g., Groder v. United States, 816 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that to quash a
summons, "a taxpayer must show more than a mere violation of the Internal Revenue Manual. He
must show that the government proceeded against him in bad faith."); Vallone v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.
794, 808-09 (1987) (finding that failure to comply with IRM procedure for obtaining extension of
period of limitation did not necessitate suppression of evidence obtained after extension obtained);
Epstein v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. M. (CCH) 128 (1989) 1989-498 (failure to follow procedures set forth
in IRM did not invalidate statutory notice); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Goldman, 644 F. Supp.
101 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (failure to comply with IRM procedure for levying upon Individual
Retirement Accounts did not invalidate levy).
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shall discuss below how the Court's rationale applies as well in the civil
context as the criminal one.
RRA 98 elevates the IRM to the status of law in several circumstances.
Most obviously-because it is the only Code provision to explicitly refer
to the "Internal Revenue Manual"--section 7811 provides that whenever
a Service employee "is not following applicable published administrative
guidance (including the Internal Revenue Manual), [a Taxpayer Advocate]
shall construe the factors... in determining whether to issue a Taxpayer
'
Assistance Order in the manner most favorable to the taxpayer."533
Less obviously, but more importantly, section 1203 of RRA 98,
provides for the automatic termination of employment for any Service
employee who violates "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Department
of Treasury regulations, or policies of the Internal Revenue Service
(including the Internal Revenue Manual) for the purpose of retaliating
against, or harassing, a taxpayer, taxpayer representative, or other
employee of the Internal Revenue Service. 534
Section 1203 also describes nine other acts that automatically result in
termination of employment. 35 Together, they are known as the "10 Deadly
Sins"; the one involving the IRM is number six.5 3 6 If a taxpayer feels

harassed by a Service employee, the taxpayer can make a complaint and
the complaint is investigated by TIGTA, one of the external "checks" on

533. § 781 1(a)(3). I do not here include the common practice of codifying particular IRM
provisions. Doing so carries other dangers than the ones I address in the text. For example, RRA
98 added section 633 1(j) to require Service employees to make a "thorough investigation" of any
property before seizing it and sets out the requirements of a "thorough investigation." The Senate
Finance Committee Report explained that it was just codifying administrative procedures,
specifically former IRM section 56(12) and Policy Statements P-5-34 and P-5-16. S. REP. No. 105174 at 85-86 (1998). What the Report does not state, however, is that the draft provision would
have required the Service to consider (and document) obtaining writs of entry as part of every levy
investigation. While the Code makes no distinction between a "seizure" and a "levy" (and in fact
defines a levy as "seizure by any means" in section 6331(b)), the IRM labels levies of salable
property "seizures" and labels levies of nonsalable assets "levies." See I.R.M. 5.11.1.1.2; see supra
note 122 (discussing differences between levies and seizures). For example, if the Service demands
that the taxpayer's debtor pay the Service instead of the taxpayer, that is called a levy. If the Service
instead goes to the taxpayer, takes all of his or her accounts receivable and then sells them to a
factor, that is a seizure. So the taxwriters' mistake here was to "seize" upon the IRM provision that
dealt only with seizures and essentially require the Service to get a writ of entry for all levies on
private property, even though no one would suggest, for example, that the Service needs a writ to
enter a bank and serve a levy.
534. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 1203(b)(6), 112 Stat. 720 (1998). This is another off-Code provision. U.S.C.S. reprints it in the
Notes section under § 7804. Other commercial services may reprint it elsewhere.
535. Id. § 1203(b).
536. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Sixth Deadly Sin, 2001 TAxNoTEs TODAY 161-5 (2001) (Tax
Analysts Doc. No. 2001-22120).
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the Service discussed above. The vast majority of taxpayer complaints
under section 1203 involve the complaint that the Service employee is
misusing the Code, regulation, or IRM to harass the taxpayer.537 From the
effective date of RRA 98 (July 22, 1998) through May of 2000, TIGTA
investigated 830 such complaints of harassment.5 38 None were
substantiated and only 4 ofthe Service's 16,000 auditors were fired in that
period under section 1203, all for improper threats to audit.139 Typical was
the revenue agent who, after being arrested for drunk driving,
demonstrated once again that alcohol impairs judgment by telling the
arresting officer that he would "find out" about him and "have a good
time" with him.54°
By giving the IRM this kind of legal dimension, RRA 98 once again
shifts the formerly inquisitorial tax determination and collection process
into a more adversarial mode. First, it removes the decision over the
consequences of IRM violations from the Service to an external source:
either TIGTA, TAS, Appeals or the courts. That is, so long as the IRM is
simply a set of internal rules of action governing employee decisions, then
decisions of what to do about IRM violations are also kept within the
Service. This practice allows the manual instructions to be written as
precise rules to cover the majority of routine cases with the understanding
that nonstandard cases warrant a departure from the usual rules. Even
though the standards for departure may be vague, the agency culture sets
the boundaries and employees know the safe range of tax determination
and collection decisions they can make without being found to be
harassing the taxpayer. When the IRM is enforced by an external
investigator, however, then it becomes more difficult to justify a departure
from rules that now have the force of law. The agency becomes locked into
the decisions reflected in the IRM even when those decisions may be
inappropriate in a specific case. The scope of action is narrowed and

537. See Joint HearingBefore the Committees of the United States Senate and UnitedStates
House of Representatives 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (testimony of David C. Williams, Inspector
General, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration).
538. Amy Hamilton, Alleged IRS Harassment,No MisconductFound in 95 Percentof Cases,
2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 157-1 (2000) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2000-21262).
539. David Cay Johnston, Inquiries FindLittle Abuse by Tax Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2001, at Cl.
540. Id. In May of 2003, the Joint Committee on Taxation staff reported that from section
1203's inception through March 31, 2003, TIGTA and the Service together completed 3,970
investigations of alleged section 1203 violations, resulting in the resignation or removal of 203
employees, or 5.1% ofthe total (assuming one complaint per employee-multiple complaints would
raise the percentage). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORTOFTHE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY
THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 Appendix Ia (Comm. Print. 2003).
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employees are more constrained in their tax determination or collection
decisions.
The paralyzing effect of giving the IRM a statutory presence is well
documented. Each year sees articles and studies documenting significant
adverse effects of the ten deadly sins, including sin number six, on
employee performance and morale.54' Some commentators suggest that it
is significantly responsible for the well documented and highly publicized
decrease in certain Service collection activities.542 In this way, the
decisionmaking authority of the Service is vested in third parties. If a
Service employee takes a certain action, the taxpayer will complain and a
third party will adjudge the propriety of the employee's decision. The
reason for this rule, of course, is to prevent harassment and abuse of
taxpayers by Service employees. This rule is thus another example how
RRA 98 prefers autonomy values over truth values where before RRA 98
the preference ran the other way.
This shift to adversarial review of Service decisionmaking creates a
problem in tax administration in that the IRM becomes a much less useful
tool to enable employees to take appropriate actions. To the extent that
employees are constrained in their ability to depart from its specific rules
of action, the Service may make the IRM less specific and thus give less
guidance; this is the danger the Caceres Court warned about. For example,
section 6331 permits the Service to levy on any property of the taxpayer.
As discussed above, in an inquisitorial tax collection process the Service
(through a combination of the IRM and the employee's execution of the
IRM) makes the unilateral decision of what particular property to levy. At
one time, Service policymakers decided that an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA) should only be seized as a last resort.5 43 The IRM translated

541. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 538; Amy Hamilton, Ten Deadly Sins: Effective Tool or
Invitation to IRS Employee Harassment?, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 238-1 (1999) (Tax Analysts
Doc. No. 1999-39064); Ann Murphy & David Higer, The 10 DeadlySins:A Law With Unintended
Consequences, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 151-39 (2002) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2002-18023);
Sheppard, supra note 536.
542. Johnston, supra note 539.
One result of the new law has been extreme caution by I.R.S. workers, especially
those involved in sensitive audits and collections against those who owe taxes past
due, many of whom have become much less aggressive and others of whom say
dust gathers on their requests to managers for permission to take enforcement
actions. Collection has grown so lax that some prominent tax advisers said in
interviews last year that they were amazed that the I.R.S. was not trying to collect
taxes owed by their clients.
Id.
543. The policy used to be reflected in IRM 536(14). See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
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that policy into rules. IRAs could "not be levied upon except when the
taxpayer flagrantly disregards requests for payment" and even then, the
revenue officer was to determine whether the taxpayer was "relying upon
[the IRA] as the chief means of support, and if so, whether deprivation of
the amount would cause hardship." 5 "4If the revenue officer decided to levy
an IRA, then the levy form was to be initialed so that the reviewing
manager would be alerted of the revenue officer's intention. 45 In First
FederalSavings andLoan Ass 'n v. Goldman, the taxpayers alleged that the
revenue officer levied the IRA without making the appropriate
determinations and without initialing the form. 46 The court agreed with the
government that "the IRM is an internal handbook and.., the instructions
and guidelines contained therein are not mandatory and do not convey
upon the taxpayer any substantive rights. '
Now, however, while one can still argue that the IRM does not give
taxpayers substantive rights, an employee's disregard for the IRM could
result either in third-party disciplinary action or in the TAS issuing a TAO
to stop the collection action. Therefore, the Service may instead choose not
to translate its policy regarding IRAs into any set of specific criteria. In
fact, the current IRM has replaced the old language on IRA's with this new
' It is not
language: "Use discretion before levying retirement income."548
clear whether this particular change occurred because of RRA 98, but it
nonetheless illustrates the point: creating third-party adversarial "checks"
against abuse potentially reduces the internal checks as the Service
attempts to preserve administrative flexibility, and thus potentially reduces
the very protections sought.
2. Tax Determination as Adversarial Process
a. Burden of Proof
Section 7491 represents one ofthe more significant shifts to adversarial
process in RRA 98. That section provides that in "any court proceeding"
the Service bears the "burden of proof' with respect to any "issue" when
the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence" and meets certain other
criteria. 549 This is part of the adversarial view that taxpayers should have
better rights to be heard by a third party decisionmaker. As discussed

Goldman, 644 F. Supp. 101, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (reprinting the IRM provisions).
544, Id. at 102.
.545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. I.R.M. 5.11.6.1 (2001).
549. § 7491(a).
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above in Part Ill-B, the Service's judgment about a taxpayer's tax liability
was, pre-RRA 98, final for all practical purposes of the taxpayer having to
pay it. That is what made the process inquisitorial. The taxpayer had the
right to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker, but that neutral
decisionmaker was the Service and its decisions were treated like court
judgments. This insularity from review also gave the Service greater
discretion over what evidence was enough to support a tax liability
determination.
Doctrinally, this idea was captured in a presumption of correctness.
Whether evidenced by a notice of deficiency or an actual assessment, the
Service's liability determination carried a strong presumption of
correctness: taxpayers bore heavy burdens, both of production and
persuasion, before a court would look behind the notice or assessment to
exercise independent judgment about the determination.5 A narrow
exception for "naked" assessments applied when the Service asserted that
a taxpayer had unreported income but had only an arbitrary foundation for
the assertion. 5 ' Even then, the Service needed only to supply "ligaments
of fact" that supported the assertion (which could be based on hearsay or52
other inadmissible evidence) in order to gain back the presumption.
Once supplied, the taxpayers were once again under a duty to come
forward with specific evidence to overcome the presumption. 53 And the
"naked" assessment exception did not apply to just any issue or any case;
it applied only when the Service asserted unreported income and not when
' 554
the Service rejected "deductions or credits claimed by the taxpayer."
Section 7491 changes all that. It blows a hole in the presumption of
correctness. By weakening the presumption, it thereby shifts the tax
determination from inquisitorial to adversarial by removing both
decisionmaking and evidence-gathering powers from the Service to an
external third party. It is true that section 7491 speaks in terms of "burden
' It is also true that the
of proof' and not "presumption of correctness."555
committee reports attempt to distinguish the terms and explain that the

550. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1976) (stating that the general rule
would not apply in the "unusual" cases where the Service's determination that the taxpayer had
unreported income was so arbitrary as to be a "naked" assessment).
551. Id.
552. Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing a delightfully
mixed metaphor that deserves reprinting: "The tax collector's presumption of correctness has a
herculean muscularity of Goliathlike reach, but we strike an Achilles' heel when we find no
muscles, no tendons, no ligaments of fact."); see also Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 46 F.3d 382,
387 (5th Cir. 1995).
553. Sealy Power,46 F.3d at 387.
554. Id.
555. § 7491.
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term "burden of proof' really means just the burden of production.15 6
However, the presumption of correctness and the burden of proof "are for
the most part but the opposite sides of a single coin." 5" That is, the
presumption of correctness automatically relieves the Service ofthe burden
of production, regardless of which party has the ultimate burden of
persuasion. That is why many courts refer to it as a "procedural device."55
To the extent that section 7491 reimposes the burden of production upon
the Service, it logically destroys any presumption of correctness that would
otherwise apply. 59 And to the extent that the Conference Report signals
congressional intent not to disturb the presumption of correctness, it just
demonstrates the taxwriters' misunderstanding ofhow the provision affects
the inquisitorial nature of tax administration. Let's now look at how the
provision affects the system.
The effect of section 7491 will vary depending on whether the taxpayer
is contesting a proposed deficiency or claiming a refund. 56 ° Taxpayers
undertake a greater task in contesting assessments than in contesting
notices of deficiency. That is, once the taxpayer overcomes the
presumption of correctness attached to a proposed deficiency (generally in
Tax Court), the taxpayer then only bears the burden of persuasion as to the
incorrectness of the Service's deficiency claim. Therefore, unless the
Service introduces positive evidence to support its proposed deficiency,
what is sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness is generally

556. See H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 238-42 (1998). The Conference Report rather confusingly
seems to equate the term "presumption ofcorrectness" with the concept of "burden of persuasion"
and equates the term "burden of proof' as used in the statute with the concept of "burden of
production." See id. As with many other of the descriptions of current law sections in the
Conference Report, this one needs to be read with a skeptical eye that the taxwriters accurately
stated the law. In this case, the taxwriters cited only a blurb from DanvillePlywood Corp. v. United
States,which was a refund case. 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 586 (1989). As I explain in the text, the taxwriters
completely ignored the different burden assigned to taxpayers in Tax Court proceedings.
557. Carson, 560 F.2d at 695.
558. E.g., Danville, 16 Cl. Ct. at 593.
559. Id. But see Johnson, supra note 2, at 441 (noting that section 7491 "uncouples the two,
potentially shifting the burden of proof, but leaving the presumption of correctness intact").
560. I use my words advisedly. The distinction does not turn on what court the taxpayer is in
but on what the taxpayer seeks to accomplish in that court: to negate an asserted liability or to
recover a sum of money already paid. Generally, taxpayers contest proposed deficiencies in Tax
Court and claim refunds in district courts or the Court of Federal Claims. Too often overlooked as
tax litigation fora, however, are Bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy Code § 505 empowers bankruptcy
courts to determine tax liabilities. 1I U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (2000). In bankruptcy court, therefore, a
taxpayer may be contesting either an assessment already made, or may be contesting a liability for
which no assessment has yet been made, but which the Service claims is due, thereby being in the
same position-and arguably having the same burdens-as a taxpayer in Tax Court. See Raleigh
v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 26 (2000) (holding that the "burden of proof on a tax claim
in bankruptcy remains where substantive tax law puts it").
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enough to meet the burden of persuasion.56 ' In a refund suit, however,
when challenging an assessment, the taxpayer has to not only prove the
excessiveness of the assessment, but also has to then independently
establish the correct liability in order claim the refund.562 Thus, losing the
presumption of correctness in a deficiency proceeding is potentially more
damaging to the Service than losing it in a refund proceeding.
It may be that section 7491 is so "hedged... with.., conditions and
exceptions" that it can rightly be criticized on a theoretical level as a
"pernicious exercise in symbolic legislation" as Professor Johnson so
wonderfully describes it in his masterful dissection of the statute shortly
after it was enacted.563 Recent developments in contested deduction cases,
however, suggest that in practice section 7491 may indeed have
substantive bite as well as rhetorical bark.
It often happens that when a taxpayer claims a deduction the issue turns
on the subjective intent of the taxpayer. The only evidence may be the
taxpayer's own testimony. Under a strong presumption of correctness, if
the Service denies the deduction because it does not believe the taxpayer's
testimony, then that effectively ends that. The taxpayer can go to Tax
Court and offer the same testimony, but typically the Tax Court refuses to
make any independent evaluation of the taxpayer's credibility, instead
generally holding that the taxpayer's "'self-serving"' testimony is not
enough to rebut the presumption of correctness, and thus, in effect, relying
on the Service's judgment to uphold the proposed deficiency." That
practice is what makes the Eighth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court's
application of section 7491 in Griffin.v. Commissioner significant.565
Griffin was a garden-variety contested deduction case. There, taxpayers
husband and wife had paid property taxes on properties owned by a
partnership in which their wholly owned S corporation (but not themselves
personally) was a 60% partner. 66 They paid the taxes because the
partnership had defaulted.5 67 They deducted the payments from income,

561. While the IRM instructs Service attorneys to "develop, to the extent practicable, all
affirmative evidence to sustain the Commissioner's determination, even though [the taxpayer] has
the burden of proof of the issues," I.R.M. 35.5.1.2, that instruction is honored more in the breach
than in the execution. See Stephen G. Salley & Anthony J. Scaletta, The Incredible Taxpayer: The
US. Tax Court and I.R.C. § 7491, 77 FLA. B.J. 80, 82 (2003).
562. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1976); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S.
281, 283 (1932) ("The action to recover on a claim for refund is in the nature of an action for
money had and received, and it is incumbent upon the claimant to show that the United States has
money which belongs to him.").
563. Johnson, supra note 2, at 413, 427.
564. See, e.g., Salley & Scaletta, supra note 561, at 80-81.
565. 315 F.3d 1017, 1017 (8th Cir. 2003).
566. Id. at 1017-18.
567. Id. at 1018.
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falsely attributing them on Schedule E to property which they did in fact
own. 68 On audit, however, the Service discovered the deception and
denied the deduction.169 Generally, one cannot deduct amounts paid on
behalf of third parties, but if the payment qualifies as ordinary and
necessary for one's own business then the deduction is allowable. 70
Whether there is a sufficient connection between the payment and one's
own business is an issue of fact and in this case, as in many, depends on
the subjective intent of the taxpayer.5 71 In Griffin, the husband testified that
he was in the construction business (it said so on his Schedule C) and that
if banks learned that the partnership had defaulted, he would have a hard
time getting financing from the banks.5 72 He testified in all sincerity.5 The
Service attorney cross-examined him but introduced no other testimony. 74
The taxpayers then claimed that the testimony was just the kind of
credible evidence that should shift the burden of proof to the Service to
present evidence on why the deduction should be disallowed. 75 The Tax
Court disagreed, holding that "[o]n the basis of [Robert Griffin's]
testimony, we are unable to conclude that the tax payments would have
represented ordinary expenses to advance any business carried on in
[appellants'] individual capacities. 576 The Tax Court explained that the
testimony was not credible, for among other reasons, because the taxpayers
had reported the payments on Schedule E instead of Schedule C.5 7 7 The
Tax Court then added a CYA footnote: "Even if the burden of proof were
placed on [the Commissioner], we would decide the issue in his favor
based on the preponderance of the evidence. '"578
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that uncorroborated testimony of
the taxpayer was enough to shift the burden of proof to the Service.5 79 It
did this by focusing on one part of the definition of "credible evidence"
found in the Conference Committee Report: "the quality of evidence
which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which
to base a decision on the issue ifno contrary evidence were submitted

568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 1019.
571. See, e.g., Capital Video Corp. v Comm'r, 311 F.3d 458, 465-66 (Ist Cir. 2002)
(upholding Tax Court's refusal to shift burden of proof on basis of taxpayer's testimony).
572. 315 F.3d at 1020.
573. See id. at 1021.
574. Id. at 1019.
575. See id.at 1020.
576. Griffin v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2002-6; No. 7315-00,2002 WL 22016, at * 12 (T.C. Jan.
8,2002) (all but initial modification from Eighth Circuit opinion).
577. Id.
578. Griffin, No. 7315-00, 2002 WL 22016, at *9 n.4.
579. Griffin, 315 F.3d at 1021-22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss1/1

112

Camp: Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Parad

20041

TAX ADMINISTRATION AS INQUISITORIAL PROCESS

(without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS correctness).""58
Although not explicit about it, the circuit court apparently believed that the
taxpayer's testimony, taken alone, was "credible evidence" if it was
plausible taken at face value. 8' The error apparently committed by the Tax
Court was in evaluating the taxpayer's testimony in light of the other
evidence in the record. While that evaluation may go to weight, it does not
go to the "credible evidence" determination, according to the Eighth
Circuit. The taxpayer's uncorroborated testimony is, after all, "evidence"
and therefore it is sufficient to trigger section 7491 as long as it is plausible
when viewed in isolationfrom anything else in the record.
In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit apparently discounted the "critical
analysis" part of the "credible evidence" definition given above by
emphasizing that the testimony must be evaluated alone, "in the absence
of any evidence or presumptions to the contrary. '582 Apparently, "critical
analysis" does not involve comparing the taxpayer's testimony with other
evidence in the record, even if that other evidence makes the testimony,
literally, incredible.
To emphasize its dissatisfaction with the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit
included this pointed language in its remand instruction:
On remand, the tax court may reconsider all of the evidence
properly before it or hold a new hearing. In either case, the tax
court is instructed to make new findings of fact in light of the
shifted burden of proof. If the same conclusion is reachedby
the tax court without a new hearing, an explanation is
warranted as to how the existing record justifies the
conclusion
that the Commissioner has met his burden of
583
proof
It remains to be seen whether the Eighth Circuit's reasoning will be
adopted elsewhere.5 84 If so, it puts teeth into section 7491 and,
correspondingly, reduces the Service's ability to decide how much to count
or discount taxpayer testimony. As practitioners have already noted, there

580. H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 240-41 (1998) (emphasis added).
581. This would also be consistent with the Conference Report which goes on to explain that
"A taxpayer has not produced credible evidence for these purposes if a taxpayer merely makes
implausible factual assertions, frivolous claims, or tax-protestor type arguments." H.R. REP. No.
105-599, at 241 (1998).
582. Griffin, 315 F.3d at 1021.
583. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added).
584. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is unsound because it creates a paradox: testimony which
is incredible given the other evidence in the record, nonetheless, is "credible evidence" to shift the
burden of proof to the Service. It requires the Tax Court to turn a blind eye to anything except the
taxpayer's demeanor and the internal content of the testimony.
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are "hundreds of factual tax disputes in which subjective intent, behavior,
business purpose, valuation, or other issues [are] subject to testimony by
a taxpayer" on his or her own behalf. 5 Under the Eighth Circuit's rule, the
Tax Court can no longer dismiss taxpayer testimony under the presumption
of correctness cover. Practitioners are delighted at this potential "quiet
revolution," which, echoing Senator Roth's rhetoric, potentially
"rebalanc[es] the playing field between the IRS and the taxpayer. ,56
Thus, in section 7491 the reality of reform matches the rhetoric. But it
does so at a cost of shifting tax administration into a less efficient,
adversarial process. Shifting evaluation of taxpayer testimony to an
external third party adds little value to the tax administration process, at
least so long as the taxpayer believes that the opportunity to be heard
before the Service is meaningful. To the extent that the objection to the
prior process was that taxpayers did not, either in fact or in perception,
receive a fair hearing from the Service, the answer was not to turn the
Service from a decisionmaker into a partisan, but to reform the Service to
ensure its neutrality. By abandoning inquisitorial process for adversarial
process, the reformers simply conceded that the Service must necessarily
be biased against taxpayers and so made the understandably intuitive move
towards adversarial process, even if the extent of the move was
unanticipated.
b. Suspension of Interest
The legislative process that resulted in RRA 98 is replete with
egregious misunderstandings of tax administration. Although beyond the
scope of this Article, the taxwriters' (particularly Senate Finance
Committee staff's) ignorance and overt hostility towards the Service made
RRA 98 one of the most difficult pieces of tax legislation to process in
recent times. The suspension of interest provision, now codified in
section 6404(g), is a good example of both the ignorance and the
arrogance, as well as yet another example of how RRA 98 tilts towards
adversarial process values by implicitly denying Truth and so elevating
Autonomy values over it.
As discussed in Part II, most of the assessments made by the Service
result from the Service accepting the liability reported by the taxpayer.
While the Service generally has three years in which to select a taxpayer's
return for audit and decide whether the return was an accurate account of

585. Salley & Scaletta, supra note 561, at 80.
-586. Id.
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the taxpayer's
financial affairs," 7 it does so for only about 0.5% of the
588
returns.
Section 6601 provides that interest on any underpayment of tax runs
from when it should have been paid until it is actually paid. Thus, when the
Service audits a return and decides that it understated the correct tax
liability, section 6601 applies retroactively, reflecting the idea that the
Service has merely discovered the "true" tax liability and has not somehow
changed the taxes owed. In fact, however, just as most of the assessments
of tax do not result from audits, neither do most of the Service's accounts
receivable; they instead arise from properly reported, but unpaid,
liabilities.589 In other words, most accounts receivable do not involve tax
liabilities that were ever the subject of dispute.
The Senate Finance Committee was concerned about the running of
interest. Even though the Code gives the Service three years to review
returns, the Senate Finance Committee thought it unacceptable for the
Service to take more than one year to identify, evaluate, and decide
whether to propose a deficiency for any given return. Accordingly, the
Senate Finance Committee proposed a new provision, section 6604(g),
which would require the Service to suspend interest anytime the Service
"does not provide a Notice of Deficiency to the taxpayer" within one year
of the return being filed (or the due date, whichever was later).5 The
" '
provision applied only to taxpayers who filed timely returns.59
To someone ignorant of tax procedure, the provision might be sensible:
penalizing the government for not telling a taxpayer that the taxpayer's
return was wrong would encourage the Service to audit returns "promptly."
Even here, however, the provision could be reasonably questioned since
(a) it is inconsistent with the general three year limitation period, (b)
section 6404(e) already gives the Service discretion to abate any interest
and penalties which are "attributable in whole or in part to any

587. § 6501(a).
588. See supra notes 34, 91.
589. While I know this from my work at the Service, it can be inferred from the Statistics Of
Income (SOl) reports. For example, for FY 2000, compare Table 10 (Examination Coverage:
Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and Size
of Return) with Table 16 (Delinquent Collection Activities, Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000). INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 16 tbl. 10, 21 tbl. 16 (2000).
590. H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 3305 (1998) (emphasis added). RRA98 wound its way through
the legislative process mostly in the form of H.R. 2676. The House version passed the House on
November 5, 1997. See http://thomas.loc.gov (detailing the bill's history) (last visited Nov. 10,
2003). The Senate Finance Committee kept the number but struck the text and substituted its own
bill. As thus modified, the Senate passed H.R. 2676 on May 7, 1998. The Conference Committee
met on June 10, 1998 and produced its report on June 24, 1998. Id.
591. H.R.2676 § 3305.
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unreasonable error or delay" of a Service employee,592 and (c) putting an
artificial deadline might pressure Service employee's to propose
deficiencies on little evidence just to get the notice of deficiency out in
time, thus forcing resolution of the dispute at more expensive and formal
levels. Nonetheless, perhaps a bright-line "one year rule" would be easier
to administer.
To someone with knowledge of tax procedure, however, the proposal
contained two glaring errors. First, it automatically suspended interest after
one year unless the Service sent "a Notice of Deficiency." The term
"Notice of Deficiency," however, has a specific and limited meaning in the
Code: it describes a specific document that the Service sends out only
when proposed adjustments in income, estate and gift tax liabilities. For
other taxes and penalties, notably excise taxes, employment taxes, and the
Trust Fund Recovery Penalty imposed by section 6672, the Service does
not follow deficiency procedures and never issues a Notice of
Deficiency. 93 So, by making the Notice of Deficiency the necessary
document to prevent suspension of interest, the Senate Finance Committee
was proposing to give interest-free loans to taxpayers who misreported
excise and employment taxes.
The second error was worse. The proposal completely ignored the
common situation where a taxpayer correctly reported a liability but failed
to pay it. In those situations, the Service would never send a Notice of
Deficiency. There would be no deficiency. There would simply be an
unpaid tax liability, which thanks to the generosity of the Senate Finance
Committee, would run interest-free after one year with the Service unable
to do anything to restart the interest.
The proposal also evidenced hostility towards the Service in two ways.
First, Senate taxwriters repeatedly ignored Service technical experts who
had caught the error and urged the Senate taxwriters to change the
provision. 9 4 Second, the proposal reveals a distrust of the Service in that
it bypasses section 6404(e) and removes from the Service the ability to
decide, first, what is a "delay" and, second, whether the delay is caused by
Service employees or the taxpayer. Implied in the Senate Finance
Committee language is the assumption that all delays of more than one
year are the Service's fault: "[T]he Committee is concerned that accrual of
interest and penalties absent prompt resolution of tax deficiencies may lead
to the perception that the IRS is more concerned about collecting revenue

592. § 6404(e)(1)(A).
593. § 6672.
594. I myself heard two Treasury representatives attempt to explain the consequences of the
provision, only to be cut off by the taxwriters.
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than in resolving taxpayer's problems. 595 That statement is only true if the
reason for the delay is the Service's fault.
The Conference Committee fixed both errors. As enacted,
section 6604(g) replaced the "Notice of Deficiency" language with "a
notice to the taxpayer specifically stating the taxpayer's liability. 5 96 The
replacement language is now broad enough to cover all types of notices,
including demands for payment (which are the typical notices sent out
when a taxpayer reports but does not pay a liability). The enacted statute
also explicitly provides that it does not suspend interest "with respect to
'
any tax liability shown on the return."597
That fixes the problem of a
taxpayer sending in a return but not sending in the money.
Even as "fixed," however, the provision still illustrates the shift
towards adversarial process values and the lessening importance of the
idea of a "true" tax liability. As noted above, it puts the Service under the
gun to produce a deficiency within one year. To the extent that the Service
employee cannot obtain and sort through and judge the information needed
to make a decision, the employee might simply propose a high adjustment,
one with plenty of "water" in it, simply to get the notice of deficiency out
the door, thinking "Let Appeals sort it out." The statute thus denigrates the
truth-seeking function of inquisitorial process and elevates the importance
of the adversarial process entailed in using a third-party decisionmaker (be
it Appeals, or the Tax Court or district court). And it does so in order to
serve an arguable autonomy value: saving taxpayers from paying a fair
market rent on the use of the government's money.
3. Tax Collection as Adversarial Process
As discussed in Part III-B, the Service historically enjoyed broad
administrative collection powers. Section 6331 authorized the Service to
levy on "all property and rights to property" of the taxpayer. Aside from
the narrow categories of property exempted from levy under section 63 34,
Service employees could seize any asset they could find. Statutes such as
5 99
the Anti-Injunction Act5 98 and Supreme Court rulings such as Flora
forced taxpayers into the inquisitorial tax collection process and denied
them access to adversarial process until after their asserted tax liabilities
were paid.
Most of the rhetorical thundering during the Senate Finance Committee
hearings was directed at the Service's alleged collection abuses,

595.
596.
597.
598.
599.

S. REP. No. 105-174, at 64 (1998).
§ 6404(g)(l)(A).
§ 6404(g)(2)(C).
§ 7421.
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960).
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particularly in making bad decisions about what assets to seize and in
executing the seizures. It is not surprising, therefore, that the strongest
moves towards adversarial process are found in the RRA 98 provisions
concerning tax collection. Although many of the RRA 98 provisions deal
with collection matters, I will only use two to illustrate my thesis: the
requirement to obtain court approval to seize homes, codified in
section 6334(a)(1 3) and (e); and the "collection due process" provisions
codified in sections 6320 and 6330.600
a. Seizure Restrictions
RRA 98 very straightforwardly shifts collection to adversarial process
by requiring the Service to obtain a court order before seizing certain
significant assets of the taxpayers, notably their homes. Specifically,
section 6334(a)(13) adds new categories of property exempt from levy. If
the amount to be collected by the levy is $5,000 or less, then not only is the
taxpayer's principal residence exempt from levy, but so are any non-rental
properties owned by the taxpayer and used by someone else as a home.
Further, these assets are absolutely exempt. If the amount to be collected
is more than $5,000, then the taxpayer's principal residence is still exempt,
unless the Service chooses to obtain court permission to seize it per section
6334(e). 60 ' Section 6332(e), in turn, requires written approval from a
district court for seizure and then only if the court "determines that the
taxpayer's other assets subject to collection are insufficient to pay the
amount due. 60 2
Here again, Autonomy triumphs over Truth. The Senate Finance
Committee explained that it
is concerned that seizure of the taxpayer's principal residence
is particularly disruptive for the taxpayer as well as the
taxpayer's family ...
and is not justified in the case of a small
deficiency.... Accordingly, the Committee believes that the
taxpayer's principal residence or business should only be
seized to satisfy tax liability as a last resort ....
63
While one might criticize the statutory policy choice of protecting
Autonomy over Truth, the point here is to see how the policy choice

600. Thus, I will not consider, for example, the Spousal Protection provisions added to § 6015,
which also provide for limited judicial review of Service decisionmaking.
601. § 6334(a)(13)(B).
602. Judicial approval was added in Conference. See H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 285 (1998).
603. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 86 (1998).
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reflects a distrust of inquisitorial process checks and so substitutes
adversarial process checks.60 4
b. Collection Due Process
The most elaborate adversarial checks on the Service's tax collection
decisionmaking are contained in the massively misnamed "Due Process"
provisions, codified in sections 6320 and 6330. 1 will first review how they
were proposed, then how they were enacted, and then how they have been
implemented by the Service. In so doing I will discuss how they shift the
inquisitorial collection process into an adversarial process.
As proposed by the Senate (there was no comparable provisions in the
House Bill, of course, because these ideas came out of the Senate
Hearings), the collection due process provisions were a dramatic departure
from previous law. The Senate Finance Committee proposal, adopted by
the full Senate, would have required that before the Service could make
any levy against a taxpayer and before it could file any Notice of Federal
Tax Lien (NFTL), it had to give the taxpayer 30 days to request a hearing
before Appeals. 605 During that 30 days no lien filing or levy was permitted,
unless the Service went through special jeopardy procedures.60 6 The
hearing was to be a "kitchen sink" hearing: that is, the taxpayer would be
able to contest the proposed action on any grounds, including "challenges
to the underlying liability as to existence or amount., 6 7 If the taxpayer did
not like the result of the hearing, the taxpayer had 30 days to take it to Tax
Court and, from there, to the Courts of Appeals.608 Meanwhile, during all
this time, "the levy actions which are the subject of the requested hearing"
were suspended.' °9 If the taxpayer took no appeal, then the suspension
lasted for 90 days after the final determination from which the taxpayer
had not taken the appeal.610 While the Service could still propose other
levy actions, since each one was subject to the same process, the taxpayer
could essentially freeze collection.
604. The check itself is vague. Since a federal tax lien will always protect the Service's claim,
it is difficult to imagine the need for a "last resort" seizure on realty. It is thus difficult to imagine
the Service ever successfully seizing a taxpayer's home. Of course, the statutory test is not strictly
a "last resort" test; it is simply whether the taxpayer's other assets could raise enough to pay the
liability. But, the Committee Reports make clear that collection alternatives such as installment
agreements and offers in compromise should also be preferred over seizures. S. REP. No. 105-74,
at 87 (1998). How the Service and courts will balance the statutory language with the expectations
set out in the Committee report remains to be seen.
605. S.REP. No. 105-174, at 68 (1998).
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. § 6330(3)(1).
610. Id.
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As proposed, the Senate's due process provisions effectively made the
taxpayer the decisionmaker on tax collection, completely reversing prior
law. The Service could not make a move without taxpayer approval. If the
taxpayer did not approve of a levy, the taxpayer would invoke the hearing
process and could do so for each and every discrete tax collection decision.
It was a tremendous shift of power to the taxpayer. While prior law
required a single notice of intent to levy at least 30 days before the first
levy, in section 6331(d), the Service was afterwards free to levy on any
property of the taxpayer it could find without further notice. 61' Under the
Senate proposal, the taxpayer was automatically given at least 30 days to
hide assets each time the Service went looking and, more importantly, to
sell assets before the tax lien could protect the government's claim. The
proposed provisions gave the taxpayer a perpetual timing advantage over
the Service and forced the Service to play a perpetual game of catch-up.
As enacted, the due process provisions do not put quite as much
decisional power in taxpayer hands. Basically, they require that before the
Service makes itsfirst levy, and within 5 days after the Service files its
first Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL), the Service must give the
taxpayer 30 days to ask for a "fair hearing" before an "[i]mpartial officer"
from the Office of Appeals.612 The hearing is widely known as the
Collection Due Process hearing, or CDP hearing. The taxpayer thus gets
only a maximum of two CDP hearings for each tax liability being collected
and is not given an opportunity to sell assets before the NFTL is filed.61 3
The CDP hearings are also modified in scope from the kitchen sink
hearings proposed by the Senate. The taxpayer may still raise any
arguments as to why the levy should not go forward or why the NFTL
should be removed, except that the taxpayer can challenge the underlying
tax liability determination only if the taxpayer "did not receive any
statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability., 614 Appeals must give a
written decision and the taxpayer then has 30 days to appeal to a court,
either the Tax Court, if it otherwise hasjurisdiction over the underlying tax
liability, or the district court if the Tax Court is not available. 615 Filing in
the wrong court is not fatal: the taxpayer has 30 days from the
determination of an incorrect filing to re-file in the right court.61 6

611.
Fla. Mar.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.

See, e.g., Glover v. Walters, No. 72-363-civ-JLK, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14608 (S.D.
17, 1972).
§§ 6320(a)(2)(c),(b), 6330(a)(2)(c),(b).
§§ 6320(b)(2), 6330(b)(2) (only one hearing per tax period).
§§ 6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(B).
§§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(l)(A).
§§ 6320(c), 6330(d)(I)(B).
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As enacted, the due process provisions still significantly shift the
collection paradigm away from inquisitorial to adversarial on a number of
levels. First, and most obviously, is the ability of the taxpayer to make the
Service a litigant in an adversarial action in court over collection decisions
once the tax determination has been made. Instead of making the collection
decision, the Service must justify its decision to an external third party and
must hold off on all levy actions while the CDP hearing process winds its
way through its various stages. The Service no longer calls the shots.
Second, and less obviously, the collection due process provisions also
undermine the Service's tax liability decisionmaking. Recall that the preRRA 98 statutory scheme gave the Service's assessment the force of
judgment: taxpayers were not allowed to contest it, either in wrongful levy
proceedings or through an injunction action or in any other way, until after
fully paying it. While they could get one pre-payment bite at the judicial
apple whenever the Service had proposed a greater liability than the
taxpayer had reported, once the Service made the assessment, it had free
reign to collect the tax. That is no longer true. Taxpayers can not only raise
collection arguments in the due process hearing, they can still raise
substantive tax arguments in those situations where they show they had not
received a notice of deficiency, or did not "otherwise have an opportunity
to dispute" it.617 In other words, the Service's determination oftax liability,
as reflected in the assessment, no longer provides the strong basis for
collection that it did pre RRA 98. Third, the provisions implicitly contain
a conception of "due process" that taxpayers have the right to be heard
before an impartial decisionmaker and the Service is not an impartial
decisionmaker: it is instead an adversary.
As enacted, the collection due process provisions meet the declared
goal of the Senate Finance Committee to use the kryptonite of adversarial
process to reduce the Service from a supercreditor to an ordinary creditor.
Perhaps the most telling statement in the Senate Finance Committee
Report is the one declaring that "taxpayers are entitled to protections in
dealing with the IRS that are similar to those they would have in dealing
with any other creditor."6 8 This is especially revealing because (1)
taxpayers deal with "any other creditor" through adversary process and (2)
the statement completely ignores the fact that, unlike private creditors, the
Service has not voluntarily assumed the risk of nonpayment by dealing
with taxpayers.619

617. §§ 6320(c), 6330(c)(2)(B).
618. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 67 (1998).
619. See William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade
I, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 606 (1968) (discussing why state debtor-creditor laws should not apply to the
Service).
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As implemented, the CDP provisions have been a boon to tax
protestors and a pain to everyone else. As of July 31, 2003, a review of the
LEXIS database shows that since RRA 98's enactment, courts have
decided 328 appeals from CDP hearings. Of those, at least 145 involved
taxpayers who could reasonably be called tax protestors.62 ° The following
chart summarizes the data, demonstrating that both tax protestor cases and
cases in which courts feel compelled to impose monetary sanctions on the
taxpayer are becoming an increasing percentage of the judicial inventory.
2001

2002

2003 (to
June 30)

Total

33

179

94

328

3

4

5

4

16

0

4

7

90

44

145

0

0

1

25

33

59

1999

2000

Total CDP Cases
Reported

0

22

TP Wins
(reversal/remand)

0

Tax Protestor
Cases
Sanctions Imposed
Against TPs

I

I

As might be expected, taxpayers have not been very successful in their
newfound access to adversarial process. Only 16 of the cases can remotely
be construed as taxpayer "wins," almost all of which were on a procedural
point (such as Mesa Oil and Keene discussed below), whereas in 58 cases
(all in 2002 and 2003) not only did the taxpayer not "win" but one or more
courts imposed monetary sanctions. While still general, these numbers
suggest that the CDP provisions do little good and much harm. Scholars
who have studied the matter in greater depth have reached similar
conclusions: "as currently applied, the CDP provisions in fact provide few
taxpayer rights, require significant administrative and judicial resources,
delay the collection of unpaid tax liabilities, and may adversely impact the
'
public's perception of the fairness of the tax system. "621
Part of the CDP provisions failure in implementation is that their shift
to adversarial process does not fit well with the traditional inquisitorial
620. The Service of course, cannot call them that because RRA 98 § 3707 (another off-Code
provision) forbids the Service from labeling any taxpayer "as [an] illegal tax protester[] (or any
similar designation)." The language probably also prevents the Service from referring to this class
as "taxpayers formerly known as tax protesters."
621. Danshera Cords, How Much Process is Due? IRC Sections 6320 and 6330, Collection
Due ProcessHearings,(forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
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paradigm.622 The Service and the courts have struggled with just how much
adversarial process the collection due process provisions require and how
much of the old inquisitorial process they allow. The Service's regulations
and procedures generally work to channel taxpayers away from the CDP
hearing, which gets judicial review, to what it calls the "equivalent
hearing," which does not. The Service, understandably, pushes for internal
over external review. For example, while the statute requires a CDP
' the regulations provide that
hearing "if the person requests a hearing,"623
"[t]he taxpayer must make a request in writing. '24 Likewise, the Service
sends out the CDP notice as a part of its series of generic collection
notices. Administratively, the decision makes sense, but it also hides the
CDP notice among all the other information being sent to the taxpayer and,
more importantly, triggers the 30 day period when there is no specific levy
or seizure contemplated. In other words, the Service has set the system up
to minimize taxpayer opportunities to have a meaningful review in an
adversarialforum. In exchange, the Service's process gives taxpayers
ample opportunity to be heard in the traditional inquisitorial administrative
review. Taxpayers can always request and receive the "equivalent"
hearing. Further, regulations provide that "Appeals will consider the same
issues that it would have considered at a CDP hearing on the same
matter.,

625

Courts also appear conflicted onjust how the CDP requirements should
be implemented, with some being more sensitive to the traditional
inquisitorial role Appeals has historically played and others being more
sensitive to the newer adversarial process rights implied by the statute. The
conflict is seen, for example, in the debate over just what rights the
statutory term "hearing" confers on the taxpayer. The essence of a hearing
in an adversary process is the ability to control evidence: to call witnesses,
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to present to the neutral
622. CDP hearings may also serve the purpose of giving taxpayers at least the perception of
having "voice" in the collection process, thus promoting acquiescence to the collection decisions.
To the extent that giving taxpayers voice is a laudable goal of tax administration, there is nothing
inherent in an inquisitorial system that denies voice. Taxpayers can participate as actively in a
system where the decisionmaker is also the evidence-gatherer as they can in a system where the two
functions are separated. To the extent, however, that giving taxpayers voice means giving them
control over the information presented, then that does conflict with inquisitorial, but not adversarial,
process. That is how Isuggest the issues regarding the development of the CDP hearings be framed.
623. § 6320(b).
624. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(c)(2). The Service is less stingy when the shoe is on the other
foot. Section 7602(c)(I) provides that the Service must give the taxpayer "reasonable notice in
advance" of third-party contacts. § 7602(c)(1). Like the language in sections 6320 and 6330, this
language does not specifically require written notice. The Service here interprets the silence the
other way, providing that the "notice may be given either orally or in writing." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7602-2(d)(1).
625. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(i)(2).
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decisionmaker the evidence supporting the story being told.626 Thus, when
in Davis v. Commissionerthe Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that he had the right to subpoena witnesses to the CDP hearing,627 that was
a decision disfavoring adversarial process. The Court emphasized the
traditional informality of Appeals procedures and declined to require
changes.628 Likewise, in Lundsford v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
majority refused read the statutory term "hearing" as requiring an actual
opportunity for the taxpayer to physically appear in front of an Appeals
Officer. 629 Instead, the Court decided that it would determine on a case-bycase basis whether a face-to-face hearing was required and, since the
taxpayer's only substantive issue was a loser on paper, a hearing was
"neither necessary or productive" to the tax administration process. 63 0 The
spirited dissent in Lundsford argued that since the statute required a
"hearing" then that was what the taxpayer was entitled to, regardless of
whether it looked necessary. 631' After all, the taxpayer might develop
arguments at the hearing itself.632 Interestingly, the Lundsford dissent relied
in no small part on the Senate Finance Committee Report633 which, as
discussed above, was explaining the considerably more adversarial
provisions passed by the Senate and not the toned-down CDP provisions
enacted by Congress.634
The issue of what kind of record should be made of CDP hearings has
caused tension between the Service and the courts. It also illustrates the
implementation choices between adversarial and inquisitorial process.
"One of the most basic rules of adversary jurisprudence is that the
evidentiary facts on which a decision rests must be found in a record

626. See generally John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. Cm.
L. REV. 823 (1985).
627. 115 T.C. 35, 40-42 (2000).
628. Id.at 41 ("The references in section 6330 to a hearing by Appeals indicate that Congress
contemplated the type of informal administrative Appeals hearing that has been historically
conducted by Appeals ....
").
629. See 117 T.C. 183, 183, 188-89 (2001).
630. Id. at 189; see also Bartschi v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (2002). Other courts have
disagreed with Lundsford on the question of whether the substantive issue was a loser. See Erickson
v. United States, No. 6-01-20798-JF, 2002 WL 57179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14,2002) (remanding
case back to Appeals because Form 4340 without a 23C date was not sufficient verification that a
liability existed despite Lundsford Court's finding to the contrary).
631. Lundsford, 117 T.C. at 195-96 (Laro, J. disssenting).
632. Id. at 191-92 (arguing that denial of face-to-face hearing was denial of taxpayer's right
to present his case).
633. Id. at 194-95.
634. The Service's regulations try to split the baby; they provide that while CDP hearings need
not be held in person, nonetheless if the taxpayer thinks to ask for a physical hearing, then Appeals
must offer one at the Appeals office closest to the taxpayer's home or business. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6330-1(d)(2).
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constituting the exclusive basis for decision. Without this rule, hearings
could be rendered meaningless and judicial review might be totally
frustrated."63
Traditionally, the Service has not created formal records of Appeals
proceedings.636 In Mesa Oil, Inc. v. UnitedStates, however, a district court
in Colorado held that it could not provide effective judicial review without
a record of the hearing and so remanded back to Appeals to create a
verbatim record. 637 The Service nonacquiesed, citing to Davis. 638 Nothing
in Mesa Oil's reasoning, however, requires verbatim transcripts and later
courts have not followed that aspect of the case, although they have
approved of its general reasoning that "there must be enough information
contained in the documentation created by the IRS for a court to draw
conclusions about statutory compliance and whether the AO abused his or
her discretion. ' '639 And indeed, the adversarial pressure of the CDP
provisions makes it very difficult to disagree with the general reasoning
that the CDP hearing must, at the end of the day, produce some record
which can be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Taxpayers, however, have pressed the issue of a verbatim transcript.
They have latched onto I.R.C. section 7521(a), which provides that if a
taxpayer gives sufficient advance notice, the taxpayer may "make an audio
recording of such interview at the taxpayer's own expense and with the
taxpayer's own equipment."' Section 7521 was enacted as part of TBOR
I and applies to "any in-person interview with any taxpayer.""' Taxpayers
argue that they can therefore make their own recording of the CDP hearing
because they are being "interviewed" by the appeals officer." 2 The Service
has strongly resisted." 3 First, the Service notes that the= CDP provisions
uniformly use the word "hearing" while section 7521 uses the term
"interview."" 4 An "interview" is different from a "hearing." A taxpayer is
generally required, or even compelled, to attend an "interview" whereas a

635. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 742 (5th ed. 2002).
636. See SALTZMAN, supra note 87, 9.05[3].
637. No. Civ.A 00-B-851, 2000 WL 1745280, at *7 (D.C. Col. Nov. 21, 2000) (This record
may be made either through audio tape recording, video tape recording, or stenographer; along with
all paper documents presented by the parties .....
638. 2001-34 I.R.B. 174.
639. Mesa, 2000 WL 1745280, at *7; accord Rohner v. United States, No. 5:02-CU-2309,
2003 WL 21456733, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2003).
640. §7521(a)(1).
641. § 7521(a). This section was added by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6233 102 Stat. 3342 (1988).
642. Keene v. Comm'r, No. 1604-02L, 2003 WL 21525479 (T.C. July 8, 2003).
643. Id.
644. Id.
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taxpayer voluntarily attends, indeed initiates, an in-person "hearing. 645
The Service has put its views in the CDP regulations,
there stating that "[a]
6
transcript or recording.., is not required.",
So when Curtis B. Keene asked to record his CDP hearing, the Service
said "no way." Keene said "way" and got his "way" in Tax Court. In Keene
v. Commissioner,the Tax Court majority held that the Service must allow
a taxpayer who fulfils the section 7521 requirements to record a CDP
hearing." 7 The Court's opinion is itself yet another good argument for why
the Service should abandon the silly practice of writing regulations in
question-and-answer format." The majority dismissed the regulation as
just "a description, in general terms, of the conduct of a section 6330
hearing" and not itself a rule." 9 On the merits of the position, the Tax
Court majority thought the Service's position was "tenuous and
unpersuasive.
The Service had the better argument. 65 ' A CDP "hearing" is not an
"interview" within the meaning of section 7521, but not for quite the
reasons the Service gave. An "interview" is part of the evidence-gathering
process. The only other statute in the Code which uses the term
"interview" is section 7491, the burden of proof shifting statute.65 2 One of
the requirements for a taxpayer to claim the benefit of that statute is that
the taxpayer "has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for
witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. 653 In other
words, the taxpayer must show that he cooperated with the Service's
evidence-gathering requests. When the Service "interviews" the taxpayer
or a witness, it is for the purpose of making a tax determination or tax
collection decision. As discussed in Part III, this is an integral part of the
inquisitorial process of tax determination. Appeals does not "interview"
taxpayers in that sense. The function of Appeals has never been to conduct
an examination but only to provide administrative review of examinations
645.
646.
647.
648.
the logic

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2).
Keene, 2003 WL 21525479.
The best argument, of course, is that the Q&A format makes it harder to read and follow
of the rules to apply to issues which are not posed in a hypothetical question. I should

emphasize that these CDP regulations do about as good ajob inthe Q&A format as can be expected
and their drafting reflects extraordinary care and attention to the difficult issues raised by the CDP
provisions. That such carefully drafted regulations failed intheir central purpose to provide binding
guidance to taxpayers is all the more reason for the Service to abandon that useless format.
649. Keene, 2003 WL 21525479.
650. Id.
651. The Service has conceded the Keene issue and is formulating procedures to allow
taxpayers to record CDP hearings. See Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-031 (Sept. 11, 2003),
reprinted in 2003 TAx NoTES TODAY 180-9, 6 (2003) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2003-20586).
652. § 7491.
653. § 7491(a)(2)(B).
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already completed. IfAppeals believes that the administrative file does not
support the proposed deficiency, the IRM instructs that the case be
returned to the examination function to collect better evidence. 654 Thus,
while Appeals is part of the tax determination decisionmaking process
(and, in reviewing collection decisions, part of the tax collection
decisionmaking process) it is not part of the evidence-gathering process.
Judge Chiechi's careful review of section 7521's legislative history
supports this interpretation as well.655
This last issue points up the struggle over the identity of Appeals:
should it continue its traditional role as part of the Service's
decisionmaking process or should it embrace a new role as a protoadministrative court, independent of the Service and before whom the
Service becomes an "other," a litigant? Having one foot in the historical
inquisitorial process and one foot in the RRA-98-mandated adversarial
process additions, where Appeals fits in the tax process is a puzzle
confronting the Service, courts, and Appeals. Requiring transcripts of CDP
hearings or, in what amounts to the same thing, permitting taxpayers to
make their own recordings, pushes CDP hearings before Appeals in the
adversarial process direction far more than necessary. So long as the CDP
hearing results in "a" record sufficient for judicial review, the adversarial
process requirements are satisfied. A verbatim transcript is not needed, and
tilting Appeals towards becoming a "mini-me" Tax Court is unwise.
Courts who are more sensitive to the historical inquisitorial nature of
tax determination should have no trouble holding that, at the time
section 7521 was added to the Code, tax administration was still
inquisitorial and this reform fit that model quite well. The RRA 98

654. See I.R.M. 8.2.1.2 (2001):
The appeals officer will make a preliminary review as soon as possible to
determine whether a nondocketed case should be returned to the originating
compliance function. If the case requires further significant action or could
probably have been disposed of without referral to Appeals, it should be returned
without delay. See also Chapter 8.1, General, for cases where an appeals
conference is not appropriate. The appeals officer does not act as an investigator
or examining officer, but is not precluded from requesting additional information
or evidence if required. However, Appeals should not accept a case if it must
obtain substantial additional information or evidence. The following
circumstances, which are not all-inclusive, are grounds for returning a case ....
,ld. While this language is written for "nondocketed" cases, I.R.M. § 8.2. 1.1 provides that the entire
chapter applies to all types of cases in Appeals unless another chapter contains more specific
contrary instructions.
655. Keene v. Comm'r, No. 11604-02L, 2003 WL 21525479 (T.C. July 8,2003) (Chiechi, J.
dissenting).
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additions of the CDP provisions should not be allowed to warp the fit of
that particular piece of the Tax Code puzzle.
4. Evidence-Gathering as Adversarial Process
RRA 98 created fewer restrictions on the Service as evidence-gatherer
than on the Service as decisionmaker. Three provisions,
however-section 7612 (source code restrictions), section 7602(c) (third
party contact restrictions), and section 7525 (restrictions on access to
certain taxpayer communications to federally authorized tax
practitioners)-nudge the evidence-gathering process from inquisitorial to
adversarial. As with the other reforms, while the enactment represents
potential shift, the degree of shift will be determined more in
implementation by the Service and interpretation by courts than in
enactment.
First, the most straightforward restriction on the Service's informationgathering powers is section 7612, which prevents the Service from
obtaining source code software, unless the Service follows strict
procedural requirements and meets certain conditions. The statute further
provides that when the Service seeks to enforce the summons in court, "the
court shall, at the request of any party, hold a hearing to determine whether
the applicable requirements of this subsection have been met.

' 65 6

The

Senate Finance Committee Report explains that while one animating
concern wasothat computer software might be inadvertently disclosed to a
competitor, the "Committee also believes that the indiscriminate
examination of computer source code by the IRS is inappropriate. 657 Thus,
although the animating concern for the statute may have been gardenvariety congressional micro-managing, the statute's very terms diminish
the Service's evidence-gathering powers by changing the nature of the
enforcement proceeding from a summary proceeding to a full-blown
adversary proceeding.
Second, RRA 98 revised section 7602 to restrict third-party contacts.
That is, section 7602(c) now provides that a Service employee "may not
contact any person other than the taxpayer" until after giving the taxpayer
"reasonable notice in advance ... that contacts with persons other than the

taxpayer may be made." While the provision does not outright forbid third
party contacts, it is still a potentially important restraint on the Service's
ability to obtain information.
As discussed in Part II, taxpayers generally have the information the
Service needs to make the tax determination or tax collection decision. For
practical reasons, Service employees generally turn to taxpayers first for

656. § 7612(b)(4).
657. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 72(1998).
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needed information. Even so, third party contacts are still necessary for
several reasons. First, Service employees may need to contact third parties
simply to find the taxpayer, who may not be at the address in the Service's
records. Third parties such as the Post Office, the Division of Motor
Vehicles, and state or local taxing authorities might have helpful
information. So might current or former clients, coworkers, employers,
former spouses, or former neighbors. One can imagine, however, a
significant difference between choosing to contact public agencies where
the information might be a matter of public record, and contacting thirdparties who may have personal relationships with the taxpayer. Secondly,
taxpayers are sometimes less than forthcoming with the information they
possess. In those cases, the Service needs to be able to look to alternative
sources for the information. Again, those sources might be public records
or might be sources with personal relationships with the taxpayer. Third,
and most often, the Service needs to verify the information provided by the
taxpayer. Again, depending on the particulars, Service employees have a
range of sources to choose from to verify information.
Section 7602(c) on its face broadly shifts tax administration towards
adversarial process by restricting the Service's ability to decide where to
gather the evidence necessary to make the tax determination or collection
decision. While the section 7602(c) hurdle is more procedural than
substantive, it gives taxpayers another opportunity to make the Service
justify its information-gathering decisions to a third party. For example, in
United States v. Jillson, the Service issued summonses to two of the
corporate taxpayer's officers, who were also "significant shareholders"
owning 100% of the corporation.65 The Service did not notify the
corporation that it intended to summons the officers.659 The district court
quashed the summons because the Service had not obeyed section 7602(c)
and therefore failed to meet the fourth Powell requirement of following all
applicable administrative steps.660
The Jillsoncourt's rhetoric illustrates how section 7602(c) changes the
relative value of Autonomy and Truth. The court emphasized that
"Congress established a series of procedural safeguards to protect
taxpayers from overreaching by IRS investigations. One of the most
important of these safeguards is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c)." 66' The
court emphasized that even though the two summoned officers controlled
the corporation, they still fell into the literal language of the statute because
they were "person[s] other than the taxpayer. ,662 Noting that the purpose

658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

No. 99-14223-CIV, 1999 WL 1249414, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 1999).
Id. at *2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
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of the pre-contact notice was to require the Service to seek the information
first from the taxpayer, the court concluded that "failing to provide a notice
of contact letter prior to serving the summonses... denied [the taxpayer]
the opportunity to resolve issues and volunteer information prior to
was harmed
contact, and as such [the taxpayer] was not only harmed, but
663
in the very way Section 7602(c) was enacted to remedy.
The Jillson court's rhetoric follows on that of Congress. Section
7602(c) was added by the Senate Finance Committee after the September
1997 hearings. In explaining the reasons for the provision, the
Committee's Report states: "Such contacts may have a chilling effect on
the taxpayer's business and could damage the taxpayer's reputation in the
community. ' '6' Recognizing that this autonomy value was affected more
by some types of contacts than others, the Report goes on to say-in
contradiction to the broad language of the statute-that "[c]ontacts with
government officials relating to matters such as the location of assets or the
taxpayer's current address are not restricted by this provision., 665 Using
regulatoryjudo, the Service has flipped this statement from mere precatory
verbiage into law by including it in its regulations.666
The regulation itself demonstrates the potential impact of
section 7602(c) on the Service's information-gathering powers. It contains
no less than twenty-four different examples of widely varying situations
where the Service's ability to acquire information is affected by the
statute.667 Each situation requires a delicate and difficult decision on the
degree to which the statute restricts Service employees. Naturally, more
times than not, the regulation explains why section 7602(c) does not
restrict the choices of evidentiary sources that Services may make. To read
the regulation, however, is to see the myriad ways in which the Service
regularly interacts with third parties and acquires information about
taxpayers.
The third restrictive provision added by RRA 98 is section 7525.
Section 7525(a)(1) provides that a taxpayer may keep secret from the
Service any communications made to a federally authorized tax
practitioner ("FATP") "to the extent the communication would be
considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and
an attorney." Academic and practitioner commentary on section 7525 has
been extensive.668 I will not add much to it here except to note that the

663. Id.
664. S. REP. No. 105-174, at 77 (1998).
665. Id. at 77.
666. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-2(0(5) (statute "does not apply to any contact with any office of
any local, state, Federal or foreign governmental entity").
667. See id. § 301.7602-2.
668. For academic commentary see generally Steve R. Johnson, TaxAdvisor-Client Privilege:
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provision is a blatant slap at the Service's information-gathering powers
since it is only good against the Service, not against any other government
agency. 669 Further, regardless of its actual utility, it is a significant
symbolic shift to adversary process, if read as an attorney-client privilege
analog. Historically, the attorney-client privilege subordinates the need for
information to determine truth to the need for a sphere of autonomy in
which taxpayers can conduct their affairs free from government
interference. 67" And it may well be that the statute's protection is more
symbolic than real. The first extensive opinion on the matter, UnitedStates

An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 98 TAxNoTEs TODAY 35-89 (1998) (Tax Analysts Doc.
No. 98-7027) (critiquing House proposal); Louis F. Lobenhofer, The New Tax Practitioner
Privilege: Limited Privilege and SignificantDisruption,26 Omo N.U. L. REV. 243 (2000); Paul
R. Rice, The Tax PractitionerPrivilege:A Sheep in Wolfis Clothing,98 TAX NoTES TODAY 148-66
(1998) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 98-24228); Alicia K. Corcoran, Note, The Accountant-Client
Privilege:A Prescriptionfor Confidentialityor Justa Placebo?,34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 697(2000);
Therese LeBlanc, Note, Accountant-ClientPrivilege: The Effect of the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, 67 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 583 (1999); Alyson Petroni, Note, Unpacking
the Accountant-ClientPrivilege Under I.R. C. Section 7525, 18 VA. TAx REV. 843 (1999).
For practitioner commentary see generally Edward Brodsky, The New FederalAccountantClient Privilege, 221 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1999); Howard S. Fisher, The Limited Scope of the New Tax
Adviser-Client Privilege, 23 L.A. LAW. 20 (2000); Phillip W. Gillet, Jr., The Federal Tax
Practitioner-Client
Privilege(I.R.C.Section 7525): A Shieldto Cloak ConfidentialCommunication
or a Daggerfor Both the Practitionerand the Client? 70 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 129 (2001);
Robin L. Greenhouse & James L. Malone III, Privilegein the IRSAudit Process-Howand When
Does it Apply?, 91 J.TAX'N 133 (1999); Bruce Kayle, The TaxAdviser'sPrivilegeIn Transactional
Matters: A Synopsis andA Suggestion, 54 TAx LAW 509 (2001); Terry L. Lantry, Be Careful What
You Ask For, You May Get It: With the Client-AccountantPrivilege You May Have Gotten Less
Than You Thought, 77 TAXES, June 1999, at 31; Michael M. Lloyd, The New FederalAccountantClient Privilege: A Taxpayer Protection or a Toothless Tiger?, in FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF TAXATION REPORT 1 (Summer 1999); Dan L. Mendelson et al., The New CPA-Client
ConfidentialityPrivilege,29 TAX ADVISOR 676 (1998); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, The
CPA Tax PracticePrivilege-LessThan Meets the Eye, 97 TAXNOTES TODAY 210-55 (1997) (Tax
Analysts Doc. No. 97-29757) (critiquing House proposal); William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby,
Tax Practitionersand Burden ofProof,98 TAX NOTES TODAY 156-71 (1998) (Tax Analysts Doc.
No. 98-25530); Lee A. Sheppard, What Tax Advice Privilege?98 TAXNOTES TODAY 128-3 (1998)
(Tax Analysts Doc. No. 98-21218); Christopher S. Rizek, When Is Tax Practice 'Legal'?, LEGAL
TIMES, July 5, 1999, at § 24.
669. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998) (stating that the privilege "should be available in
noncriminal proceedings before the IRS and in noncriminal proceedings in federal courts with
respect to such matters where the IRS is a party"). Ironically, for all the rhetoric about how
taxpayers have fewer rights than criminals, the statute does not protect communications against the
Service in criminal proceedings, just civil ones.
670. The modem justification for the attorney-client privilege is basically an instrumentalist
one preferring Autonomy to Truth. See, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The HistoricalCycle
in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern
Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 241, 243 (2002).
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v. KMPG LLP,6 7 1 is widely viewed in the tax practitioner community as
having reduced section 7525 to a nullity.67 2 Regardless of its actual impact,
however, the provision still indicates RRA 98's tendency to shift tax
administration from inquisitorial to adversarial process in that it purports
to protect Autonomy (the ability to confer with one's tax advisors) at the
sacrifice of Truth (evidence to determine the "true" tax liability).
Much of the eTfect of the RRA 98 provisions on information-gathering
cannot be measured because decisions to forgo certain information or
certain sources of information are not captured in any database. A quick
look at what data is available-the outcome of summons enforcement
proceedings-shows no diminution in the Service's almost unbroken string
of successful summons enforcement actions. For example, in 2002, the
courts judged the appropriateness of a summons in 44 instances, mostly in
the context of enforcement proceedings brought by the government but
also in some motions to quash.6 73 In none of those proceedings did the
Service fail to obtain judicial enforcement of its summons, although in 6
cases it had to settle for less than the full amount of information requested
by the summons.6 4 In all other cases, however, the summons was fully
enforced.675 Thus, to outward appearances, the core of the Service's
inquisitorial powers-its power to gather the information it needs to
determine taxes-remains intact after RRA 98.
V. CONCLUSION

Taxwriters and academics have given insufficient thought to what
process model tax administration should follow. This article has argued
that thinking about tax administration as an inquisitorial process is the
most coherent and sensible approach to understanding the procedural
aspects of the tax code puzzle and proposed reforms should be evaluated
in that light. The justification for inquisitorial process is the need for the
information that underpins voluntary compliance and the need to ensure
that taxpayers properly determine and pay their true and proper tax
liability. RRA 98 shows how reforms that attempt to promote autonomy

671. 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002).
672. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: No Privilegefor Tax Planning,2003 TAX NOTES
TODAY 9-9 (2003) (Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2003-1290). The KPMG opinion is actually incoherent.
It denies the § 7525 privilege for a tax opinion prepared by an accountant on the grounds that it was
created to aid in the preparation of a tax return and so the taxpayer could not have the requisite
intent to keep the document's contents confidential. See KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43. The
court then, without explanation, decided that the attorney-client privilege nonetheless applied to
at 44.
the exact same tax opinion, this time signed by a lawyer and not an accountant. See id.
673. See table supra note 159.
674. Id.
675. Id.
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values through an adversary process paradigm are, literally, sense-less
when applied to an existing inquisitorial regime. While there are limits, the
Service and courts have choices in how they implement and execute the
RRA 98 reforms. In light of the purpose and history of tax administration,
and in light of the poor understanding of these matters by the RRA 98
taxwriters, the choices should be towards minimizing adversarial process
aspects of the reforms in favor of interpretations more consistent with the
historically inquisitorial process paradigm.
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